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The ontological source of Dasein's Being is not 
'inferior' to what springs from it, but towers 
above it in power from the outset; in the field 
of ontology, any 'springing-from' is degenera­
tion. If we penetrate to the 'source' ontologi- 
cally, we do not come to things which are ontically 
obvious for the 'common understanding'; but the 
questionable character of everything obvious opens 
up for us.
Martin Heidegger
PREFACE
The often turbulent but nevertheless short history 
of psychology as a science reveals a strange and often 
strained relationship with its parent, philosophy. At its 
inception psychology received its identification by revolting 
against philosophy and basing itself on a model patterned 
after the natural sciences. The revolt occurred in the 
late nineteenth century and since that time both psychology 
and the philosophy it so rigorously denounced have changed. 
But despite the change the basic antagonism has persisted.
In recent years, however, there has been a movement within 
the broad field of psychology which has sought the establish­
ment of a cordial and productive relationship with philoso­
phy. This movement, initiated in Europe, has now spread to 
the United States.
As we look back from the vantage point of contempo­
rary thought, various forces involved within the movement 
can be discerned. There were sporadic voices calling for 
a detente on both sides but the major impetus for dialogue 
came primarily as a result of a "new" philosophy which 
seemed to be speaking directly to those psychologists 
involved in confronting the multi-faceted problems, pains
vii
and sufferings of fellow human beings. This new philosophy 
was identified as existentialism.
At this point our historical vision begins to nar­
row down the general relationship between psychology and 
philosophy to a specific identification of psychotherapy 
and philosophical anthropology. This is not to negate 
experimental psychology or philosophy of science in the 
form of logical positivism or empiricism, but merely to 
emphasize the former relationship.
In the United States, existentialism began to titi- 
late various psychologists because of its identification 
with humanistic perspectives. Many psychologists, Gordon 
Allport, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Hollo May to mention 
a few, were already predisposed to a humanistic orientation 
so that the arrival of existentialism as a philosophy seemed 
to open up avenues of communication.
The burgeoning interest within psychology over the 
new philosophical orientation appears to have become 
explicitly formulated with the publication in 1 9 5 8 of 
Existence; A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, 
edited by Hollo May, Ernest Angel guid Henri Ellenberger. ^ 
This publication stimulated a wide-spread interest within 
psychology so much so that a lasting detente between psy­
chology and philosophy was established.
^Hollo May (ed.). Existence: A New Dimension in 
Psychiatry and Psychology (New York; Simon and Schuster,
viii
The "New Dimension" referred to in the subtitle of 
Existence relied heavily on existential philosophy, a 
philosophy which surprisingly had a longer heritage than 
initially realized and came replete with names and theories 
of various philosophers. It was also discovered that some 
European psychotherapists had been operating with existen­
tial themes for several years. The most notable of these 
therapists was Ludwig Binswanger. It was Binswanger who 
had taken the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and utilized 
it as the basis for a viable psychotherapeutic model. As 
far as psychologists--and philosophers--in this country 
were concerned the name Martin Heidegger played a prominent 
part in the dialogue between philosophy and psychology.
As such, he was identified as a principal contributor to
2
the philosophy of existentialism.
When Heidegger's major work. Sein und Zeit became 
available in English in 1962 it seems to have been met, 
for the most part, with a predisposition towards seeing it 
as an existential document. Since that time, however, sub­
sequent re-evaluations of Heidegger's philosophy, following 
his own protest at being identified with existential phi­
losophy and philosophical anthropology, has revealed that
2
The history behind this identification, complex 
as it is, will not be pursued at this point except to men­
tion that for psychologists the acquaintance with Heidegger 
came primarily from Paul Tillich and Ludwig Binswanger.
See May's two introductory essays in Existence, pp. 3-91.
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there ^  a different Heidegger. It is becoming more 
obvious that to identify Heidegger exclusively with existen­
tialist ideas and themes is, in a way, to miss that which 
he is trying to say. It is now believed by some that 
Heidegger's philosophical works, inclusive of Being and 
Time, are not necessarily existential pronouncements con­
cerning the "nature" of man. Robert Scharff, for instance, 
has commented that if division one of Being and Time is 
seen in context with division two there is less of a ten­
dency to see Heidegger as an existentialist. If this is 
the case, Scharff continues, there appears to be less of a 
discrepancy between the so-called earlier and later 
Heidegger. Scharff observes, "the stated intentions and 
the plan of the whole of Being and Time deserve serious
3
reconsideration."
What if Scharff's observations are correct, that 
the Heidegger initially seen as existentialist is not that 
at all? What does this do to the position of those phi­
losophers and psychologists who initially saw Heidegger as 
an existentialist? Does this negate Heidegger's contribu­
tion to the detente between philosophy and psychology?
The issue here is compounded by the fact that Ludwig 
Binswanger, the principal figure involved with using the
3
Robert C. Scharff, "On 'Existentialist' Readings 
of Heidegger," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, II, 
Nos. 1 & 2, p. 7.
philosophy of Heidegger for a psychotherapeutic paradigm, 
stated a few years before his death that he had misunder-
stood Heidegger. How is all of this to be assessed?
The position taken in this dissertation is that 
Heidegger's philosophy, inclusive of both later and earlier 
phases, is not to be seen as basically existential but as 
a conçern with "Beingness as such"; i.e., Heidegger attempts 
to discern the way things are in that they are. He is not
seeking properties or substances that reside within things
but the fundamental characteristics "things" reveal in their 
Beingness--in their "that they are." This is referred to 
by Heidegger as the ontological difference.^ As I hope to 
demonstrate in this dissertation, seeing Heidegger this 
way will not only retain the detente established between 
psychology and philosophy but, indeed, put it on a firmer 
foundation.
In order to accomplish our task of revealing a non- 
existential Heidegger and one who has important contribu­
tions to make to psychology, an exposition of his thought 
will be undertaken. This exposition will be aided in its 
development by using primarily the published works of, and 
information gathered from my personal conversations with, 
Medard Boss.
^See p. 13 below.
5
See pp. 5 1 -5 3 above, also Chapter III, especially
p. 1 3 3 .
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Medard Boss and Martin Heidegger have been personal 
friends for over thirty years. Having studied in person 
with Heidegger and having developed a psychotherapy out of 
Heideggerian philosophy puts Boss in the unique position of 
participating in the dialogue between philosophy and psy­
chology first hand. Boss, a Swiss psychotherapist, has 
called into question Binswanger's interpretation of Heidegger; 
he has also attempted to show that the Heidegger who asks 
the question of the meaning of Beingness as such, does 
have something to say to and for psychotherapy and, by 
implication, for science itself.
Whereas some of the works of Boss have been available 
in English as early as 19^9 critical evaluations have been 
lacking.^ Perhaps this is due to Binswanger's large influ­
ence in this country and the general belief that since 
Binswanger and Boss are both "Heideggerian" and both call 
their psychotherapies Daseinsanalysis, their positions are 
fundamentally the same. It will be demonstrated that this 
is not the case.
In 1971 Boss published his major work Grundriss der
7
Medizin. A review of this work by John Glenn Gray brought 
this comment. Grundriss, "provides a new perspective on
To my knowledge, as of 1973, not one doctoral dis­
sertation, either in philosophy or psychology has been 
written directly concerning the thought of Medard Boss.
7
Medard Boss, Grundriss Der Medizin (Bern: Hans
Huber Verlag, 1971).
xii
psychiatrie theory and practice and one that Americans 
ought to be exposed to as soon as possible."^ The perspec­
tive has been here for several years, perhaps the phi­
losophy of our time as well as the psychology is just now 
catching up to it.
* * * * *
In the introduction (Chapter I) of this disserta­
tion I attempt to demonstrate how the labels "existential­
ist" and "philosophical anthropologist" were given to 
Heidegger. In this chapter I also deal with the change 
that takes place in Heidegger's language after the publi­
cation of Sein und Zeit. Why did this change come about? 
How does it effect Heidegger's initial questions as found 
in Sein und Zeit? I also introduce Boss and clarify his 
identification with Heidegger's thought via his various 
publications. As well, a demonstration, without explana­
tion, is given of how Boss uses Heidegger's thought in his 
psychotherapy.
In the second chapter I am primarily concerned with 
elucidating the phenomenological method as used both by 
Heidegger and Boss. A distinction is made between the phe­
nomenology of Husserl and Heidegger including an exposition 
of Heidegger's phenomenology as "laying-bare" that which
8Personal letter June 26, 197^- Gray was acting in 
his capacity as review editor for the Heidegger series of 
Harper and Row Publishers. At this date, Grundriss will 
be published in English, at least in part.
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has been covered. As well, Boss' use of phenomenology is 
presented along with three examples.
In Chapter III I am concerned with developing the 
meaning of Da-sein especially as seen with its identifica­
tion with the German term Lichtung. What is the relation 
of Da-sein and Beingness as such? What is Er-eignis?
What are the existentialia? How do they function in respect 
to Da-sein? Is the identification of existentialia with 
matrices, world-designs and so forth justified? How does 
Boss see the existentialia especially in light of his 
psychotherapy?
Whereas in Chapter III I am primarily interested 
in revealing the equiprimordial characteristics of Da-sein, 
in Chapter IV I am interested in revealing Da-sein as 
Being-in-the-world. This chapter begins with the issue of 
"Care" as an a^ priori. What does Heidegger mean by a^ 
priori ? The question of non-immanence is pursued with its 
important epistemological implications. When Da-sein 
knows something, is this knowing a "representational idea"? 
As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein is "with" things as well as 
other Da-seins. This notion of "other" is referred to by 
Heidegger as Being-with. What does Being-with entail?
Many of the basic criticisms of Heidegger revolve around 
this element of his thought. An attempt will be made to 
reveal the weaknesses--misunderstandings--involved in these 
criticisms by looking at three examples. Also in this
xiv
chapter is a discussion concerning the effect of Heidegger's 
Being-with on psychotherapy.
In the fifth and concluding chapter I develop a 
philosophy of science gleaned from the Heideggerian corpus.
1 also attempt to show how this philosophy of science has 
led to the development of Daseinsanalysis. Heidegger says 
that science is in a fog as to its essence. What does this 
mean? When science works exclusively with abstractions does 
it not distort the phenomena? Can a science operate along 
the guidelines of Heidegger's thought? Have the existen­
tial, humanistic psychologists, in restoring "dignity" and 
"personhood" to their science, overcome the problems found 
by accepting a reductionistic paradigm based on the natural 
sciences? Whereas in the previous chapter criticisms of 
Heidegger are reviewed, in this chapter (five) I will look 
specifically at some of the criticisms of Boss' Daseins­
analysis .
In summary, there are basically two problems dealt 
with in this dissertation. First, Heidegger has been pri­
marily identified as an existentialist and as doing philo­
sophical anthropology. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger's 
own protest at being identified an existentialist is justi­
fied. This necessitates an exposition of his thought, 
one which will reveal the similarities in content between 
the so-called earlier and later Heidegger. Secondly, 
Heidegger's philosophy was instrumental in the development
X V
of existontial psychology in this country primarily because 
it was identified as existential. I will demonstrate that 
seeing a different Heidegger, i.e. a non-existential 
Heidegger, reveals a relevance for psychology that is more 
important, even more revolutionary, than when he was seen 
as an existentialist. This relevance will be revealed 
through Daseinsanalysis. To accomplish both an exposition 
of his thought, justifying his protest, and his relevance 
for psychology I will use the works, my personal conversa­
tions with, and the psychotherapy of Medard Boss.
X V I
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1. Martin Heidegger
The history of philosophy appears to get its sense 
of mobility from what might be referred to as revolutions 
of thought. The common element characteristic of these 
revolutions is the abandonment of one orientation and the 
framing of another. Yet the abandonment can never be 
fully complete for that which has been abandoned pervades 
that which has been framed or adopted as being the "from 
which" that initiates the spring into the "towards which" 
that represents the goal--the new orientation itself. 
Expressed differently, the one who revolutionizes does so 
by revolting from within the "from which." It provides the 
impetus to move on, or toward the "toward which." Thus, he 
who introduces a revolution is to a certain degree caught 
within the milieu "from which" he makes his revolutionary 
pronouncements. The dialectical relationship involving 
what is called the "from which" and the "toward which" is 
seemingly inseparable.
Two examples of the binding quality of revolutionary 
thought can be discerned in the pronouncements of Copernicus
1
2and Descartes. Whereas the former was bold, even 
courageons, enough to state the opposite of the existing 
Wo J-tanschauung, he nevertheless retained various notions 
about the fixed stars and celestial spheres. Descartes' 
daring attempt to rest philosophy on solid ground with the 
revelation of the Cogito nevertheless capitulated to a 
scholastic argument for proving God's existence.
It thus would appear that however bold and revolu­
tionary a thinker might be he is tied with apparent neces­
sity to that "from which" he revolutionizes.
Our century is far from being without revolutionary 
thinkers; indeed, one of the boldest qtade his philosophic 
debut in 1927. Yet if the above thesis holds, then even 
he is a product of that "from which" he has revolted and 
perhaps in subtle ways that are just now being realized.
In our time, Martin Heidegger is a thoroughly 
revolutionary thinker.^ He has called into question a 
subtle "world attitude" (metaphysics) that has lasted for 
some 2,000 years. In essence, the revolution of Heidegger 
rests in his bringing into relief and hence questioning
J. L. Mehta, paraphrasing the words of Otto 
PBggler, has stated concerning Heidegger: "To label him
as an existentialist, the propounder of a heroic nihilism, 
as a myth-maker, as a metaphysician in the traditional 
sense or a phenomenologist, or as a pseudo-theologian or 
a mystic, is to overlook him as a thinker and to miss com­
pletely the originality and the profoundly revolutionary 
character of his thinking." (emphasis mine) J . L% Mehta, 
The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1 9 7 1), p. 6 .
3the legitimacy of a thinking which grounds itself in the 
objectification of a self and/or a subject— the establish­
ment, in other words, of substantiality.
Yet the difficulties in fathoming his thinking are 
legendary and battles over interpretation legion. He has 
been called an atheist, an existentialist, a nihilist, a 
Nazi, and subversive. Some early followers have deserted 
his banner, saying they had misunderstood him. Yet his 
influence on theology, even though charged an atheist, has 
been overwhelming and his influence on psychotherapy has
been revolutionary in and of itself. However, some still
2
say, "There is nothing new in Heidegger."
Could it be that the difficulty Heidegger himself 
has had in pursuing the question of Beingness as well as 
that of interpreting and understanding him lies on this 
side of his revolution, the "from which" that he revolted? 
And to make the issue even more perplexing, could it be 
that Heidegger's thinking is revolutionary in not just a
single sense but possibly two? After all, his basic work,
3
Being and Time was claimed to be the initial revolutionary 
statement of existentialism. This is a claim that Heidegger
2
Personal conversatici with Charles Hartshorne, 
Arlington, Texas, 19?0.
3
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and
Row, 1 9 6 2 ); henceforth referred to as B & T, the first page 
number referring to the English translation, and the page 
number preceded by "H" referring to the original German.
4himsell' disclaims. Yet the influence Heidegger has had on 
psychotherapy, as well as on other disciplines, has come 
mainly through seeing him as an existentialist. If this 
is the case then the Heidegger who rejects the label exis­
tentialist would seemingly have nothing to say about, to, 
or for psychotherapy. Rudolf Allers, in his book Existen- 
tialism and Psychiatry, has stated that as far as a phi­
losopher having an impact on psychiatry, "Only one, namely
4
Heidegger, has gained influence. . . . "  In that same 
work. Allers states that although he agrees that Heidegger 
had great influence on psychiatry up to 1929, "The later 
speculations of this philosopher seem to have had nothing 
to say to psychiatry and an immediate bearing on psychiatry 
is, indeed, difficult to imagine."^
Does this latter charge by Allers stand? The answer 
is a resounding No! If it does not stand then what could 
possibly have led to such a charge? A provisional answer 
is the failure to adhere to the cardinal rule for under­
standing Being and Time; it is a work in ontology, and to 
render any part of it ontically is to push it into an 
anthropology. To do so not only distorts the original 
intent of Being and Time but further increases the likelihood
4
Rudolf Allers, Existentialism and Psychiatry 
(Springfield: Charles C~, Thomas Publisher, 1 9 6 1) , pT 33.
In reference to Sartre Allers states " . . .  only one, 
Sartre, has made explicit statements on psychiatric, espe­
cially psychoanalytic, questions," p. 33.
^Ibid., p . 9 2 .
5of seeing the early Heidegger as distinctly different from 
the later. Specifically why.does this failure seem to 
occur over and over again, not only with psychotherapists 
but philosophers as well? This question reveals one of 
the fundamental problems of Being and Time, not only for 
the reader of that work but for its author as well. In 
his attempt to state the revolutionary question of the 
meaning of Being, Heidegger s vehicle for stating the 
question was a language permeated by metaphysical structure-- 
structuie which the question of the meaning of Being was 
attempting to clarify (ground). Heidegger's difficulty 
with Being and Time was that experienced by all revolu­
tionary thinkers: he was forced to communicate with and
from within the framework that was the impetus for his 
revolutionary thinking; i.e., he was "speaking" from within 
the "from w h i c h . E v e n  though he specifically took
Heidegger himself says in the Preface to Richard­
son's Through Phenomenology to Thought that the process of 
Being and Time, . . remained captive to contemporary
modes of (re)presentation and language. . . p. xiv.
He has also said in "Letter on Humanism," referring to the 
terms found in Being and Time, "I have come to be convinced 
that even these terms must immediately and inevitably lead 
astray. For the terms and their corresponding conceptual 
language were not rethought by the readers from the thing 
which had-to-be-thought-first; instead, this thing was 
imagined through terms maintained in their usual significa­
tion." "Letter on Humanism" in William Barrett and Henry 
Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. Ill (New 
York: Harper and Row, 197l) , p. 220, Jl L. Mehta's work,
reflecting on the basic failure to understand the issue 
raised in Being and Time, says that the failure was due in 
part, ". . . to the ineradicable and deep-seated habituation
to the modern way of thinking. Man is conceived as a subject 
and all reflection on man is taken as anthropology," p. 3 8 .
6measures to avoid this through the adoption of various 
neologisms, he nevertheless was not able fully to disengage 
himself from this hold. The disengaging occurred only 
later and accounts for the seeming disparity between the 
earlier and later Heidegger. The difference lies in the 
expression, not the content. As Heidegger states in a 
recent publication of a work originally written in 1 9 3 6 ,
The difficulty, however, still remains that one's 
own ownness (essential character) must be talked about. 
Concerning this matter, self-deceptions are unavoidable 
even where an interval of time has occurred between 
what was formerly given (saic). This does not mean 
that "Sein und Zeit" has become something in the past 
for me. I have not "advanced" even today, for this is 
due to the fact that I am not allowed to "advance"; 
but perhaps I have come even closer to that which I 
attempted in "Sein und Zeit."7
But the problems of understanding the content of 
Heidegger's Being and Time do not all rest with Heidegger. 
After introducing the initial problems, Heidegger explicitly 
apologizes for the "awkwardness and inelegance" of the 
expression used and takes specific note of the fact that 
what is being done is not reporting about entities but
7Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Abhandlung über 
das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (Tubingen; Max Niemeyer 
Verlag, 1971) , p% 229. (my translation) In his Nietzsche 
book, Heidegger has said, "If there is such a thing as a 
catastrophe in the creative activity of great thinkers, 
it lies not in the fact that they suffer shipwreck and 
make no advance but rather that they 'move on,' i.e., let 
themselves be influenced by immediate appeal , which is 
always the result of a misunderstanding of their thoughts. 
What is fatal is always the mere advancing 'further,' 
instead of staying behind at the source where one starts," 
Nietzsche, Vol. I, pp. 337-338, quoted in J. L. Mehta's 
The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York; Harper and 
Row, 1972) , p i p .  36-37.
7attempting to group entities in their Being. "For the
latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above
g
all, the 'grammar'."
Throughout Being and Time Heidegger explicitly 
warns the reader to be careful in understanding particular 
points or phrases, a warning that has apparently often 
gone unheeded. The following represents only a sampling 
of such warnings.
The Existential Analytic is designated by Heidegger 
as an attempt to disclose the ontological structure of 
Da-sein. One of these structures, the Understanding 
(Verstehen), is said by Heidegger to be not a knowledge 
derived from an acquaintance with something but is a pri­
mordial kind of being (ontological) which makes knowledge--
g
and understanding--possible. And further, he states that 
the Understanding is not to be thought of in the sense of 
cognition that grasps something thematically.^^
Projection (Entwurf), a fundamental structure of 
the understanding, is often confused with a thematically 
conceived project; yet Heidegger warns, "Projection has 
nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that 
has been thought out. . . .
& T, p. 63; H, 39.
*^Ibid. , p. l6l; H, 124.
^^Ibid., p. 385; H, 336.
^^Ibid., p. 1 8 5 ; H, 1 4 5 .
8A specific development of the understanding is
called by Heidegger "Interpretation” (Auslegung). Through
interpretation the understanding develops as understanding.
Yet understanding and interpretation, which are the same
things, are, for Heidegger, still seen ontologically.
Thus, Heidegger warns that "in interpreting, we do not, so
to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing
which is present-at-hand; we do not stick a value on 
12it. . . ." All things encountered within-the-world
already have an involvement and it is through interpreta­
tion that these involvements get disclosed.
The Existential-Analytic is in itself an "Interpre­
tation." Heidegger states, ". . . i t  may not be superfluous 
to remark that our own interpretation is purely ontological 
in its ai m s , and is far removed from any moralizing critique 
of everyday Dasein, and from the operations of a 'philosophy 
of culture
The structural whole of Da-sein as ontological is
called "Care" (Serge). Yet Heidegger warns that "Care
cannot stand for some special attitude towards the 
14
self. . . . "  It is purely an existential-ontological 
designation and is not to be confused with worry or
^“Ibid., p. 190; H, 149.
l^ibid., p. 2 1 1 ; H, 1 6 7 .
^^^Ibid. , p. 237; H, 1 9 3 .
9carerreeriess, or even love.^^ And further on, referring 
again to the existential-ontological Interpretation of 
Care, he says, "What it has in view is not a set of ontical 
properties which constantly keep emerging, but a state of 
Being which is already underlying in every case and which 
makes it ontologically possible for this entity to be 
addressed as 'Cura'." (Emphasis mine.)^^
One of the most difficult and hence confusing ele­
ments of the Heideggerian analytic is the meaning behind 
the term Entschlossenheit or, as translated by Macquarrie 
and Robinson, "Resolution." This term does not mean what 
the translation suggests. Heidegger states, "One would 
completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if 
one should want to suppose that this consists simply in
taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recom-
17mended, and seizing hold of them." Further on, in Being
and Time, Heidegger states that the existential analysis
"cannot, in principle, take into consideration what Dasein
J'ac tually resolves, only the question of ontological "résolu- 
18lion itself." And still further, he states, "Resoluteness 
would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose
l^ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 244; H, 200.
^?lbid., p. 345; H, 2 9 8 .
^^Ibid., p. 434; H, 3 8 3 .
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that it would be actual as 'Experience' only as long as
the 'act' of resolving 'lasts
These few examples reflect a style within Being
and Time which is definitely intended by the author to be
20a warning to the reader not to be led astray. But this 
"style," if it can be called that, is not used specifically 
with reference to the important concepts of authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit). 
Nevertheless, Heidegger does attempt a clarification and 
distinction which can easily be overlooked. For instance, 
Heidegger states that the "inauthenticity of Dasein does 
not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of 
Being." In fact, as he explains, even a Dasein in the 
"fullest concretion . . . can be characterized by inau-
thenticity--when busy, when excited, when interested, when
l^ibid., p. 443; H, 391.
20There are several more places in Being and Time 
where Heidegger specifically warns the reader; for instance: 
He warns against accepting the ontological structure of 
what is given as obvious, without need of further investi­
gation. P. 152; H, ll6. Modd or "state-pf-mind" is present 
in any cognitive determination but this should not be seen 
as a surrendering of science ontically to 'feeling.'
P. 177; H, 1 3 8 . The term "fallen-ness" is not to be under­
stood in an ontical sense of being bad or deplorable.
P. 220; H, 1 7 6 . Nor is it to be seen as a "corruption of 
human nature." P. 224; H, 179* We must not confuse 
"ontico-existentiell characterization with ontological- 
existential Interpretation." P. 229; H , l84. Do not assume 
too much from the term "uncanniness." P. 253; H , I8 9 . 
"World-hood" does not signify the adding up of a "world" 
of objects and welding it together with a subject. P. 236; 
H, 1 9 2 .
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21ready f or enjoyment.” There is a significant difference 
between an authentic man as seen by existentialism and an 
authentic Da-sein as seen by Heidegger.
Despite these attempts at clarification, the 
thinking of Being and Time has been revolutionary in its 
impact and equally revolutionary in its being misunder­
stood. One of the basic theses found in this dissertation 
is that the thinking of Heidegger is revolutionary on two 
accounts. First, Heidegger has attempted a critical analy­
sis of the objectification of self, or what amounts to the 
same thing, grounding man in transcendental subjectivity. 
This is a manifestation of a substantival metaphysics.
Yet this general metaphysical atmosphere was (and is) so 
prevalent, even in the structure of language, that Heidegger 
himself was seen to perpetrate this thinking on a new scale. 
The aspect of this rendering of Heidegger has been to push
him to varying degrees, into what can generally be called
22philosophical anthropology. The second revolution of
& T, p. 6 8 ; H, 43.
22An example can be drawn from Ludwig Binswanger's 
interpretation of the Heideggerian corpus. Binswanger saw 
B & T as disclosing the structural unity of Man's existence, 
hence grounding Man in Transcendental subjectivity--a 
subjectivity that "endows” or imposes Man in Transcendental 
phenomena. In other words, Binswanger saw Heidegger devel­
oping and extending the philosophy of Kant and utilizing 
Husserl's "Transcendental" phenomenology. As Binswanger 
says, Heidegger has "elucidated the structure of subjec­
tivity as transcendence." ^^The Existential Analysis 
School of Thought," Existence; A New Dimension in Psy­
chiatry and Psychology, eds., Rollo May & Ernest Angel 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958), p. 194_^ But as we
12
Heidegger concerns the question as to the meaning of 
Heingnoss as such. Yet this revolution, far from being 
singularly occupied only with Being has revealed new 
insights into the Beingness; that is, the ontological char­
acteristics, of man. It is this latter revolution that
becomes the central, but not necessarily the exclusive,
23area of concern in this dissertation.
Ludwig Binswanger can be credited as being one of 
the first to recognize the significance of Heidegger's 
existential analytic, as found in Being and Time , for 
psychotherapy. Indeed, it was principally through Binswanger 
that Heidegger, in his capacity as being the primary influ­
ence on the development of an "existential psychotherapy," 
was introduced to this country. And for the most part, in
shall see, it is Heidegger's intention to overcome subjec­
tivity, not to perpetuate it.
2 3
Otto Ptiggler, a noted student and critic of 
Heidegger alludes to the dual classification of Heidegger's 
thought when he says; "Heidegger's thought is first classed 
among the philosophies of existence. . . . On the other
hand, . . . the assertion is advocated with full energy
that Heidegger's thought, as Heidegger himself has said and 
as one may demonstrate easily from his works, is not a 
philosophy of existence, that Heidegger's question is the 
question of Being. . . ." Ptiggler further states that it
is customary in classifying Heidegger, to draw attention to 
these two aspects of Heideggerian thought by reference to 
the "kehre," "a turning from existence as Dasein to Being 
itself." Otto pBggler, "Heidegger Today," The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 4, 1970, p. 277. In 
this dissertation we will see that there are not two 
Heideggers, there is only the Heidegger concerned with the 
question of Beingness including the Being of Da-sein.
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terms of psychology, Heidegger is still seen via the 
Binswangerian interpretation. Yet Binswanger saw Heidegger 
exclusively in the light of the previously mentioned "first 
revolution," i.e., in grounding man in transcendental sub­
jectivity. It is somewhat ironic that now, after the fact, 
Binswanger admitted (I96O) that he misunderstood Heidegger, 
although, as he puts it, it was a productive misunder-
, ^ . 2 kstanding.
One of the basic insights of Heidegger's Existen­
tial Analysis was the revelation of Da-sein as Being-in- 
the-world. With this disclosure the dichotomy of subject- 
object vins undercut. Binswanger made this insight central 
to his "Daseinsanalytik" orientation. "Only because through 
the concept of being-in-the-world as transcendence has the 
fatal defect of all psychology been overcome and the road 
cleared for anthropology, the fatal defect being the theory 
of a dichotomy of world into subject and object."
According to this view, human existence is reduced to a
2 kLudwig Binswanger, "Daseinsanalyze und Psycho­
thérapie II," Psychotherapeutica et Psychosomatica• VIII
(i9 6 0), 2 5 8. -  ^  ----------
"In this connection, however, I must note that I 
did recognize Heidegger's concern for a long time less 
sufficiently in its ontological importance for a philosophi­
cal anthropology. This misunderstanding, which is by the 
way yet a 'productive' one, still predominates in my work 
' Girundforraen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins ' . (Zurich, 
1 9 4 2 , 2 Aufl., 1 9 5 3)." (My translation)
25Quoted by Ludwig Binswanger, "The Existential 
Analysis School of Thought," in Existence, p. 193-
14
mere subject in which external objects are to be seen, 
but how this subject is to interact, communicate, or 
understand the "object" is never explicitly delineated.
Yet despite Binswanger's endorsement of being-in-the-world, 
and his cry that the "fatal dichotomy" had been undercut, 
he nevertheless still remained tied to a subject-oriented 
posture which forced him away from seeing the central ele­
ment of Heidegger's existential analytic--the nonsubjectiv- 
istic delineation of Da-sein.
For Binswanger, man is seen as essentially a tran­
scendental subjectivity where the "existentialia" are 
regarded as transcendental, a priori structures that mold, 
form a design, and give structure to the objective world. 
Thus Binswanger sees Heidegger as perpetuating the Kantian 
a priori, transcendental framework. For Binswanger, being- 
in-the-world
represents an extremely consistent development and 
extension of fundamental philosophical theories, 
namely of Kant's theory about the conditions of the 
possibility of experience (in the natural-scientific 
sense) on the one hand, and of Husserl’s theory of 
transcendental phenomenology on the other.^
By transcendence, Binswanger means that toward which the
transcendence is directed, the world, and that which has
27been transcended, the human being itself. As he says, 
"Where we speak of 'world' in terms of existential analysis.
26 Existence, p. 193* 
^^Ibid.
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there world always means that toward which the existence 
has climbed and according to which it has designed
., 28itself. . . .
but, as we will see in more detail later, this 
conception of Heidegger's existential analytic is mis­
directed on two counts. First, Heidegger is not carrying 
on the Kantian idea of a priori structures as somehow mold­
ing or structuring experience. In point of fact, Heidegger 
is attempting to overcome this type of metaphysical repre­
sentational thinking. And secondly, Heidegger does not 
reveal transcendence as the operation of a subject that 
climbs out of itself and goes to a world outside.
A further confusion on the part of Binswanger, and 
one that implicitly reveals his anthropological rendering 
of Heidegger, is his conception of "Care" to mean "being-
in-the-world as being of the existence for the sake of
29inysel f (designated by Heidegger as 'Care'). . . ."
"Care" is seen in this sense as a self enclosed, hence, 
subjective self-concern. Thus Binswanger is forced into 
an "extension" of Heidegger's theory by implementing 
"being-beyond-the-world" which for Binswanger means 
"being of the existence for the sake of ourselves (desig­
nated by me as 'love')."^^
2 8
Ibid., p. 194; Ftn. 2, 
^^Ibid., p. 1 9 5 .
^Ofbid.
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This not only distorts Heidegger's sense of "Care" 
but also misses the significance of being-with as a funda­
mental characteristic of Da-sein. To bring in "love" as
an extension of "Care" is to render "Care" as a mood or
31feeling which, as has been seen, is antithetical to the
3 2sense in which it was intended.
Several things are required in order to follow
the trail that Heidegger has blazed. As Heidegger often 
33reminds us, his is a thinking that is unterwegs, under­
way. Those of us who follow this thinking must remember 
this but must also remember that our thinking is unterwegs 
as well. That is, in following we do not always follow 
clearly; the path we follow is not always obvious, the 
trail is often obscure. We who follow do so with a constant 
awareness that the going is difficult and often we our­
selves have taken a wrong path.
It is hoped that in this dissertation it will be 
demonstrated that the path we are following is made doubly 
difficult by the blazing of a trail which resembles no set 
theory, doctrine, or position. It gives no one particular
31See pp. 8-9 above.
3 2For an excellent description of Binswanger's 
misreading of Heidegger, as well as a general statement of 
Boss' position, see Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger, Madness 
and Well-Being," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy,
IV, No. 3 (1974), 157-177.
33Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klosterman,
1950).
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world-view; it does not use the traditional canons of 
logical coherence as found in all "systems" of thought.
And it does not use a method that is easily recognizable , 
for his thinking method in the sense of methodos, "the 
way to."
How does one go about following the path of a
thinker of the magnitude of Heidegger? How does one meet
such thought? Perhaps to answer these questions we should
turn to Heidegger himself. In Was Heisst Denken?, Heidegger
states that to have a face-to-face "converse" with a
thinker there is one thing that is necessary; clarity as
to how a thinker is to be encountered. "Basically, there
are only two possibilities; either to go to their encounter,
3 kor to go counter to them." To encounter a thinker you 
magnify first of all what is great in his thought and doing 
so reveal what is unthought in his thought. And it is this
unthought quality that is "the greatest gift that thinking
3 5can bestow." Yet the common sense attitude regarding the 
unthought is that it is merely incomprehensible. On the
other hand, to go counter to a thinker's thought is to
precisely minimize what is great in his thought and hence 
retard the coming to the fore of what is unthought. To
34
M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, Trans, 
Fred D. Wieck & J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row,
1968), p. 77. 
35lbid., p. 76.
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succumb Lo this way of thinking is to reduce the thought 
of the thinker to a commonplace presumptive know-it-all 
position. And as a consequence, "It makes no difference 
if we assert in passing that Kant /for example]/ was none­
theless a very significant thinker. Such praises from 
below are always an insult."
As a provocative thinker of our time, Heidegger 
has had his share of praise and insult. The latter results 
generally from the creation of a "straw-man" image of 
Heideggerian thought, i.e., an image that is created by 
the reviewer, not by Heidegger himself. One of our tasks 
in this dissertation is to vitiate this "straw-man" response 
on the part of some writers.
Marjorie Grene, for instance, acknowledges
Heidegger's influence and the "appeal of his rhetoric
37about Dread and Nothingness." This, in its own way, is 
a praise of sorts, at least in the sense of acknowledging 
an impact or influence that transcends the average thinker. 
Hut then Mrs. Grene states, resounding the ideas of Stuart 
Hampshire, that the "badness of the man and of his philosophy
o O
are intimately connected." And further, referring to 
Heidegger's ontology, she says it is indeed empty and
^^Ibid., p. 77.
37Marjorie Grene, "On Heidegger," Encounter, X
(April, 1 9 5 8 ), 68. 
38.Ibid., p . 6 7 •
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39arrogant nonsense.  ^ Perhaps what is being witnessed
here is not only a high degree of value-judgment assessment 
under the guise of a legitimate critique, but the very 
essence of what has been referred to as "countering" a 
thinker.
To carry this further, Mrs. Grene's book on Heidegger
acclaims him as the basis of "existentialism"--a claim that
she admits Heidegger would not accept; nevertheless, she
40makes it ("there is an existentialist Heidegger"). The
existentialist Heidegger, as she calle him, was embedded
4lwithin the ontological frame but independent fiora it.
And referring to Heidegger's ontology, she says,
'I'lie trouble with Heidegger's ontology is not that 
it is ontology, but that it is spurious ontology, 
while his existentialism (we must call it that despite 
his disclaimer) expresses the ultimate insight of that
tradition, the very heart of the existentialist mes-Zi osage.
In this dissertation an attempt is made to make 
clear that to divorce Heidegger's ontological analysis 
from the concrete operations of ontic phenomena is to criti­
cally undercut the primary emphasis of Being and Time. To 
do this is to introduce the notion that Heidegger is an
'^-^Ibid. , p. 68.
^^Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger (London: Barnes
and Bowes, 1957), PP• 11, 13-14. 
41Referring to ultimate loneliness and the importance 
of death, Grene says, "This is an 'existentialist' insight, 
which was in fact embedded in, but is nevertheless inde­
pendent of the ontological frame." Ibid., p. l4.
42 .
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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existentialist, based on his philosophical anthropology.
But Heidegger himself disclaims both these categorizations. 
He does so for a good reason. He is not an existentialist 
if by this one means a person who is preeminently concerned 
with the concrete actions of individuals as they exercise 
personal freedom, choice and assume or deny responsibility. 
Heidegger is concerned about these characteristics but on 
the ontological frame; i.e., the "way" they are rather than 
the "what" they are or the "what they do." If by "philo­
sophical anthropology" one means the study of man, the 
rational animal, then Heidegger is not a philosophical 
anthropologist. His concern for "man" comes from the side 
of man's beingness, "that he is" rather than a presupposed 
categorization of "what he is."
Although Walter Kaufmann is not known for his 
appreciation of Heidegger's philosophy, a round-about praise 
can be found, if pushed slightly, when Kaufmann concedes 
that despite the "exceeding difficult and scholastic" 
style of Heideggerian thought, it did make discussions of
death and despair and dread and care and other previously
43
unacademic subjects quite respectable." Yet this "praise" 
appears as a slightly disguised categorization of Heidegger 
as an existentialist. In his Hegel book, Kaufmann lumps
Walter Kaufmann (ed.). Existentialism from 
Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland and New York; World 
Publishing Co. & Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 34-35.
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the thought of Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus 
together when he says, "One of the most glaring faults of 
most 'existentialism' is the lack of seriousness. One
4 4remains at the surface and is edified."
This is an example of the "countering" phenomenon 
at work. Heidegger's task in Being and Time , much less the 
remainder of his published works, was and is not a desire 
to "edify." This is a grossly over-simplified rendering 
of the so-called purpose of Heideggerian thinking. If 
there is an overriding purpose to the thought of Heidegger, 
it is to reawaken the issue of Beingness as such. This 
reawakening is not a desire on the part of Heidegger to 
edify but, indeed, to provoke and challenge, even to do 
violence to, to overthrow or overcome (uberwindung)
45existing modes of thought--this is not edification.
The implication coming from writers like Grene and 
Kaufmann is that if there is anything basically operative 
in the thought of Heidegger, and particularly in Being and 
Time, it is the existential quality of the work, not the 
ontological question. However, as it will be revealed in
44Kaufmann, Hegel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
& Co., 1 9 6 5 ), p. 11.
45 As Heidegger states in Vom tfesen des Grundes 
(The Essence of Ground), the task of Being and Time was a 
"concrete, revealing sketch ^^rojec^ of transcen- 
dence. . . ." There is no hint of an attempt on the part
of Heidegger to edify. (Trans, by Terence Malich, 
Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, I9 6 9 ).
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this dissertation, this assumption reveals a fundamental 
weakness of those who read Heidegger in this manner. If 
this is the case, and it is, it can be stated that the 
"real" revolution of his thought has been passed by with 
the facile m a n n e r in which he has been misunderstood. If 
legitimate, future philosophers will see the "real" signifi­
cance of Heidegger to be exactly that which has been over­
looked by many of his contemporaries.
2. Medard boss
In 1 9 2 6 , at the age of 23, Medard Boss initiated
his training analyses in Zürich. Among his teachers were
Sigmund Freud, Eugen Bleuler, Ernst Jones, Karen Homey,
and Otto Fenichel. Like many young analysts in the
middle or late ’3 0s, he began to feel "suffocated with
l i7
psychoanalytic theory" as presented by Freud. Specifi­
cally , he was troubled by an overly deterministic theory 
which, when applied through treatment, aimed at freedom.
In addition, he was becoming aware of the restrictiveness 
of this theory in that it did not seem to fit the phenomena. 
It was about this time that Jung, with a broader, less 
confining viewpoint, asked Boss to join him. With the aid 
of this more comprehensive view, specifically Jung’s
Medard Boss, Meaning and Content of Sexual Per-
version: A Daseins analytic Approach to the Psychopathology 
ve (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1949),of Phenomenon of Lo
p. x; and "A Conversation with Medard Boss," Psychology 
Today, II (December, I9 6 8 ), 5 8 .
A Conversation," Psychology Today, 6 0 .
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concepts of Selbst and Selbstwerdung, "individuation,"
Boss began to realize that the general Freudian approach 
had unjustifiably reduced and objectified the human being. 
In his eagerness for rigor and upholding of the natural, 
scientific perspective, Freud had "isolated and objectified 
the psychic phenomena of man as an apparatus analogous to
48the physical organism." Both Jung and Boss began to see
that the "self" was unobjectifiable and could not be
defined in terms of encapsulating compartments such as
"the Ego," "the Id," and "the Super Ego."
While serving in the Swiss Army around 1943, Boss
became interested in the concept of time and by chance
happened to see an advertisement for a book on the subject.
The book turned out to be Being and Time. At first, he
could not grasp the basic notions of the work but only
vaguely sensed "that here was something completely new, a
49fresh and decisive approach." And within this newness 
he was aware that Heidegger was speaking about a non­
objective view of man.^^
Sensing but not fully understanding the revolution­
ary implications inherent within Being and Time, Boss
48Boss, Meaning and Content, pp. x-xi.
49"A Conversation," Psychology Today, 62.
^^"Here I encountered concepts and ideas which were 
philosophically adequate to this non-objectifying mode of 
thinking about man," Boss, Meaning and Content, p. xi.
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communicated with Heidegger and thereby established a bond,
the fruit of which was the sought-after understanding.
Since the initial contact between these two men, many
51meetings have occurred and communications exchanged. 
Heidegger has helped Boss understand the initial problems 
of Being and Time and its relation to the "later" works, 
and Boss has in turn attempted to use that understanding 
as a basis for new psychotherapeutic approach. "In
52Heidegger's thinking I found at last a good, solid basis."
For Boss, this new understanding given to him by
Heidegger himself was explicitly demonstrated with the
publication of his first book in 194?, Sinn und Gehalt Per
53Sexuellen Perversionen. With the publication of this 
book, Boss overtly severed his theoretical ties with Jung 
and established himself as an independent psychoanalytic 
theorist. The procedure of the book rests with its
Heidegger has been a frequent visitor to Boss' 
home in Zollikon, Switzerland and has personally partici­
pated in several seminars at the Institute for Daseinsanaly- 
tic Therapy.
52"A Conversation," Psychology Today, 62. More 
specifically. Boss states that the fundamental ontology of 
Being and Time is the basis upon which the ontic descrip­
tions of the psychoanalytic situation are grounded. . . .  
These ontic descriptions are taken "on the basis of and 
seen in the light of Sein and Zeit." Personal interview,
1972.
^^Medard Boss, Sinn und Gehalt Per Sexuellen Per­
versionen; Ein Daseinsanalytischer Beitrag zur Psycho- 
pathologic der Phanomens der Liebe (Bern; Hans HuberVerlag, 
1 9 4 7 ). The English translation of this work has been 
previously referred to as The Meaning and Content of Sexual 
Perversions on p. 22.
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characterization and criticism of both psychoanalytic and 
"anthropologic" positions (Von Gebsattel, E. Straus,
H. Kunz, and to a certain extent, Binswanger and Jaspers) 
concerning the psychopathology of sexual perversions.
There then follows the psychoanalytically oriented presen­
tation and characterization of eight specific cases of 
sexual perversions, the major emphasis being that these 
particular modes of perversion represent a restriction or 
constriction of the mode-of-being of love as well as the 
all inclusive being-in-the-world of the isolated and per­
sonal individual. The preface to the English edition 
(19^9 ), incidentally, contains a criticism of Ludwig 
Binswanger as incorrectly attempting to extract from 
Heidegger an isolated theory of man--an anthropology,
5^something which Heidegger himself believes cannot be done.
Boss' second work was Der Traum und Seine Auslegung,
19531 and was published in English in 1957 under the title,
55The Analysis of Dreams. With this work Boss becomes more 
explicit in his overall criticisms of psychoanalytic theory 
as well as more specific as to the guiding principles of 
Daseinsanalysis. The dream is the vehicle for this expres­
sion and finds itself released from causative explanations
5 k Boss, Meaning and Content, p. xii.
55Medard Boss, Der Traum und Seine Auslegung (Bern 
and Stuttgart; Hans Huber Verlag, 1953); and The Analysis 
of Dreams (London: Rider and Co., 1957).
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and given a legitimacy of its own, commensurate with its
phenomenal status. This position representing the overall
tone of the work is captured in this statement: ", . . the
theoretical approach which reduces all dream phenomena to
mere representations of 'real objects,' the better to
endow them immediately with manifold symbolic projections
from the dreamer's unconscious, is quite unjustified."^^
Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik, Boss' third
book, was published in 1957- Its publication in English
in 1963 (Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis) represents
the definitive statement of Boss' position available in
57English to date. Actually, the English publication 
represents a substantially enlarged work in comparison to 
its German counterpart. One thing missing from the English 
translation is a crucial discussion of Binswanger's posi­
tion .
As the title suggests, the book is specifically 
concerned with demonstrating the basic differences between 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the Daseinsanalytic
Boss, The Analysis of Dreams, p. 101. In a 
personal conversation, Boss related that this work, and to 
a lesser degree, his work on sexual perversions suffered 
in translation. In point of fact, several crucial passages 
in the former work have been so mistranslated as to appre­
ciably alter the intended meaning. This is dealt with 
later; see pp. 93-9^, ftn. 93-
57Medard Boss, Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik 
(Now York: Basic Books'^ Inc. , 1963) . It is highly
regrettable that the English edition is now out of print.
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p* o
orientation. In a penetrating critique of Freud, which 
is reminiscent of Heideggerian critique of Kant, Boss 
demonstrates that it was Freud's explicit desire to stay 
within the confines of a strict, causal, and mechanistic 
natural-scientific framework that induced him to stray 
J'loin the phenomena. As Boss shows, Freud's therapy was of 
a highly sensitive and even "phenomenological" nature but 
his theory was unduly distortive. Also contained in the 
book is a highly constructive, useful clarification of 
some of Heidegger's basic principles.
Although not a book, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psycho­
therapeutic Liberation," is important enough to list here 
among Boss' major publications. Originally published as
Lebensangst, Schuldgefuhle, und psychotherapeulische 
59Hefreiung, ' this work attempts to clarify the psychothera­
peutic implications of anxiety and guilt by demonstrating 
their respective ontological grounds. Liberation from the 
oppressive weight of neurosis and psychosis can best be 
accomplished by the specific openness of the psychothera­
pist toward his patient. This "openness" is called "psycho­
therapeutic eros" by Boss, and goes way beyond the generally
Boss' treatment of Freud in this book is an excep­
tionally fine example of what Heidegger describes as 
"encountering" rather than "countering" a thinker. See 
p. 17 above.
59Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychothera­
peutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 11 (1 9 6 2!^ 122-202.
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known and accepted definitions of various types of 
love.
Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters was published in 
1 9 5 9 and published in English, A Psychiatrist Discovers 
India, in 1 9 6 5»^^ This book reveals the intense experi-s : 
ences of Boss as he studied with the sages in India and 
Indonesia in 1956 and again in 1958- It is an in-depth 
look at some of the basic tenets of Oriental though and, 
as well , reveals some of the weaknesses of prior transla­
tions and commentaries found in the West. These transla­
tions suffered from an overly Westernized interpretation 
of various Eastern cultural concepts or ideas. For instance, 
the highest of Indian Wisdom regards "chit" as a primordial 
lumination and opening-up which is non-objectifiable. If 
it is seen as subject or mind in the sense of psychological 
fiuictions, it loses the meanings as seen by the Wisdom of 
the East. The similarity here with Daseinsanalysis is 
striking. Boss states,
. . . I remained greatly dumfounded by the entirely
unexpected, very far reaching affinity between what 
the very recent Western 'daseinsanalysis’ and what the 
very ancient Indian wisdom recognized as the most 
profound 'ground' of 'being-ness' as such; this 
'ground' being called 'clearance,' 'openness':
(Lichtung) by 'Daseinsanalysis,' and 'chit' by the 
Indian philosophical tradition. Could it be that in 
quite another part of our earth, in the Black Forest
Medard Boss, Indienfahrt eines Psychiaters 
(Pfullingen: GÜnther Neske, 1959)5 A Psychiatrist Discovers
India (London; Oswald Wolf, 1 9 6 5)*
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or Germany, the same deepest insight into that which 
is is trying to well forth?®^ (Emphasis mine)
Boss' major work, yet to be translated, appeared 
in 1971" The title is as foreboding as seeing all of the 
b o o pages amassed before you. This forebodingness, however, 
is arrested when one realizes the scope and extent of the 
project. Its full title is Grundriss der Medizin; Ansatze 
zu einer phanomenologischen Physiologie, Psychologie, 
Pathologie, Therapie und zu einer daseinsgemassen Praventiv- 
Medizin in der modernen Industrie-Gesellschaft. A possible 
translation of this title is; Fundamentals of Medicine: 
Studies in a Phenomenological Physiology, Psychology, 
Pathology, Therapy, and, as appropriate to the Da-sein, 
Preventive Medicine and Social Psychiatry in the Modern 
Industrial Society. T h e  importance of this work generally, 
and for this dissertation specifically, cannot be overly 
emphasized. Perhaps the best possible way to demonstrate 
this importance is to quote from the author's foreword:
First of all, however, the following book itself 
during all the time of its preparation has received 
the indefatigable attention of Martin Heidegger. He 
did not refuse his repeated critique (criticism) of
^^Ibid., pp. 1 2 8-1 2 9 .
^^Medard Boss, Grundriss der Medizin (Bern, Stutt­
gart, and Wien; Hans Huber Verlag, 1971)• Hereafter this 
work will be referred to as Grundriss. The English transla­
tion of the title of this work was supplied by Dr. Brian 
Kenney, an analyst in training at the Institute for 
Daseinsanalytic Therapy.
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of any paragraph which contained a "philosophical
statement.
This citing of books written by Medard Boss was not 
designed to be exhaustive of his published works. Impor­
tant journal articles both in German and English have been 
purposely omitted (these can be found in the Bibliography). 
By taking note of the major publications we have demon­
strated not only the thematic concern of Boss but also the 
overall use of the Heideggerian corpus as grounding his 
approach.
Medard Boss owes a lot to Martin Heidegger. The
obviousness of this fact tends to hide its reverse; the
inherent difficulty of Heideggerian philosophy--yea, its
oftentimes seemingly unfathomableness--has been greatly
clarified without loss of meaning or content by the writings
and in the personage of Medard Boss. In point of fact, the
extent of this clarity is such that it offers, on occasion,
new insights into understanding Heidegger, especially for
64the English reader.
Boss, Grundriss, p. 9. (My translation) Boss has 
stated elsewhere regarding Heidegger, "He has hoped that 
through me and my students and medical co-workers that the 
benefits of his thinking will come directly to the assis­
tance of those who need him most of all." Richard Visser 
(éd.), Martin Heidegger im GesprUch (Freiburg: Verlag
Karl Alber, 1970), pV 20. (My translation.)
64Martin Heidegger, in one of his many visits to 
Zürich to participate in the "Zollikon-seminares" arranged 
by Medard Boss, made the statement that there is no better 
introduction to the existential analytic than through the 
works of Boss . . .  that Boss has completely understood 
and conveyed this understanding of Being and Time through
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It is our aim and purpose in this dissertation to 
investigate the meaning of Heidegger's fundamental ontology 
and to show its applicability to a psychotherapy. To 
accomplish this, the following needs to be mentioned. 
Heidegger's all pervasive concern was and has been the 
meaning, the question, of Being-ness. Being and Time 
introduced the question but insisted that a preliminary 
step was necessary, that of phenomenologically disclosing 
the questioner in his being. Subsequent works have dealt 
more with the primary question than the preliminary step. 
This does not mean that there has been a change in the 
sense of an alteration in Heidegger's thinking, but only a 
change of position within the original question. However, 
since the concern of psychotherapy, and in this instance, 
Daseinsanalysis, is primarily man--ontically speaking--Boss 
has remained with some of the language as well as the con­
tent of Being and Time, whereas Heidegger has in many 
instances abandoned some of the language. This does not 
mean that the later Heidegger has nothing to say to psycho­
therapy (as stated by Allers previously) . It does not 
mean that Boss has abandoned the "later" Heidegger or has 
stretched the original conception of Daseinsanalytik of
his writing. This account was related to this author by a 
student in attendance.
^^See above, p. 4.
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Being and Time into something it isn't as Spiegelberg
.66wants to suggest.
With the aid of Heideggerian thinking as its ground, 
Daseinsanalysis, as presented by Boss, is challenging some 
of the time-honored, as well as more contemporary, concep­
tions of psychology, and of psychotherapy in particular.
Boss is therefore "revolutionary" in his own right and 
within his own specific area of concern. This revolutionary 
stance stems from his daring to penetrate into the "leveled- 
off" assumptions of psychology in general and to explicitly 
reveal these assumptions, as well as, the phenomena within 
psychology in their own immediate phenomenality. The 
implications for future orientations in psychology, much 
less the philosophy of science could--and most likely will-- 
be dramatic. The concern of this dissertation, along with 
the exposition of Heideggerian thought, is to reveal these 
implications.
What follows is a general summary of the basic 
method and orientation of Daseinsanalysis. At this point.
Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology 
and Psychiatry, p. 336. "What is puzzling about this 
Daseinanalytik, as used here by Boss, is that it is not 
exactly identical with its meaning in Being and Time. . . ."
Boss is aware of the distinction between his use of Daseins­
analytic and that of Heidegger's in Being and Time. The 
latter is primarily concerned with following the ontological 
characteristics of Da-sein, whereas Boss is concerned with 
utilizing these characteristics in implementing ontic 
descriptions. To make this subtle distinction. Boss spells 
with "c" the term Daseinsanalytic whereas Heidegger uses 
"k". (Personal interview, 1972.)
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no attempt is made to expand or ground what is stated; this 
awaits the remainder of the dissertation. This summary 
provides an introduction for the reader by revealing some 
of the basic themes of Heideggerian thought as they are 
applied to a "philosophy" of the behavioral sciences as 
seen by Medard Boss.
The term "science" is a compound of the two Latin 
verbs, "scire," to know and "facere," to make. Thus, in 
its etymological sense, the term "science" means "to make 
known." During the past three hundred years of the develop­
ment of what is called "science," that which was to be
"made known" was naturally assumed to be the "real world." 
Yet, with increasing insistence, the reality of our world 
was seen to be composed solely of "calculable, measurable
objects which are related to each other in a causal, dynamic
7
way." But this is an unjustified usurpation of the very 
term "science." There is no legitimate justification for 
the assumption that only through a calculating and measurable 
approach can phenomena be known. This assumption is a pre- 
scientific article of faith.
An adjunct to the assumptive bias of science seeing
reality as constituted only by calculable, measurable 
objects, has been the increasing "objectification" of
Boss, "What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, II (1 9 6 2 ),
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science in the sense of making itself value-free. To 
boast of or attempt to base oneself within a value-free 
discipline is not to rid oneself of values but is, in point 
of fact, to endorse with fervor a value. The across-the- 
board rejection of differential evaluations is made pos­
sible on the basis of a value judgment. "It is that value 
judgment of the natural sciences themselves which regard 
the levelling down of all values to a so-called objective,
qualitativeless indifference as being of the highest
„68value."
It is becoming clearer to modern investigators, 
both in philosophy and in some quarters of science, that 
the way man reacts to his world, in the sense of trying to 
articulate the world in some systematic "scientific" fashion, 
is guided by certain prescientific notions that each indi­
vidual has (or carries with him). These notions refer in 
general to the goal and nature of man as well as the funda­
mental character of the world. Thus the so-called "pure 
facts" of science are not "pure" at all; they are brought 
forth into the foreground of attention by the prevailing 
prescientific notions of the time.
To take the stance that there are causal and 
dynamic forces operating behind the phenomena and hence 
define the reality of the phenomena is to perpetuate a
^^Ibid.. 57.
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prescientific bias. This is in fact one of the major 
articles of faith of the natural sciences. But to assume 
this, is to in large measure, degrade the phenomena them­
selves, to impoverish them and to "tell them," impose upon 
them, what kind of intellectual inferences reside behind 
them and constitute their "reality." The methodological 
procedure, on the other hand, which allows the phenomena 
themselves to tell us about their immediately given content 
is phenomenology. "Back to the things themselves!" Yes, 
but for the phenomena to reveal themselves as they are in 
their immediacy is to reveal themselves in their beingness. 
Thus they are phenomenologically disclosing their ontologi­
cal character. Phenomenology is as ontology!
When a phenomenological procedure is implemented, 
it is found that phenomena are in themselves rich in con­
tent. We need not go behind the phenomena to ferret out 
so-called dynamic, causal structures; the phenomena them­
selves supply us with a thorough meaningful content. If 
this is the case the many mechanisms which have been promul­
gated in the name of "objective" science, the causal dynamic 
structures, will have to undergo serious reappraisal as 
to their legitimacy. We might find that some of our time- 
honored conceptions are not helping understand phenomena 
but are in fact hindering this comprehension and therefore
must be abandoned.
It turns out that a phenomenological approach, 
specifically in relation to the questions of the nature
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of man, far from being "overly philosophical," is in point 
of fact more "objective" than the so-called "objective" 
natural and behavioral sciences which have for the most 
part given us our definition of the "reality" of man. 
Phenomenology, by remaining with the phenomena themselves, 
may be "truer" to the phenomena in question and therefore 
not have to resort to the imposition of intellectual infer­
ences. This is a "making known" of the phenomena which is 
qualitatively distinct from that given by the natural sci­
ences. Could it be that phenomenology has helped us become 
more "scientiiic" than the natural sciences?
The ego concept has played a central part in the 
development of modern psychology, psychotherapy, and psycho­
analysis to say nothing of philosophy in general. But what 
is the ego? It has been defined variously as a "substance- 
less bundle of perceptions, representations, and psychic 
experiences, sometimes defined as an intellectual or 
thinking substance, at other times as a nexus or as a cen-
69ter of psychic intentional acts." The ego is also seen 
as the unity and individuality of the person, constituting 
the overt manifestation of his basic personality. Freud, 
for instance, saw the ego as a "psychic instance" somehow 
mediating between external and internal perceptions. Jung, 
on the other hand, saw the ego as exclusively conscious.
69Medard Boss, "Ego? Motivation?" Journal of 
Existential Psychiatry, 1 (Fall, I9 6O), 275-2^3,
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constituting the essence of consciousness and therefore
70the subject of all personal conscious acts.
If we examine these various definitions of the ego, 
nowhere will we find how the ego could make possible human 
perception, and above all, the awareness of things. How 
would the ego have to be constituted, we may ask, to allow 
us to enter into an understanding, meaning-disclosing rela­
tionship with the world? Nowhere can this be found in 
these definitions of ego. What can be found as a common 
element characteristic of these definitions is the presup­
position of immanence. All see man defined as primarily
"a precinct . . .  self-contained and delineated over
71against the external world."
If the ego is tacitly assumed to be this encapsu­
lated precinct, how could it grant, be open to, things 
which confront the individual? How could it, in other 
words, transcend itself, get out of the encapsulation and 
go over to the objects in the world?
Immediate experience does not reveal the ego in 
its encapsulation but an "I" in relation to something. The 
"I" in other words is never seen in isolation. The "I" is 
only as in a relationship to something or somethings. This 
further reveals that man, being in relationship to "things,"
f^Ibid., p. 2 7 8 . 
7^Ibid.
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is always ’’outside" with things; i.e., things shine forth 
within the luminosity of man's openness to things and hence 
constitute, along with this openness, his essence. Man 
is never seen in his immediacy as an isolated ego or psychic 
instance that only later "relates" to our external world.
If the ego, and for that matter the id, are 
hypotheses which are not verified by immediate experience 
and are hence abandoned, how can we account for human motiva­
tion? After all, with the ego and id it was simple enough 
to see man as driven from within himself to something 
external to him. What if, instead of being driven, man in 
his being is attracted by what encounters and engages him, 
by what addresses and summons him, from what appears in the 
"light" of his existence?
But what about addiction and the state of bondage? 
Certainly we feel at times driven within to approach cer­
tain "external" things. Yet even addiction to something 
presupposes a hearkening, the awareness of a calling and 
summoning. To fall into slavish submission presupposes 
being called forth, being summoned. It is this same calling 
which creates for man the possibility of standing open to 
all the phenomena with which he encounters and to stand 
open authentically.
When man is revealed to exist in and as_ his rela­
tions to the objects of the world, inclusive of other men, 
then this, which is man's primordial nature, is called
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Being-in-the-world. As Being-in-the-world man exists with
a fundamental awareness that something and/or can be.
". . . primary awareness of 'Being-ness as such' (if ever
so vague) is the fundamental condition for the possibility
72of being touched and affected by something. . . Man
exists as this awareness because he stands outside with
the objects he encounters. He "exists" in the literal
sense of the verb "to exist" which is the English equivalent
of the Latin verb "ekstare" or "ek-sistence," which means
"to stand out into." Man "ek-sists" as this standing open
and holding open, spanning a free realm of awareness for
73that which is encountered.
Metaphorically, man as Being-in-the-world can be 
compared to an openness and a light pervading that openness 
in which all things appear and reveal themselves as the 
phenomena for which they are. Man, primordially speaking, 
is this light, a brightness which illuminates things; yet 
to follow our metaphor, light and brightness come about 
with varying hues and intensities. To follow traditional 
terminology, the brightness would be comparable to a basic 
comprehension, not necessarily thematic, and the varying 
hues comparable to mood or attunement. The two, therefore, 
cannot be separated. A tendency to be guarded against at
72
Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 37
73Boss, Grundries, p. 48?.
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this point is to see this openness and/or brightness as 
being separate from that which appears within the bright­
ness. On the contrary, openness, light, brightness needs 
the particular essents without which there would be no 
brightness. If, for instance, a light was shining and 
nothing appeared within the spectrum of light, there would 
be no light. Man is thus "thrown" on particular "essents" 
(objects) like the shining of a light and is in "need" of 
these "essents" in order to be what he is, i.e., Being-in- 
the-world.
As Being-in-the-world man is primordially not just 
open to the world of things or objects but other men as 
well. There is, in other words, a primordial being-with 
of men twoards each other so that in direct and immediate 
"understanding" other men are seen to be in this world 
fundamentally in the same way I am. As Being-in-the-world 
man is "there" with other men, primordially and fundamen­
tally. The world is therefore something I always share 
with others (the mitwelt). To follow our metaphor, humanity 
as a whole is a full brightness, a shining-together of 
individual brightnesses to constitute an all encompassing 
brightness which itself can reveal some things, and hide
others. It is like the shining together of all individual
74sun rays to constitute the totality of the sun.
74See Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (ed.). Psychoanalysis 
and Existential Philosophy (New York; Dutton, 19h2), 
p. 8 4 . Boss states, "Humanity, as a whole, therefore, is
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The somatic aspect, corporeality, of man is also a 
basic characteristic of Being-in-the-world. Primordially 
man d^, has his abode, "out there" with relational possi­
bilities; i.e., we are corporeality immediately as an 
aspect of existence. "How should essentially blind par­
ticles of matter and quanta of energy suddenly become endowed 
with the power of sight and be able to perceive things as
they are in all their far-flung, manifold meaningful inter-
715
relationships?" How else but as being open to and with 
that which is encountered? Our "physical behavior" is con­
stantly oriented toward that which confronts it on all 
levels at once--hormonal, cortical, muscular, and skeletal.
In essence, the corporeal side of man's nature is nothing 
more than an aspect of man as Being-in-the-world; as such, 
it can only be fully understood from the standpoint of the 
totality of relationship to objects, fellow human beings, 
and matters of our concern at any given time.^^
Contemporary medicine is prone to use the terms 
"psychogenic" and "somatogenic" to refer to exclusive 
realms where the cause of a disease can be found. It
best comparable to the full brightness of the day which 
also consists of the shining-together of all individual 
sun rays." This is the Mitwelt. See B & T, p. 154; H, II8 .
7 5Boss, "Conception of Man in the Natural Sciences 
and Daseinsanalysis," Comprehensive Psychiatry, III (August,
1962), 193-214.
7^Ibid.
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thereby perpetuates the dualistic idea of two substantial 
media through which man exists. Yet the essence of all 
phenomena, either healthy or diseased, "is the undifferen­
tiated reality that underlies physical and psychic events--
human existence, incapable of being concerned in objecti- 
77fying terms." Thus what is called "psychosomatic medi­
cine," in terms of the Daseinsanalytic orientation, is a
method whereby physical illness is seen as a deviant
7 ft
expression of modes of human existence. The entire 
human life history, therefore, is an essential element in 
unfolding this human existence and cannot be reduced to a 
matter of statistics.
All men experience conflicts, confusions, disappoint­
ments, and upsets. What is of concern is not that he 
experiences these but the manner as well as the medium in 
which he projects and lives his existence. Environmentally, 
this can manifest itself in terms of conscious thematic 
acts or through the spheres of "unconscious," unthematic, 
bodily manifestations.
The term "hate" or "hatred" in German is Hass and 
the term "ugly" is HHsslich. In an attuned state of hate, 
all form or shape is distorted and made ugly or grotesque.
77Medard Boss, "Mechanistic and Holistic Thinking 
in Modern Medicine," The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
XIV (1954), 48-54.
^®Ibid.
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Yet by being attuned to hate one is not only held within 
a "psychic" sphere of destructive impulses or wishes, but 
includes the bodily sphere as well. The distorted grimaces, 
the taut muscles and peculiar feeling in the "pit of the 
stomach" are all too easily discernible to be lightly dis­
missed.
In a state attuned wholly to anxiety, the bodily
sphere shows itself with equal force as found with hate.
In the mood of anxiety the whole body will at times flush
and there will also be observed gestures of retraction of
the extremities. Internally, the body tightens with a
constricted throat, the internal organs are cramped,
breathing becomes difficult or pressured.
In joy, however, the body is lifted, is deconstricted.
The breast lifts, the heart beats faster, there is an easy
calm that overcomes the internal organs and, externally,
the mimicry that was described in hate takes on its 
79reverse.
We find in viewing man primordially as Being-in- 
the-world that the notion of a psyche as well as the repre­
sentation of a body gives way. Man exists neither as an 
encapsulated psyche nor as a mechanistically or energetically 
contrived body but simply man exists ek-statically; i.e..
c h i a t r y , 211,
79Boss, "Conception of Man," Comprehensive Psy-
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man exists as a luminating realm standing out and within 
the world openness in which all that is and has to be mani­
fests itself, comes forth, and reveals itself. Thus, when
fioHeidegger states that "man is the shepherd of Being," 
he means that man is that through which Beingness and 
things which "have" Beingness are revealed and thereby 
man lets the "revealed" (later Heidegger refers to this as 
"presence") unfold its own meaning to the highest extent 
possible.
Viewing man in this way demolishes the fatal
dichotomy of mind-body, subject-object. " . . .  there are
no 'ob-jects' whatsoever which are--as this term would
have them--thrown-over-against a subject's consciousness
in order to give rise to mental images of themselves only
8lwithin this subjective consciousness."
Man as Being-in-the-world also reveals the artifi­
ciality of the dichotomy and dispute between "existentialism" 
and "essentialism." This dichotomy initially presupposes 
a Neo-Platonic dualism between a realm of "essential," 
supersensual ideas over against a less real world of defec­
tive, changeable realizations of these ideas found within
82the existential behavior of man.
80Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 210. 
^^Ibid., 212.
^^Ibid.
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Daseinsanalytically and hence phenomenologically, 
if we stand open and with the phenomena themselves and let 
them reveal themselves to us in their immediacy, all such 
dichotomies vanish. Man has, viewed from the Daseins­
analytic perspective, invariably pushed himself beyond the 
phenomena in order to extrapolate and imbue the phenomena 
in question with extensive theoretical structures. Such a 
procedure rests on pre-scientific notions about the status 
of the world and the phenomena of the world; i.e., this 
procedure is a "philosophical" system. Daseinsanalysis, 
on the other hand, does not intend to exchange one philo­
sophical system for another but merely attempts to stay 
with the phenomena themselves. It is a method.
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY: "THE WAY TO SOMETHING"
The Heideggerian method is phenomenological. 
Although the "later" Heidegger abandons the term phenome­
nology, the method remains the same. Of primary concern 
in this chapter is the elucidation of Heidegger's method 
and how Boss uses it in psychotherapy. The task in sec­
tion 3 is to develop Heidegger's own meaning of phenome­
nology. In section 4, this meaning is contrasted with that 
of Husserl's. Section 5 reveals the counter-concept to 
phenomenology--leveling off--and how it is the task of 
phenomenology to overcome this "tendency." In section 6, 
phenomenology as interpreted and used by Boss is presented.
3. Phenomenology: "Only as Phenomenology is
ontology possible."
For those who are convinced that the "later" 
Heidegger is different in expression as well as content 
from the earlier Heidegger, the brief description of phe­
nomenology offered by Heidegger himself in his preface (or 
letter) to Richardson's Through Phenomenology to Thought 
should prove to be revealing, if not downright remarkable. 
There are two essential points revealed by this discussion. 
The first revolves around a Heidegger writing a reply to
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Richardson's questions, a Heidegger in the so-called 
"later" phase, who refers to his use of phenomenology in 
Being and Time as what he still considers, . . a  more 
faithful adherence to the principle of 'phenomenology'."^
The second point, an adjunct of the first, is that 
Heidegger himself would place so much emphasis on and 
distinction between the prepositions "from" and "through." 
Richardson had originally conceived of the title of his 
work as "From Phenomenology to Thought." Heidegger sug­
gests that if the term "phenomenology" is conceived as a 
philosophical position--as it came to be through Husserl-- 
then the use of the term "from" is justified; i.e., that 
Heidegger's use of "phenomenology" is to be distinguished 
from Husserl’s. For the latter, as Heidegger states, phe­
nomenology functions as a philosophical position, "according
2
to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte." If, 
however, "through" is used instead of "from," it is to sig­
nify phenomenology "as the /process o^7 allowing the most
3
proper concern of thought to show itself. . . ." The
William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenome­
nology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Wijhoff, 1 9 6 7 )1
p. xiv. The point here bears repealing. The later Heidegger 
is not a different Heidegger in terms of an alteration of 
views, but a Heidegger at a different location on the path 
of questioning Beingness. Or, as Medard Boss succinctly 
stated it, "The Kehre is nonsense." (Personal interview,
1 9 7 2).
^Ibid.
3
Ibid. This is Richardson's translation of "als 
das Sichzeigenlassen der eigensten Sache des Denkens. . . . "  
P. xvii. Italics added. Translation of Sache as "concern" 
should be noted.
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title should then be, as suggested by Heidegger, "Through 
Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being."
Yet that which is "the most proper concern of 
thought" is Beingness itself. Hence, phenomenology properly 
understood, is a thinking of Beingness. Any distinction, 
therefore, between phenomenology and the "thinking of Being" 
disappears. The two are the same. Expressed differently, 
the "thinking" of the expression "the thinking of Being" 
is equivalent to "phenomenology" and the "Being" is equiva­
lent to ontology. Thus, "only as phenomenology is ontology
possible," or Being is revealed through thinking--albeit a
4
special way of thinking.
What is revealed by this important play on words is 
again a change in the Heideggerian expression, i.e., the 
language, but no correlative change in content. This 
alteration of expression was precipitated by the captivity 
of the language of Being and Time, ". . . t o  contemporary
modes of (re)presentation and language. . . ."^
The process which allows the most proper concern 
of thought to show itself, is net a forced or contrived
4
In one of Heidegger's latest publications trans­
lated into English, he says, "But in what is most its own 
phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of 
thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, of 
corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought." In 
the essay, "My Way to Phenomenology" as found in On Time 
and Being, trans., Joan Stambaugh (New York; Harper and 
Row, 1972), p. 82.
^Richardson, p. xiv.
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definition of phenomenology. As Heidegger demonstrates in 
Being and Time^ the term "phenomenon" etymologically is 
derived from the Greek word /fit ^  which has the double
meaning of "showing itself" or "being shown." It may also 
mean "to come to the light" since this particular Greek word 
is etymologically connected with the Greek word for light,
• The suffix "ology" of the term, phenomenology, 
comes from the Greek and as Heidegger notes^ is
closely related to the term £/J 0 X X  which means to "make
manifest what one is talking about," or as Heidegger sug­
gests, "letting something be seen."
Phenomenology, states Heidegger in Being and Time, 
is neither a "stand-point" nor a special "direction" and
B & T , p. 51; H, 2 8-2 9 . The thinking of Being and 
Time was one in which metaphysics was to be overcome by 
going back "into the ground," yet the language used was one 
held in check by tradition; i.e., metaphysics itself. New 
modes of expression had to be found and old expressions 
(terms like phenomenology and ontology) had to be abandoned. 
Heidegger states in one of his later works, "Our Western 
languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in 
its own way. It must remain an open question whether the 
nature of Western languages is in itself marked with the 
exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked permanently 
by onto-theo-logic, or whether these languages offer other 
possibilities of utterance--and that means at the same time 
of a telling silence." Identity and Difference, trans., 
Joan Stambaugh (New YorkT Harper and Row, I9 6 9), p. 7 3 . 
Perhaps the abandonment by Heidegger of the linguistic 
expression in Being and Time reflects his own awareness 
at being caught within the "from which" referred to in the 
Introduction.
& T, pp. 5 5-5 6 ; H, 3 2-3 3 .
50
ô*will remain neither as long as it understands itself.
Phenomenology for Heidegger means "to let that which shows
itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it
shows itself from itself." This is equivalent to the
g
expression, "to the things themselves." Yet this is only 
half of the definition of phenomenology as Heidqgger 
intends it. What about the "things?" What about the 
"matter" of thinking? What is it that phenomenology lets 
us see? To answer these questions poses some difficulty, 
for phenomenology does not follow the general tendency of 
terms having the suffix, logos--theology, biology, psy­
chology, and so forth--which demarcate their subject 
matter. Phenomenology does not in fact designate the 
object of its research, nor does it characterize the subject- 
matter. The emphasis of phenomenology as seen in reference
O
B & T, p. 50; H, 2 7 .
& T, p. 5 8 ; H, 3 4 . The expression in German,
"Zu dem Sachen Selbst," is generally translated, "to the 
things themselves." Yet Sachen is not Dingen. A more 
proper translation or at least an understanding of Sachen 
would be "matter," or "concern of thought." The expression, 
"Die Sachen des Denken," for instance, is translated, "the 
matter of thinking."
In his essay "The End of Philosophy" (On Time and 
Being) pp. 61-62, Heidegger reveals that the call that 
thinking address itself "to the things themselves" has taken 
place in modern philosophy with the works of both Hegel 
and Husserl, the former in his Preface to the System of
Science (The Phenomenology of Mind, I8 0 7 ) and the latter in
Philosophy as Exact Science. Yet for both Hegel and Husserl, 
the call to things means a grounding in the subjectivity of 
consciousness. The next section of this dissertation deals 
with the distinction-between HUsserl ahd Heidegger, regarding 
this issue of subjectivity.
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to "logos" is on the "how" with which a "what" is to be 
treated; i.e., a method for revealing what is otherwise 
hidden or concealed. That which shows itself in a phe­
nomenological sense has for the most part been covered up, 
"hidden from view." What we generally "see," what are for 
the most part "things" of experience, are semblances and 
appearances which "hide" (cover up) the phenomenologically 
"seen." This phenomenologically "seen" thing is nothing 
less than that which constitutes the meaning and ground of 
that which appears or is a semblance--the Beingness of 
entities "itself." Beingness, however, is not one entity 
among others. It is not this entity or that entity, but 
the Beingness of all entities.
Yet this Beingness remains hidden or covered up for 
the most part and must be wrested from the "things" (appear­
ances, semblances) seen. This is accomplished as interpre­
tation (auslegung) in relation to Beingness and interpreta­
tion as hermeneutic in the sense of the phenomenology of 
Da-sein. The meaning of interpretation (auslegung) is a 
"laying out" or "laying bare" of possibilities— or an 
uncovering. Interpretation as hermeneutic operates as the 
"laying bare" of the a^ structure of the Understanding 
(Verstehen). In other words, it aims at the meaning of
The Understanding (Verstehen) will be considered 
later. (See p. 155 below.) The term "hermeneutic," borrowed 
from theology, is used by Heidegger in its original sense 
as "interpretation" or description but with a special refer­
ence for Da-sein.
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that which is to be interpreted. Yet a warning must be 
issued. Not only Understanding but Interpretation, as 
well, function for the most part unthematically.^^
In dealing within the framework of scientific proofs, 
the scientist must not presuppose that which it is his task 
to demonstrate. To do so is to operate within a circle.
Yet Heidegger reveals that the Understanding as interpreta­
tion does indeed operate within a circle in that it already 
understands what is to be interpreted. What does Heidegger 
mean by this? Da-sein is, as Being-in-the-world, spread out 
and strung along--or ek-static. The world is part of the 
very definition of Da-sein; thus Da-sein, as disclosedness 
(openness) already "is" that which is being disclosed via 
understanding; that is, ". . . in every understanding of
12the world, existence is understood with it and vice versa."
By the rules of basic logic this is seen as a vicious circle.
B & T , p. 1 9 0 ; H , 4 9 . "That which is understood 
gets articulated when the entity to be understood is brought 
close interpretatively by taking as our clue the something 
as something, and this articulation lies before (leigtvor) 
our making any thematic assertion."
J.2
B & T, p. 1 9 6 ; H, 1 5 3 . Elsewhere Heidegger states, 
"If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we 
want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, 
what is this but going in a circle?" B & T , p. 27; H , 7*
In his essay, "What Is Philosophy?" (Was ist das-die 
Philosophie?), (New Haven: College and University Press,
n.d.), Heidegger calls philosophy itself a circle. To ask 
what philosophy is requires beforehand a knowledge of what 
it is; i.e., we can ask our question only if we have previ­
ously taken a look into philosophy. This is going around in 
a circle. P. 43*
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However, Heidegger declares that, to the contrary, it is a 
vehicle for the most primordial kind of knowing. The know­
ing of Being-ness itself as it announces itself from the
things themselves devoid of any artificially contrived
13explanations.
The circle is a direct correlation of what Heidegger 
refers to as the ontological difference, that is, the dis­
tinction between Beingness and beings or essents. Beingness 
manifests itself only as essents. Yet essents are because 
of Beingness. The circularity found within this relational 
difference captures the essence of Heideggerian thought.
In a personal letter to Medard Boss, Heidegger said that 
the sufficient distinction between the mode of being of a 
specific species of things or living beings and Beingness 
as such, "the whole road of my thinking is concealed, inso­
far as one follows its progression through the essence of
14metaphysics."
Since the circle serves as a vehicle for a primordial 
kind of knowing (ontological), a knowing of Beingness itself, 
the point is not how to escape the circle but how to get 
into it in the right way. We must, in fact, leap (springen) 
into it. In Being and Time the leap is merely pointed to.
^^B & T, pp. 1 9 4-1 9 6 ; H, 1 5 2-1 5 3 .
^Sledard Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, 
trans., Ludwig Lefebre (New York; Basic Books, Inc., 1963), 
p. 36, Ptn. 4. See also p. 134 below.
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it is not given a full disclosure as to its essence; this 
awaits the so-called later Heidegger. Nevertheless, the 
leap, as found in Being and Time cannot be abandoned as a 
topic yet. Important elements of the leap (springen) are 
revealed by Heidegger in subtle ways. For instance, in 
section 26, regarding the "Dasein-with" of others, Heidegger 
refers to a solicitude which leaps in (einspringen) and one 
which leaps ahead (vorspringen) T h e  importance of the 
etymological root of springen is apparent, but what is per­
haps not so apparent is the ontological distinction and 
significance of the two forms einspringen and vorspringen.
The latter is ontologically more appropriate— note that 
this does not mean "better."
What are the subtle nuances of these distinct onto­
logical possibilities revolving around the phenomenon of 
leaping? Perhaps an answer lies in the statement by Heidegger 
at the very beginning of Being and Time;
In the question of the meaning of Being, there is 
no circular reasoning but rather a remarkable "rela­
tionship beckward or forward" which what we are asking 
about (Being) bears ^o the inquiry itself as a mode of 
Being of an entity.^
B & T , p. 1 5 8 ; H , 122. Footnote 1 on that page 
refers to the translation of einspringen and suggests a 
more idiomatic translation as "intervene for him." Boss 
translates these as "intervening care and anticipatory 
care." P & D, p. 73. These are further explained in 
Section 12.
^^B & T, p. 2 8 ; H, 8 .
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A leap suggests not only a "going to" but a "coming
from." In Identity and Difference, Heidegger expands the
significance of the leap by revealing the "coming from."
Heidegger is speaking about the relationship of Being and
man and asks how can this domain of belonging together be
entered. He answers, "By our moving away from the attitude
of representational thinking. This move is a leap in the
sense of a spring. The spring leaps away, away from the
habitual idea of man as the rational animal who in modern
17times has become a subject for his objects."
A leap in thought leaves the representational, con­
ceptualizing of metaphysical thinking and enters the realm 
of the mutuality in immediacy of Da-sein and Beingness.
This is not a leap into the mystical but a leap which allows
what is to reveal itself, a letting shine forth of phenomena
free from the grasp and manipulation of conceptual thought. 
The leap is the "way" to something, or the "how" something
is revealed. Phenomenology, as Heidegger sees it, is this 
18way or how.
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 32. Since 
our concern here is primarily the leap itself, it will be 
mentioned only in passing that this particular quote hides 
within it the basic question of Being and Time, the ontologi­
cal difference and its meaning as well as the issue of 
representational thinking, or what has been and will be 
referred to as "immanence and non-immanence." This latter 
point reveals the metaphysical entity, the subjectivity of 
the subject. And a hint, at least, is given to the "domain 
of belonging together," what Heidegger refers to as Ereignis.
l8 ■
In his later works Heidegger introduces the German
expression, der Schritt Zurück, the step back, which seem­
ingly is a type of leap much like hermeneutics was (is) a
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Phenomenology is unique among methodologies in that
it does not base itself on the traditional schemata of
laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions
is deduced, or in other words, it does not base itself on
"proof." Phenomenology is a "how," not a "what" in the
sense of a standpoint or a position, for phenomenology does
not "posit" anything, it simply attempts to reveal or dis-
19close that which is revealing or disclosing itself to us.
20Phenomenology "is not a making, it is a seeing as a given."
Phenomenology as method directs the thinking of 
Heidegger (whether this thinking is found in Being and 
Time or any of his later works). As the "how" with which 
the "what" is to be interrogated, phenomenology is a seeing 
in the sense of a revealing or uncovering and conversely 
is not a making in the sense of positing. It is somewhat 
puzzling, therefore, to hear the charge that Heidegger is 
operating as did Kant, by fiat. If the philosopher is 
restricted by his method from deducing or proving, say.
special type of interpretation. "The step back . . .  
moves out of metaphysica into the essential nature of meta­
physics." Identity and Difference, p. ^ 1 , On Time and 
Being, p. 30.
19B 8c T, p. 50; H, 2?. "Thus our treatise does not 
subscribe to a 'stand-point' or represent any special 
'direction,' for phenomenology is nothing of either sort, 
nor can it become so as long as it understands itself."
20Medard Boss, personal interview, 1973.
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for example, the self, then all he can do "is to presup-
21pose the constituitive nature of the self by fiat."
Jacob Needleman, in his book, Being-in-the World, 
says that Heidegger is operating by fiat when he presupposes 
being-in-the-world. For Needleman, operating by fiat means 
that Heidegger has refused to accept traditionally accepted 
criteria for working with the problems of philosophy. 
Needleman says, for instance, that, " . . .  the entire 
argument of Sein und Zeit can be read as a 'justifica­
tion' . . .  of the essential Being-in-the-world of the 
22Dasein." And further, "The inherent structure of the 
Dasein is such that Being-in-the-world is presupposed; it
is antecedent to all other experiences or modes of being
23of the Dasein." In order to demonstrate this fiat and/or 
presupposed nature of Being-in-the-world, Needleman presents 
two quotes from Heidegger which he assumes will demonstrate
his point; the two quotes aire these:
. . . What then is there left to ask when one pre­
supposes that knowing is already ^Æerged7  with its
21Jacob Needleman, Being-in-the-World, trans. and 
Intro. (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 196?),
p. 17» Needleman in supporting his claim quotes from
Sartre: "In his abrupt, rather barbaric fashion of cutting
Gordian knots rather than tfying to untie them, he gives an 
answer to the question posited as pure and single defini­
tion." Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans..
Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library), p. 244.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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world which it was not supposed to get to except by 
transcending the subject?^^
Knowing is a mode of the Dasein founded on its being- 
in-the-world. This being-in-the-world as a funda- „ 
mental structure, requires antecedent interpretation.
If the "in context" nature of both of these quotes 
is examined it will be found that instead of endorsing 
Noedleman's claim, just the opposite is true. For instance, 
regarding the first quote, if Needleman had included the 
first part of the quoted sentence, a completely different 
situation would be revealed. The first part of that sentence 
reads, "But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally 
that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in- 
the-world, one might object that with such an interpreta­
tion of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; . . .'
and thus the remaining part of the sentence follows, that 
quoted by Needleman; but with the addition of the first 
part of the sentence it is plain that Heidegger is not the 
one who uses the expression "presuppose," it is the one 
who might object. The objector naturally would assume 
Being-in-the-world as "presupposition" since he "knows" 
that knowledge is really "inside" and that the object is 
really "outside." On the preceding page from where this 
quote was extracted by Needleman, Heidegger states.
P h
Ibid., B & T, p. 8 8 ; H, 6 l.
^^Xbid., B & T, p. 90; H, 62. Both of these quotes 
differ only slightly with the Mcquarrie and Robinson 
translation.
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. . . no matter how this inner sphere may get inter-
preLed, if one does no more than ask how knowing 
makes its way 'out o f  it and achieves * transcendence,' 
it becomes evident that the knowing which presents 
such enigmas will remain problematical unless one has 
previously clarified how it is and what it is.^°
The point that Needleman overlooks is that Heidegger has
not presupposed at all but has found phenomenologically
that knowing is a kind of Being that belongs to Being-in-
the-world.
The second quote covers the last two sentences of 
Section 15* Heidegger frequently uses the last few sen­
tences oar' even a whole paragraph of a section to introduce 
the theme(s) of the following section and the two sentences 
quoted by Needleman are no exceptions. As found in the 
English translation which varies slightly from the transla­
tion provided by Needleman, the quote reads; "Knowing is 
a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus 
Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be interpreted 
beforehand."
Before any phenomenological clarification of knowing 
is brought about, Being-in-the-world, as a fundamental 
state of which knowing is a mode, must be clarified first. 
The term, "Interpretation," in this sentence needs to be 
seen in the phenomenological signification of "laying bare." 
The point is that Being-in-the-world is not presupposed in 
the sense of "posit," nor are any of its equiprimordial
^^B & T, p. 86; H, 60-61.
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constituent characteristics, but it, and they, are phe­
nomenologically disclosed or revealed. Dasein, ontologi- 
cally understood, shows itself immediately without deriva­
tives or deductions as Being-in-the-world.
Another discrepancy in Needleman's treatment of 
Heidegger revolves around the former's charge that "This 
concern of man as to the nature of Being is fact for 
Heidegger just as the necessary sensory element of experi-
27
ence and knowledge is fact for Kant." But Man is not 
concerned, for the most part, with Being-ness, in point of 
fact, just the opposite is true; his preeminent concern 
with things takes him farther away from Being-ness. What 
is the "fact?" As Boss states, "That Man's essential 
structure consists of the understanding of Being is not a
28theoretical postulate, but a fact." It is the "under­
standing" of Being-ness which is the fact; that man in his 
essential nature is immediately "aware" of Being-ness as
27Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21.
28
Quoted, and evidently translated, by Jacob 
Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21. This statement was 
taken from Boss' Psychanalyse und Daseinsanalytik (Bern: 
Hans Huber Verlag, 1957), p. 61. In the English edition 
of Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, which is an expanded 
version of the German text. Boss has said, "Just as no one 
would dismiss the description of man's having two arms as 
merely a dogmatic assertion without any proof, simply 
because this fact can only be seen and can neither be 
'proved' by nor derived from, assumed presuppositions, it 
is a little justified to call Heidegger's insights into 
the fundamental nature of man's existence dogmatic, unveri­
fied assumptions." P. 31. See also pp. 35-36.
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such, the "is-ness" of a thing or things, prior to any 
determination as to what kind of being it is. The "con­
cern” is for the most part with the being or thing, not
its Being-ness. As Needleman states it, the fact is,
29"Man is the being concerned with Being." This is a 
dubious rendering of what Heidegger means by Seinsverstfelndnis 
or the understanding of Being-ness.
Needleman seems to be pushing (in the sense of 
forcing) the similarities between Kant and Heidegger. It 
appears to be better to stress the differences between 
these two thinkers rather than concentrate on their simi­
larities .
4. Heidegger, Husserl, and Consciousness
Heidegger's article on phenomenology, prepared at 
the request of Husserl for an anticipated entry into the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, was never published in that work. 
Husserl became dissatisfied with Heidegger's apparent 
divergence from the main stream (Husserlian) of phenome­
nology. The article itself was later published and within 
it is a question as to shift in thought (philosophy) from 
the Greeks and their concern with being (Seiendes) to
2 9 Needleman, Being-in-the-World, p. 21.
^^This point will be expanded when the existentialia 
are considered. See also Heidegger's treatment of Kant's 
"I Think" below, p. 66 and in Being and Time, pp. 247-249; 
H, 2 0 3-2 0 5.
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modern thought's concern with consciousness. Is this shift 
arbitrary, says Heidegger, or "is it perhaps demanded by 
the peculiarity of that which, under the title of Being,
is constantly attended to as the problem area of philoso-
31phy?" Whatever the case, the concern with consciousness
(Bewusstsein) in all its ramifications is the domain of
phenomenology. Yet as Heidegger later points out, Husserl
and phenomenology both fail in being radical enough; they
do not inquire into the mode of Being of consciousness, or
32more specifically, the subjectivity of the subject.
Perhaps it is this specific neglect of the subjec­
tivity of the subject that induced Heidegger's comment, via
his preface in Richardson's work, that Husserl was carrying
33on a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte. But 
after all, what is more evident than the giveness of the 
"I"? In point of fact, this "I" is seemingly so evident 
that it could naturally serve as a starting point for 
philosophy. And it follows that as the initial and pri­
mordial unit for philosophy, all other "givens" be disre­
garded and we as philosophers be content with expanding this
31Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," New 
Scholasticum, XLIV (Summer, 1970), p. 335*
3 2See Walter Biemel, "Husserls Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu," 
Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XII (1950), pp. 246-280.
33Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought,
p. xiv.
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formal, reflective awareness of the "I". This whole con­
cern is provided under the framework of a "formal phe­
nomenology of consciousness." But, what if this reflective 
awareness of the "I" of actions does not disclose Da-sein 
to everydayness but hides it? In that case a formal phe­
nomenology of consciousness would be perpetuating this
very hiddenness of Da-sein and indeed, for Heidegger, this
34
is precisely the case. Since this message is found in 
Being and Time and not in some of his later works, could 
it be that this is an implicit criticism of Husserl's phe­
nomenology?
One of the perennial problems of philosophy has 
been that of "Reality" or an external world which is 
extant (Vorhanden). Attempts to prove the existence of 
this external, extant world have been fruitless, not 
because of an insurmountable impasse, but because the very 
formulation of the question--on ontological not linguistic 
grounds--is repudiated. The basic nelgect of an existen­
tial analytic of Da-sein has tended to foster the re-asking 
of the question, epistemologically, as to the "problem of 
reality." Yet, this basis, says Heidegger, cannot ". . . b e
obtained by subsequently making phenomenological corrections
3 5on the concepts of subject and consciousness." Again,
^^B & T, p. 151; H, 115-116 
^^B & T, p. 250; H, 20?.
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could this statement be taken as an implicit criticism of 
the phenomenology of Husserl?
It comes as no surprise to learn from Spiegelberg 
that Husserl had a suspicion that there were hidden attacks 
against his phenomenology by Heidegger in Being and Time 
as well as in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
Indeed, Heidegger was leveling attacks against Husserl by 
questioning the legitimacy or depth of a phenomenology of 
consciousness. Yet there is no explicit criticism to be 
found in Being and Time concerning Husserl directly.
There is, however, an indirect attack. It occurs with 
Heidegger's treatment of Descartes and Kant. Recall that 
in Richardson's book Heidegger has stated that Husserl 
was continuing a pattern established by Descartes, Kant 
and Fichte.
Heidegger's treatment of Descartes in Being and Time 
is incomplete in that the proposed phenomenological destruc­
tion of the cogito in Part Two, Division 2, was never
38
published. Nevertheless, enough is provisionally revealed
A
Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Move­
ment; An Historical Introduction, Vol. I (The Hague; 
Martinus Nijhoff, 19&5), pi 332.
37Richardson, p. xiv. See p. 37 above.
o Q
Referring to the definition of the world as res 
extensa, and a consideration of the Cartesian ontology of 
"world," Heidegger says, "The considerations which follow 
will not have been grounded in full detail until the 
'cogito sum' has been phenomenologically destroyed. (See 
Part 11, Div. 2)." This is contained in that portion of 
Being and Time that has never been published. B & T, 
p. 123; H, 8 9 .
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so that at least the problem of consciousness, "mind," 
and/or subject becomes apparent. And this problem centers 
around Descartes' neglect of the sum of the cogito sum.
In other words, he left undetermined the meaning of the 
Being of the sum. If the sum is to be determined ontologi- 
cally it needs to be seen as "I am in a world" in such a 
way that the "I am" is a state of Being of which some of 
the possibilities of the Being are a comporting of myself-- 
as cogitations--as Being alongside entities within-the- 
world. Descartes, on the other hand, regarded these cogi­
tations as extant (Vorhanden) and contained within an
3 9extant ego which was worldless--the res cogitans. ^  Thus, 
by positing a lone solitary "I" (ego), cut off and sepa­
rated from a world, he undermined, not only the meaning of 
the Being of the cogito sum, but the phenomenon of world 
as well.
The difficulty is compounded when it is seen that 
even the positing of an "I" or a "subject" ontologically 
posits the subjective, even if there are ontical " . . .  pro­
testations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification
k oof consciousness'."
Regarding the question of "I" or "ego," Kant's 
treatment is superior to that of Descartes in that he does
^^B & T, p. 254; H, 211. 
& T, p. 72; H, 46.
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not see the "I" in isolation--a worldless ego. Expressed 
positively, he sees the "I" in the context of "I think" or 
"I take action." Secondly, Kant is aware of the impossi­
bility of ontically reducing the "I" to a substance. Yet 
in rejecting the substantiality of the "I", " . . .  he merely 
rejects a wrong ontical explanation of the ^I'; he has by 
no means achieved an ontological interpretation of self-
/tl
hood." For Kant, the "I" as consciousness is the form 
of representation in general, that is, as the formal struc­
ture of representing, the "I" becomes subjectum which binds 
together— it is the "logical subject." But to define the 
"I" as subject in this manner is to do so in an ontologi­
cally inappropriate manner in the sense that as that which
binds together it has the characteristics of a ". . . self-
1 0^
sameness and steadiness that is always present-at-hand." 
Making the "I think" a subject which is extant (Vorhanden) , 
Kant thereby falls back on to a metaphysics of substanti­
ality. After a sequitous route the "I think" comes back to 
the res cogitans. "'Consciousness of my Dasein' means for 
Kant a consciousness of my Being-present-at-hand in the 
sense of Descartes."
^^B & T, p. 366; H, 318.
^^B & T, p. 367; H, 320.
^^B & T, p. 2^7; H, 203. "When Kant uses the term
'Dasein' he has in mind the Being-present-at-hand of 
consciousness just as much as the Being-present-at-hand of 
Things." Ibid.
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44In Kant's "Refutation of Idealism," the theorem 
that consciousness of my own 'Dasein' proves the 'Dasein' 
of external objects, operates on the level of extantness 
(Vorhandenheit). For Heidegger, that Kant demands a proof 
at all for the "Dasein of things outside of meY shows that 
the subject--the "in me"--is taken as the starting point.
But even if this critical priority of the isolated subject-- 
the "in me" or ego--is given up, Descartes' position would 
still be retained. "What Kant proves . . .  is that entities 
which are changing and entities which are permanent are 
necessarily present-at-hand t o g e t h e r . I n  other words, 
Being-in-the-world is never touched as a theme for his 
argument; instead he falls back on the traditional distinc­
tion of an extant subject over against an extant object and
. 46their connection.
Since Heidegger has claimed that Husserl maintains 
a position held by Descartes and Kant we can ask. How is 
this so? Basically, Husserl defines consciousness in its 
essence as intentional; i.e., consciousness is always
44Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., 
Norman K. Smith (New York; St. Martin's Press, I9 6 5), 
pp. 2 74 ff.
^^B & T, p. 248; H, 204.
46Ibid. "Kant presupposes both the distinction 
between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me,' and also the 
connection between these. . . ." Also see Heidegger's "On 
the Essence of Truth" (Vom Wesen des Wahrheit) in Existence 
and Being, Intro., Werner Brock (Chicago, 111.: Henry
Regnery Co., Gateway, I9 6 8), p. 321.
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conscious of soraething--"Every cogito contains its cogi- 
47tatum." Does this definition preclude a subjectivistic
or substantival conception? An explicit attempt on the part
of Heidegger to answer this question appeared with the
publication in 1929 of Vom Wesen des Grundes.
If one characterizes every way of behaving toward 
being as intentional, then intentionality is possible 
only on the basis of transcendence. It is neither 
identical with transcendence nor that which makes 
transcendence possible.^"
Special care must be taken concerning the term 
transcendence. It does not refer to subjectivistic con­
sciousness, or more specifically, to consciousness as an
immanence somehow going over ("climbing-out-of-itself) to
49an external world regulated by "things." Transcendence 
does mean, i^, the ecstatic unity of Da-sein, or in other 
words, "openness" (Lichtung). It must be noted at this
4?Joseph J. Kockelmans, A First Introduction to 
Husserl's Phenomenology (Pittsburg, Penn.: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 19&7), p . 1?4.
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Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, trans., 
Terrence Malik, The Essence of Reason (Evanston, 111.: 
Northwestern University Press, 19^9), p. 29.
49Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, p. 305. 
Spiegelberg, for instance, in his summary of Vom Wesen des 
Grundes, says that this essay is concerned with "Transcen­
dence which means the self-transcendence of man in the 
direction of a world." (Emphasis mine.) This is an overly 
subjectivistic reading of "transcendence" as intended by 
Heidegger.
^^See Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, 
trans., Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., Inc., Anchor Books, I96I), p. 75* "But the 'transcen­
dental' there intended is not that of the subjective
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point that Heidegger had already in Being and Time alluded 
to this grounding of intentionality on transcendence, in 
a footnote. He says, "That the intentionality of 'con­
sciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein, 
and how this is the case, will be shown in the following 
D i v i s i o n . T h e  Division to which he referred was never 
published.
Being-in-the-world as transcendence "makes pos­
sible" Da-sein's concernful being alongside the ready-to- 
hand and its thematizing of extant (Vorhanden) phenomena.
This "making possible" refers to the openness, inclusive of 
that which openness is open for, which Da-sein is as 
ecstatically "projected." Or, as Heidegger says, "Having 
the ground /gründend7  in the horizonal unity of ecstatical 
temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already
have been ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it
KOentities within-the-world can be encountered." This
may be stated another way. Da-sein is open, cleared
so that it may "understand" itself and entities intentionally.
consciousness, rather it defines itself in terms of the 
existential-ecstatic temporality of human being-there."
It would have been better if Ralph Manheim, translator of 
EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik, had left "Dasein" untrans­
lated for reasons to be explained later.
^^B & T, Ftn. xxiii of Division 2, Chap. IV, p. 498. 
^^B 8c T, p. 417; H, 3 6 5-3 6 6 .
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In other words Heidegger is referring to a "pre-intentional 
state,” that of transcendence. Whereas the expressions 
"pre-intentional” and intentionality are not referred to 
explicitly in Being and Time, they can nevertheless be 
found implicitly. For instance, Heidegger states that 
Da-sein, as Da-sein, finds itself already encountering 
entities within-the-world. This is a result of Da-sein as 
transcendence; i.e., as openness to and with entities 
within-the-world. "The fact that such entities are dis­
covered along with Dasein's own 'there' of existence, is 
not left to Dasein's discretion. Only what it discovers 
and discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, 
how and how far it does so--only these are matters for
Dasein's freedom, even if always within the limitations
53of its throwness.” It appears, and we must be careful 
not to push Heidegger on this point, that the operation of 
the what, the how apd how far are intentional whereas that 
which is not left to Da-sein's discretion is pre-intentional, 
It might be objected that this identification of intention­
ality (intentional acts) does not take into consideration 
intentionality as the simple reference to an object.
This criticism may be true to a point. The intention of 
an object, however, implies the subject who, or that.
^^Ibid.
5 k See J. N. Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality 
(St. Louis: Warren H. Green, Inc., 1972), p. 9b.
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intends, it does not reveal the openness which makes that 
intention possible. If one stays on the level of inten­
tionality he is forced into a subjectivity.
Thus for Heidegger, Husserl, like his predecessors 
Descartes and Kant, fails to be "radical" in the sense of 
following through with the notion of the Being of con­
sciousness itself--the sein of Bewusstsein. Husserl did 
not investigate the way consciousness is, instead, he con­
centrated on what consciousness is. As such, he falls 
back into a subjectivistic, metaphysical posture. This 
is apparent when he takes the acts of a universal, "tran­
scendental ego" as constituting the world. By doing this,
he, like Descartes and Kant, falls back on the concept of
55an extant subjectivity which is worldless.
This does not negate Heidegger's relationship to 
phenomenology as a methodology. Heidegger would agree with 
Husserl's requirements "not to hunt deductively after con­
structions unrelated to the matter in question, but to 
derive all knowledge from its ultimate sources. . .
These "ultimate sources" refer to the phenomena themselves. 
But Heidegger will not accept a reduction to subjectivity. 
For him this is a move dictated by a metaphysics which 
rests on an unawareness of its own origins, a metaphysics 
which perpetuates a substantial and/or subjective basis.
55See Mehta, pp. 21-23. 
^^Quoted in Mehta, p. 23.
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Heidegger sees Husserl as a product of this metaphysics by
his perpetuating a subjectivism through the conception of
consciousness as basically intentional and/or grounded
57"within" a transcendental ego. Heidegger would contend 
that by accepting a definition of consciousness as inten­
tional one is tacitly endorsing the idea of an immanent 
subject relating to a transcendent (or constituted) object.
Since Husserl sees consciousness essentially as 
intentional and Heidegger sees intentionality as presupposing 
Da-sein as transcendence, consciousness for Heidegger becomes 
problematic in its basis. Anyone using consciousness as a 
synonym for Da-sein fails to understand Heidegger's aim 
and as well, perpetuates a subjectivity which it is Hei­
degger's intention to overcome.
Spiegelberg says that Heidegger in Being and Time, 
while shifting emphasis from consciousness to "human being,"
nevertheless remains subjectivistic since he makes man
59the starting point. This and other statements by
57This "interpretation" of Husserl is not without 
its critics. See Mohanty's The Concept of Intentionality, 
especially pp. 1 2 9 -1 3 2 and 14Ü-152.
g" Q
"Any attempt . . .  to re-think Being and Time is 
thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation 
that in this study the term 'being there' is used in place 
of 'consciousness'." The Way Back into the Ground of Meta­
physics , Barrett and Aiken, III, p. 134. The term "being- 
there" is Ralph Manheim's translation of Da-sein.
59Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 303 
"The Phenomenology of Sein und Zeit is still subjectivistic 
to the extent that it makes man its point of departure."
73
Spiegelberg^^ reveal that he has misunderstood Heidegger's 
Being-in-the-world and transcendence and still sees them, 
as did Husserl, in the subjectivistic model of a subject 
"in" or over "here" relating to an object over there.
When intentionality and/or consciousness is seen this way, 
it falsifies Heidegger's revealing of Da-sein's openness 
by presupposing consciousness as immanence. To assume this 
posture is to perpetuate the conception of consciousness 
as a thing or container which for Heidegger is the legacy 
of Descartes, Fichte, Kant, and Husserl. A phenomeno­
logical disclosure of Da-sein will lead through a critique 
of consciousness as immanence; this awaits Section 11.^^
In the Introduction^^ it was seen that Binswanger 
misunderstood Being-in-the-world and transcendence by con­
fusing them with a subjectivistic orientation; i.e., a 
subject "moving" toward a world. It will be noted that this 
is similar to the position of Husserl as well as Spiegelberg. 
That Binswanger understood transcendence essentially in the
Ibid., p. 301. Spiegelberg's use of "human being" 
as a translation of Da-sein misses the emphasis that Heidegger 
wants to put on Da-sein as ek-static. He also says that 
Heidegger's approach, "beginning from human being and leading 
to Being itself, reflects at least to some extent Husserl's 
primary emphasis on subjectivity." And "Sein und Zeit repre- 
sented an effort to substitute human being for the subject 
of pure consciousness, but it still approached Being from 
the same direction." P. 3l4.
^^See pp. 1 9 6 -2 1 0 below. 
^^See pp. 14-13 above.
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same manner as Husserl is no accident since he was greatly 
influenced by Husserlian phenomenology. In fact, as 
Spiegelberg has pointed out, Binswanger, after his state­
ment concerning his "productive misunderstanding" of 
Heidegger, turned again toward Husserl.
Contained in the forward to the third printing 
(1 9 6 6) of Boss' Sinn und Gehalt Per Sexuellen Perversionen 
and hence not available in English, is a statement regarding 
Binswanger's use of Daseinsanalysis and his misunderstanding 
of it. Boss states that during several seminars offered in 
Zürich jointly by himself and Heidegger, that Heidegger 
repeatedly told the participants that Binswanger had mis­
understood the Daseinsanalytik and had indeed perpetuated a 
thinking coming from Kant and Husserl. As Boss says,
With these opportunities Heidegger never tires of 
confirming to the psychiatrists that the concepts 
introduced into psychiatry by Ludwig Binswanger have 
nothing to do with his Daseinsanalytic understanding.
On the contrary, there could not exist any bigger error 
than this one which Binswanger committed with his char­
acterization of the Daseinsanalytic as an extreme con­
sequent confirmation of the doctrine of Kant and Husserl.
5. The "Leveling-off" of Phenomena
Only as ontology is phenomenology possible because 
all things revealed by phenomenology "are." Only as
64
61
Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology 
and Psychiatry (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University
Press, 1 9 7 2), pp. 2 0 9-2 1 0.
64Medard Boss, Sinn und Gehalt der Sexuellen Per­
versionen , p. 10. (My translation)
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hermeneutic is phenomenology possible for that which does 
phenomenology "is," and "is" in a special way. Its "isness," 
is equiprimordially founded by that which appears in the 
"openness" (clearedness) and brightness of its Beingness; 
an openness and brightness which is uniquely its "own," 
thereby establishing a ground of reference relations, or 
onvironmentality, which functions as the basis for interpre­
tation. Yet, for the most part, the Da-sein is not its 
own. It has fallen prey (Verfallenheit) to the objects 
which help constitute its essence. It not only has fallen 
prey to objects but covers them up in their primordiality, 
thus "seeing" them derivatively.^^
"Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to phe­
nomenon'."^^ Since Dasein essentially and for the most 
part falsifies the primordiality of the phenomena by 
covering them up, the procedure of phenomenology is to lay 
bare these covered-up phenomena by returning to, revealing 
the phenomena in their primordiality. This is primarily 
the meaning behind the statement, "Back to the things them­
selves . "
Thoughout Being and Time Heidegger has employed 
the terms "leveling off" (nivellieren) and "leveling down"
(einebnen) to describe this covering-up characteristic of
^^The next chapter deals with the characteristics
of Da-sein.
66B & T, p. 60 ; H, 36.
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Da-sein--a characteristic which is described by Heidegger
as an "essential tendency, of D a s e i n . " L e v e l i n g - o f f "
belongs to distantiality and averageness as constituting
"publicness which in turn directs the way in which Da-sein
68interprets itself and its world. Through publicness 
everything that gets observed in its own unique primordial 
structure and is seen in what might be referred to as a 
watered-down generality (commonness) which masquerades as 
clarity. Phenomenology operates to cut through this often 
multilayered generalness in order to reveal the "thing" in 
its essence. This requires doing violence to the general­
ized phenomena.
B & T, p. 1 6 5 ; H , 1 2 7 . "This care of averageness 
reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we 
call the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of Being."
See also p. 2Ô5; H , 222. In What Is Called Thinking?
(pp. 1 1 8-1 1 9 ) Heidegger refers to the seduction of language 
which entices man into an averageness or commonness. Per­
haps in this work he is carrying on, without the terminology 
exhibited in Being and Time, the same unveiling concern as 
when he speaks of the "covering up" tendencies of Da-sein.
He says language plays with our speech; it lets speech 
drift into the more obvious meanings of words. "It is as 
though man had to make an effort to live properly with 
language. It is as though such a levelling were especially 
prone to succumb to the danger of commonness."
^^Ibid., p. 1 6 5 - H, 12f.
69B & T, p. 359; H, 3 1 1. "Dasein's kind of Being 
thus demands that any ontological interpretation which 
sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their 
primordiality should capture the Being of this entity, 
in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up. 
Existential analysis^ therefore constantly has the character 
of doing violence ^Gewaltsamkeit7 whether to the claims of 
the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its 
tranquilized obviousness."
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Since the leveling down tendency of Da-sein is an
essential element, it can therefore be described in various
ways such as distantiality, averageness, and publicness.
Another way of describing this phenomenon is through the
"as" structure and its two forms, the primordial "as"
referred to as existential-hermeneutic and the "apophanti-
70cal as" of an assertion. For instance, a hammer is an 
entity which lies in a context of equipment that is ready 
to be used--or in Heideggerian language, ready-to-hand 
(zuhanden). As ready-to-hand it reaches out to, and lies 
within, a reference relation of potential equipmental involve­
ments; i.e., the hammer functions as something with which 
something is done. Yet, if an assertion is made about the 
hammer, an alteration occurs whereby the hammer is now seen 
as an "about which;" i.e., it becomes an object. In so 
doing, the assertion says something about the hammer as a 
what; it has become an "extant" (mere entity; Vorhanden)
The alteration in question takes place as a result of 
pushing the "as" of the existential-hermeneutic interpreta­
tion whereby the entity reaches out to a totality of 
involvements, to a plane of mere extantness. This altera? 
tion is described by Heidegger as a "leveling down" of the
7°Ibid., pp. 200-201; H, 157-158. The following is 
a summary of what Heidegger discusses on these two pages 
using the example of the hammer.
71Vorhanden has been translated by Macquarrie and 
Robinson as "present-at-hand" which basically means an 
object. In this dissertation the term "extant" is used.
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primordial "as" to an object status of extantness, the 
"apophahtical as" of an assertion.
Throughout Being and Time Heidegger offers examples 
of this leveling tendency of Da-sein. For instance, a 
major theme of Being and Time, and one that has become 
central to "existentialist” readings of Heidegger, has 
been that of death. Death is revealed to Da-sein by the 
attunement (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety (Angst). Anxiety, 
Heidegger warns, must not be confused with fear, particu­
larly in relation to death, fear of one's own demise. On 
the contrary, anxiety serves as the disclosedness, the 
revealing of Da-sein as thrown Being towards its end. That 
is, anxiety reveals Da-sein in its individuality, its own­
mostness, which is non-relational (unbezügliche) and which 
cannot be outstripped (unliberholbare). Yet Da-sein, with 
leveling as a basic tendency, covers up its ownmost Being- 
towards-death by fleeing from it. "Dying is levelled off
to an occurrence which reaches Dasein . . . but belongs to
7 2nobody in particular." Da-sein is thus able to characterize 
death as an actual event--an event that happens to others.
It thereby misses death as a possibility--its own possi­
bility. In so leveling death as one's ownmost possibility, 
the nonrelational and not-to-be-outstripped aspects of death 
are also covered over.
& T, p. 297; H, 253.
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In Section 3, it was seen that Heidegger regards
phenomenology with its leap--and in his later works, the
step-back, as operating as a rather " . . .  remarkable
7 3'relatedness* backward or 'forward'." This backward or
forward relationship can be referred to among other things,
as the "coming from" and "going to." This "remarkable
relatedness" is found in various forms throughout all of
Heidegger's works. It is, speaking generally, the essence
of his "Method," the essence of phenomenology. The "coming
from" and "going to" might possibly be referred to as a
dialectical relation; but caution must be taken in using
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this term since Heidegger himself disparages using it. 
Da-sein as falling (Verfallenheit) falls towards, into, 
objects in the world, but this implies not only a falling 
into but a falling from, for falling reveals that in the 
face of which Da-sein flees. It appears that for Heidegger
^^Section 3, p. 34 above; B & T , p. 28; H, 8 .
^^Heidegger states in Being and Time (p. 47; H , 25) 
that "'dialectic,' which has become a genuine philosophical 
embarrassment. . . . "  Further that dialectic becomes super­
fluous when the ontological characteristics of Da-sein are 
worked out. It appears that Heidegger's dislike for dia­
lectics is based on the relationship with subject and object, 
a relationship which Heidegger finds unclear as to its 
ground. For instance, the Greeks conceived of entities as 
a presence or presencing, to be known by a subject (B & T, 
p. 48; H, 2 5-2 6 ). But the question of what allows presencing, 
the presence of the present, was unasked. Da-sein, it must 
be remembered, is essentially Being-in-the-world; its essence 
is already defined by the present for it is open to the 
presencing. There is, in other words, an undercutting of 
the subject-object distinction upon which dialectic is 
based.
8o
the essential characteristics underlying the Daseinsanalytic 
is to reveal, via the leap, the "falling from," To lay 
bare, disclose, Da-sein's primordiality, it must be "•wrested 
from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken
by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpréta-
7 Stion." The term wrested here can be equated with phe­
nomenologically laying-bare the leveled off, or covered up, 
phenomena of falling Da-sein and revealing these phenomena 
in their essence.
For instance, as has been seen with death, Da-sein 
as falling levels down the phenomenon equating it with an 
actual event that occurs, robbing it of its essential char­
acteristics as a potentiality which is dramatically ownmost. 
By following "the opposite course," revealing that from 
which Da-sein flees, the ontological significance of death 
is disclosed.
In the later works, such as Identity and Difference 
and On Time and Being, the characteristics of "coming from" 
and "going to" can be seen operating, yet in a slightly 
different manner than in Being and Time. Whereas in Being 
and Time the central point was the unfolding of Da-sein, in 
these two later works the issues are broader, dealing with 
metaphysics, technology. Beingness, and Time. For instance, 
in Identity and Difference, Heidegger refers to moving out
^^B & T, p. 359; H, 311.
8i
or metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics.
This is not merely pushing metaphysics one more step or
revealing a presupposition heretofore not thought, but
indeed moves out of metaphysics altogether. This move is
accomplished by the step-back which for Heidegger means
7 6"the manner in which thinking moves, and along path."'
(Emphasis mine.)
In the essay, "Time and Being," Heidegger states
that in the beginning of Western metaphysics. Beingness
was thought but only in the sense of things, or as he
states it, only the "gift" is thought, not the "It gives"
77of the gift. This "self-concealment" of Beingness can
be disclosed by following the opposite course of exclusive
preoccupation with Being seen as the totality of things or
Being seen as a Being (an essent) but towards that which
gives essents. Put in another way, Heidegger moves from
what is given in the openness of beings to the openness
itself which has for the most part been concealed in beings
themselves. This openness, Lichtung, is what has been
revealed by the Daseinsanalytic of Being and Time and
7 Ôremains a major theme in Heidegger's later writings.
Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (New 
York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 19&9), p. 50.
See pp. 58-54 above for discussion of moving out of meta­
physics to the essential nature of metaphysics.
7?Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans., Joan Stam- 
baugh (New York, Evanston: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 8.
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This point is expanded in Chapter III in the dis­
cussion of Da-sein.
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Whether dealing with the essential characteristics
oi Da-sein as found in Being and Time or with the issue of
the Ereignis and the oblivion of the difference between
Beingness and beings as can be found in the later works
(notably the two just cited), this "dialectic" of the
"coming from and going to" can be found.
Medard Boss also uses this dialectical relationship
in his Daseinsanalysis. In the essay, "Anxiety, Guilt, and
79Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Boss refers to the "of 
what" (Wovor) and the "about what" (Worum) of anxiety.
Each anxiety reveals the "of what" of which it is afraid 
and an "about what" about which it is alarmed. For instance, 
the anxiety of death is the "of what" and existence, being,
8 ois the "about what." Guilt as well demonstrates this dual 
relationship. There is always a something which is owed 
and a creditor or a "to whom" to which something is owed.
6. Medard Boss and Phenomenology
Medard Boss assiduously adheres to Heidegger's claim 
that Phenomenology, following the dictum "to the things
79Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychothera­
peutic Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry, II (I9 6 2 ), 179-180.
80Heidegger says ". . . das Wovor der Angst ist das 
gemorfene In-der-Welt-sein; das Worum der Angst ist das 
In-der-Welt-sein konnen." (Emphasis mine.) Sein und Zeit, 
p. 1 9 1 . Macquarrie and Robinson render this, " . . .  that in 
the face of which we have anxiety about is our potentiality- 
for-Being-in-the-world." Being and Time, p. 235*
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themselves!” is . . opposed to all free-floating construe-
O 1
tions and accidental findings. . . For Boss this
means setting aside a philosophical and psychological heri­
tage which has relegated to the domain of "self-evident,” 
derived constructs and assumptions that from their incep­
tion were imposed from outside the phenomena in question. 
Positively stated, for Boss, phenomenology means letting 
the phenomena themselves speak to us.^^ This rather simple 
admonition is not an empty or "floating" methodological pro­
cedure but rests on the phenomenologically disclosed funda­
mental characteristics of Da-sein. These characteristics 
reveal the essential lighting-up, illuminating, disclosing 
quality that is Da-sein as Being-in-the-world. But this 
light or illumination would not be anything at all without 
that upon which it operates as disclosiveness; i.e., there 
would be no light at all unless there were something that 
could be lit up; hence, light is a "being-with-things- 
primordially." Da-sein, as this lighted realm, is what it 
is in relation to those things which come into the purview 
of its light or disclosedness, and vice versa, "things" are
®^B & T, p. 50; H, 38.
82Regarding phenomenology. Boss says, "It is a sci­
ence which simply wants us to stay with the phenomena them­
selves; a science which lets the objects themselves tell us 
all about their immediately given, inherent meaning content 
instead of ^  telling the objects what kind of intellectual 
inferences must be assumed to exist behind them." "What 
Makes Us Behave at All Socially?" Review of Existential 
Psychology and Psychiatry, IV (February, 1964), 61-62.
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by reason of their having been disclosed. By following 
the phenomenological admonition of letting the phenomena 
themselves speak, without any contrived techniques to force
O O
this "speaking," Boss reveals autonomous phenomena which 
for some--Freud for instance--would be seen as deceptions, 
not legitimate or even nonexistent.
"Analysis of Dasein categorically refrains . . .  
from imposing some arbitrary idea of being and reality-- 
however customary or 'self-evident'— on the 'particular
84essent' (Seiendes) we call 'man'." It is this strict 
phenomenological adherence that fundamentally distinguishes 
Daseinsanalysis from the natural, and many schools of the 
behavioral, sciences. Since the inception of natural sci­
ence, the watchword has been to "find," or explain phenomena
Q o
Heidegger's phenomenology is a "laying bare of 
the phenomena" devoid of technical devices to do so. He 
says, "The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked 
out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles 
on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primor- 
dially is it rooted in the way we come to terms, with the 
things themselves, and the farther is it removed from what 
we call 'technical devices,' though there are many such 
devices even in the theoretical disciplines." B & T, p. 50; 
H, 2 7 . Could this statement possibly be taken as a criti­
cism of Husserl's "way" of phenomenology?
84Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 31. 
Boss has said, "Daseinsanalysis (or analysis of Dasein) is 
neither a philosophy nor a psychotherapeutic procedure. It 
is a new empirical research method or way of observation." 
Quoted in Gion Condrauîs Die Daseinsanalyse von Medard Boss 
und ihre Bedentung fur die Psychiatrie (Êer'n; Hans Huber 
Verlag, I9 6 5)> p. 9- (My translation.) Boss has also 
stated that "Daseinsanalysis is not a system of readymade 
truth, but a method--how to approach things. It is letting 
what appears speak to you." Personal interview, 1973.
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by appealing to "dynamics" or forces "that somehow exist" 
behind the phenomena. In many instances these "forces" 
have been regarded as "more real" than the phenomenon itself. 
Since the behavioral sciences, for the most part, adopted 
the procedure as well as the practice of the natural sci­
ences, this "force" or "cause" hunting has been perpetuated. 
In several of his publications, Boss uses a statement by 
Sigmund Freud that epitomizes this natural and behavioral 
science approach and indeed, for Boss, represents the basic 
working principle of those sciences. Freud states:
We do not seek merely to describe and classify 
phenomena but to comprehend them as indications of a 
play of forces in the psyche, as expressions of goal- 
directed tendencies which work in unison or against 
one another. We are striving for a dynamic conception 
of psychic phenomena. Perceived phenomena must in our 
conception recede behind the merely assumed, posited 
tendencies. (Italics in the last sentence are those 
of Boss . ) 8 5
O c
Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho­
analysis (New York; Simon and Schuster, Clarion, I9 6 9 ), 
p . bO. The translation differs slightly from the one used 
by Boss; for example, the last sentence of the Riviere 
translation reads, "In this conception, the trends we merely 
infer are more prominent than the phenomena we perceive."
The quote in this dissertation was taken from "Anxiety,
Guilt, and Psychotherapeutic Liberation," Review of Existen­
tial Psychology and Psychiatry, II (I9 6 2 ), 175« It can 
also be found in Psychoanalysis and Dagejnsanalysis, p. 30; 
"What Makes Us Behave at All Socially^" p. 5^5 "Meaning and 
Content of Sexual Perversions," p. 11; and "The Conception 
of Man in Natural Science and Daseinsanalysis," Comprehensive 
Psychiatry, III (August, 1 9 8 2), 212. It is interesting to 
note that Binswanger also makes use of this quote from 
Freud and remarks, "This is the genuine natural-scientific 
spirit. Natural science never begins with just the phe­
nomena; indeed, its main task is to divest the phenomena 
of their phenomenality as quickly and as thoroughly as 
possible." Quoted in Needleman's Being-in-the-World, p. I5 6 .
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The three hundred or so year history of the natural
sciences, and now the behavioral sciences which follow this
ideal, demonstrate allegiance to a conception of science
which relegates the reality, independence, and uniqueness
of the phenomena to hypothesized forces, dynamics, devices,
and so forth. Boss contends that the behavioral sciences
follow a framework exemplified by Newton and Freud; but that
if the behavioral scientist listened instead to Newton's
great antagonist Wolfgang Goethe he would hear Goethe say
from his "Maxims and Reflections," "By all means, do not
search behind the phenomena; the phenomena themselves are
the teaching, their immediate appearance tells us what 
86actually is." Yet Boss is quick to point out that an 
approach based on Goethe's admonition, a phenomenological 
approach, does not attempt to abandon, let alone destroy, 
the achievements of the natural sciences. The phenomenologi­
cal approach allows for an evaluation and recognition of 
the essence of the natural sciences themselves--an essence 
which the natural sciences themselves cannot see at all. 
Phenomenologically, the natural sciences are revealed as a 
particular pre-scientific attitude or frame of reference 
toward what it encounters. "It is that ^^orld-relationshigY 
in which our world reveals itself insofar as its phenomena
Quoted in Boss, "What Makes Us Behave?" p. 6l.
This call back to Goethe can also be found in Heidegger's 
Zur Sache Des Denkens which has been translated into English 
under the title, On Time and Being, pp. 6 5-6 6 .
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are calculable, measurable, and predictable."^^ As such, 
it is but one world-relationship among many.
When the phenomena themselves get relegated to a 
secondary status in favor of dynamics or forces that some­
how underlie them they then become covered up or "leveled." 
Daseinsanalysis attempts to stay with the phenomena and 
thereby resist this leveling tendency characteristic of 
man as a whole, a tendency which desires to flee from the 
phenomena in order to rest secure in causes or forces that 
underlie them. A curious thing occurs, as Boss points out, 
when this leveling tendency is curtailed by strictly adher­
ing to the phenomena; analysis of Dasein may be more "objec­
tive" and more "scientific" than those behavioral sciences 
which use the methods appropriated from the natural sci­
ences. The term, "scientific," as has been seen, in its 
etymological sense, means to "bring about knowledge" (scire, 
to know, and facere, to make). "If 'scientific' is used in 
this unprejudiced manner, the claim that the methods of
natural science alone can yield precise information becomes 
88unwarranted."
In order to give explicit testimony to the method 
of Daseinsanalysis— a method which cannot successfully be 
divorced from the ontological structures it reveals--three
G^lbid., p. 64.
88Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 29,
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examples will be given. Since at this point primary con­
cern is with the phenomenological method, content, in the 
form of the fundamental characteristics of Da-sein itself 
must await the next chapter. The examples comprise a cross 
section of human behavior, the dream of a "normal" woman, 
the so-called repression of a nineteen-year old girl 
resulting in a paresis of the legs, and the hallucination 
of a schizophrenic.
a. Phenomenological analysis of dreams. It is to 
Sigmund Freud's merit that a whole new spectrum of behavior 
was revealed as meaningful and significant for an under­
standing of man. Unconscious phenomena, particularly that 
associated with dreams, became, in essence, the dwelling 
place for Freud's peculiar genius. Yet, true to his pre- 
scientific bias for a natural scientific approach, the phe­
nomena in question became "leveled." This leveling was 
occasioned by a conceptual ordering of a ". . . world in
which everything can be reduced to a predictable interplay 
of forces, and consequently to cause and effect. With such 
assumptions no theory other than the Freudian is possible, 
for only dreams of wish or instinctual fulfillments are
89susceptible of an immediate and dynamic explanation."
89Boss, The Analysis of Dreams, trans. , Arnold 
Pomerans (London: Rider and Co., 1957), pp. 36-37. Freud's
natural scientific bias led him to the dogmatic assertion 
that all dreams are nothing but wish fulfillments, energy 
for which came from infantile, individual wishes.
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If dreams are regarded as ‘'nothing but" representa­
tions and reproductions of "real objects" from the waking 
world, then the dream phenomena, as phenomena, have become 
impoverished as to their own phenomenality; they have, in 
essence, become leveled. Methodologically speaking, 
Daseinsanalysis attempts to cut through this leveling in 
order to expose the phenomena in their own phenomenality. 
Expressed in another way, Daseinsanalysis returns to 
phenomena in their own primordiality and lets them "speak." 
This returns the phenomena to their own sphere, not one 
based on a reference to the waking world. Dreams, there­
fore, are legitimate in their own realm, can speak within 
that realm, and do not need to be sifted through a mechanism 
or dynamism contrived by the waking world to fit its own 
criterion of explanation. This does not leave us with two 
irreducible "worlds," for after all, both are manifesta­
tions of Being-in-the-world. We are always within a 
world whether in dreaming or in the waking state.
The following is the verbatim report of a 32 year 
old lady whom Boss describes as both mentally and physi­
cally healthy. A woman of more than average intelligence
who had set about recording immediately upon waking any
dreams she had experienced.
Tonight 1 had a strange dream of an urn. At first 
1 dreaunt that 1 was sitting at the dinner table with 
my husband and children. The table was in our dining­
room, which 1 had made even more cozy by moving the
sideboard. I felt safe and peaceful in this room
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which was so dear to me. On the walls I could see the 
really good pictures which my husband loved to col­
lect: in the windows I could see flowers, and in
front of me the very attractively set table. On it
was a lovely beefsteak with roast potatoes and a juicy
lettuce. I can still feel the seductive odour of the 
roast beef pleasantly tickling my nose, and the mere 
thought of the delicious juiciness of the lettuce 
still makes my mouth water. Greedily I took one bite
after another, for I was very hungry. I was fully
absorbed in eating, and my husband and my children 
were tucking it in as well. "Do you remember," I asked 
my husband a little while later, "that we had exactly 
the same menu on the first day of our honeymoon in 
Cannes?" He confirmed it with a smile, adding, "It was 
exactly a year ago." In the dream I was not in the 
least disturbed by this ridiculous assertion, and by 
the fact that our children, five and six years old, 
were sitting at the table. We had actually been married 
for ten years. Indeed, I was fully convinced that my 
husband was right, and I then thought quietly of those 
happy days. I looked at my husband and my children, 
and I felt extremely fond of them and very near to all 
of them, especially to my eldest son. While he had 
originally been sitting in his usual place at the oppo­
site corner of the table he was suddenly and strangely 
transported right next to me. In the dream it did not 
appear strange that he had suddenly changed places 
without any movement on his or anybody else's part.
It was quite reasonable. Nor did it strike me as 
peculiar that while I was sitting so happily amongst 
my family, there suddenly appeared colourful bridges, 
reminiscent of very bright rainbows. They extended 
across the table between me and my family. A large 
and golden urn hovered on these bridges between us, 
and particularly near by favourite son.
While I was so absolutely happy, I suddenly 
thought: "Who knows how long we shall be together?
Who knows what the future will hold? Won't the Rus­
sians be here shortly?" I imagined how the Russians 
might suddenly enter our house one night and kill all 
of us. But just as quickly I thought of turning our 
garage into a hiding-place. I did all this in such 
vivid detail that, in my imagination, I could already 
see a troop of wildly gesticulating soldiers storming 
the house. And as so often happens in dreams, it was 
no longer a matter of imagination, but now I could 
actually see the Russians approaching. However, I 
immediately pulled myself together and with great effort 
of will I dispelled all these dark images. I was
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determined to feel only the happiness of the present 
and to leave the future to God. Full of eagerness I 
again turned to my husband and children and began to 
devise a plan for a drive in the afternoon.
I then awoke, because the maid had been knocking 
at the door. But for quite some time I did not know
where I was. The luncheon table around which all of
us had just been chatting so merrily, had been so real 
and vivid in all its detail, that it confused me 
utterly to find myself in bed. At first I could not 
decide which of the two was real: the luncheon which
I had just dreamt of, or my bed.
Most dream theorists, including those from opposing 
schools of thought, would agree that what occurs in dreams 
generally reflects behavioral patterns or orientations in 
the waking life which for various reasons have not been or 
could not be realized, lived out, or unfolded. In the 
dream just cited, for example, it is known that the woman
had gone to bed quite hungry. It is also known that she
was basically a maternal woman who wanted to devote herself 
to her family but was forced to work and hence was not able 
to realize that devotion, at least to the extent that she 
wanted to. Also, it is known that for some time prior to 
her dream she had fears of a Russian invasion. She had 
even considered preparing for such an invasion but had 
always suppressed these ideas when they arose.
Most dream theorists, in point of fact, would con­
sider that in this particular dream, and dreams in general.
Boss, Analysis of Dreams, pp. 77-79. What fol­
lows is a paraphrase and summary of Boss' phenomenological 
description of this dream.
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certain instinctual drives, wishes, or even basic charac­
teristics of the dreamer find some form of hallucinatory 
91expression. Yet, in all of these considerations, the 
question remains: are not these dream phenomena themselves
by-passed as to their own phenomenality in favor of either 
a psychological explanatory mechanism or an interpretation 
based upon the waking state? If this is the case and the 
dream phenomena is by-passed, does not this reflect an 
idea, perhaps an all too hasty idea, of the dreamer as a 
person who is merely asleep and in whom pictorial images 
make their appearance and run their subjective and fantasy­
laden courses? "Can the definition of such a dream as a 
hallucinatory image mean anything else than the fact that 
its phenomena are prejudged as mere hallucinations and 
representations of the corresponding objects of the waking 
w o r l d ? " 9 2
To consider all dream phenomena as hallucinations 
is to imply a form of sensory confusion. This implication 
is derived from the waking state which naturally devaluates 
the dream phenomena itself. If this implication of sensory 
confusion is then used to interpret or explain, the dream
91Boss states, for instance, that Freud, "believed 
that he had found . . . /^he7 source of energy of the
dream, once and for all, in our infantile instinctual 
wishes. Very dogmatically, therefore, he states that all 
dreams are wish fulfillments; . . . "  P. 29.
^^Ibid., p. 8l.
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as dream has become doubly misinterpreted. Yet it has 
often happened that dreamers highly prize the dream state, 
often above that of waking experience. If dreams are rele­
gated to the status of unreal hallucinatory images, man 
finds himself in the dubious position of often prizing, 
finding comfort in, unreal hallucinatory states. In the 
dream cited, the woman did not experience just images, 
mental pictures reproducing physical reality but instead 
experienced, felt, and actively participated with her 
"body," as well as her "mind" or "soul," in a world which 
was as real to her as had ever been experienced in her 
waking state. Did she not, upon awakening, wonder which 
was the real world, her bedroom or the dinner table scene 
of the dream?^^
93On this point Boss is critical as well about 
some "existential" approaches to dream analysis--notably 
that of Binswanger. According to Boss, Binswanger would 
read into the happy and contented orientation of our dreamer 
an "embodiment" or expression of the basic patterns of her 
life. He would in fact equate these embodiments as "the 
theme of elevation, the rising phase of the wave of exis­
tence." Yet it will be seen that Binswanger is also char­
acterizing the dream on the basis of the waking state 
itself--as dream phenomena merely representing objects in 
the waking world. Boss further criticizes Binswanger's 
"existential" approach to dream analysis as referring to a 
Cartesian framework whereby it is presupposed that the 
"dreamer is inherently involved in dream images in a Car­
tesian sense, as an object-substance or as a subject- 
thing. Ibid., pp. 8 2-8 3 .
After Boss has criticized Binswanger's expression 
"basic patterns" or "embodiment" as unduly imposing the 
waking life on dream phenomena, he says on page 1 1 2 , 
"Corresponding to this unequivocal mood, only those objects 
and people are allowed to enter the respective dream world 
whose essence and being correspond exactly to the behavior
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Seeing our dreamer as involved in a dual relation­
ship of external and internal worlds--a volume of space 
occupied by a body on one hand and an independent psychic 
experience on the other— merely artificially abstracts the 
dream phenomenon itself and cuts it loose from its own 
phenomenality. "The room of her dream was from the very
beginning the happily attuned space of her whole exis- 
94tence."
But what of the beef-steak and green salad that our 
dreamer reported that she was "fully absorbed in eating?" 
Does not this reveal some form of wish-fulfillment? Yet, 
if the dream itself is interrogated, there is no trace of 
wish. From the beginning of her dream, food was supplied 
to the dreamer so that there was no wishing but only 
eating. Yet it is true the dreamer went to sleep hungry ;
patterns in which the dreamer himself happens to be moving." 
(Emphasis mine.) It would appear Boss has made use of the 
very expression he has criticized Binswanger of using.
What is wrong? The translation of Boss' dream book 
Traum und seine Auslegung (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag), 19537
should be regarded as defective in places. In this particu­
lar passage, the expression, "behavior patterns," needs to 
be replaced by "attunement." Boss himself stated he was 
unable because of publishing deadlines to do anything 
about it. (Personal interview.) A similar discrepancy 
occurs in Chapter 13 where Boss is comparing Daseinsanalysis 
and Psychoanalysis and states that Daseinsanalysis is 
"indifferent both to psychotherapeutic techniques and to 
practical consequences and aims." (P. 119.) This state­
ment is wrong in translation as well as the statement pre­
ceding it which refers to Daseinsanalysis as being comparable 
to psychoanalysis only in the sense that both are "systems 
of psychology offering a theoretical understanding of man." 
These mistranslations have been corroborated by Boss him­
self. (Personal interview.)
9^Tbid., p. 83.
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but if we begin our analysis on the pre-dream state, a 
state external to the dream itself, we then push the phe­
nomenon itself from our purview and concentrate on external 
causative explanations.
Perhaps in viewing the dream we can discern certain
oral drives or instinctual experiences. Yet even here if
concepts such as drives or instincts are emphasized the
concrete phenomena become disconnected. The immediate
experience of our dreamer was neither a drive nor an
instinct but the table laden with good things to eat, the
pleasing aroma of the cooked meat, the salad--all of these
attracted her. "To turn this feeling of being attracted
by an actual something into an inner propensity means falling
9 5victim to the customary subjective interpretation of man." 
This means, for Boss, equating man with his body whereby 
he is considered to be driven by both internal and exter­
nal forces. Yet, and this is to repeat, to have this 
view is to deal more with abstractions--explanations or 
theories--than the phenomenon itself.
For Boss existence applies to dreams as well as 
the waking state. To "exist" for Boss means to be within 
a world--"within" in the sense of being "outside," along­
side particular relationships. Primordially, and this 
means essentially speaking, our dreamer "existed" within
^^Ibid., p. 85.
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a world which was attuned to, among other things, hunger.
The attunement to hunger reveals a world of eatable things.
The term hypermnesia is used to designate a 
heightened sense of memory. Since our dreamer was able 
to recall vividly and accurately the exact menu of her 
honeymoon dinner some.ten years previous, the dream might 
be explained as a product of hypermnesia. But the experi­
ence of this meal was not lost in the past. Ever since 
its happening it had been a part of her experience, remain­
ing as part of her life history. Since this experience 
was part of her very being, it was never irretrievably 
lost. It is because past events are and serve as that 
which constitutes the beingness of each individual that 
any particular event can reappear freely. In the mood of 
happiness our dreamer was open to happiness in its various 
forms both as past experience and future anticipation.
Our dreamer has revealed her unqualified sense of happi­
ness within the dream. Perhaps only on one other occasion-- 
her honeymoon in Cannes--had she experienced such happi­
ness. In other words, the happiness experienced as a young 
lover and that experienced as a dreamer corresponded so 
that the attunement of happiness found in the latter experi­
ence allowed her to rediscover the happiness of the former. 
To assert that she was able to remember accurately the 
menu of an experience ten years previously due to a 
heightened sense of memory is again to attempt to explain
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the dream in terms of a non-dreamlike theoretical formu­
lation.
Even though the dream as a whole seems to be some­
what comprehensible there nevertheless remain certain ele­
ments of nonsense and even absurdities. Several examples 
can be illustrated. For instance, it seems rather absurd 
that our dreamer would think about the Russians attacking 
and thinking so intensely that she would suddenly see 
"real” Russians attacking her. Secondly, it seems non­
sensical that the husband would contend that their honey­
moon had occurred only a year ago when in point of fact, 
it had been ten years. This is especially ludicrous when 
our dreamer agrees with him while sitting next to and 
opposite her five and six year old children. Thirdly, it 
seems utterly absurd that the favorite son would be bodily 
transported from his initial position to a seat next to 
his mother. The golden urn, in turn, hovering above a 
rainbow emanating from or to all the members of the family 
seems to be quite nonsensical.
It should be noted that these four illustrations 
of so-called nonsensical information revolve around four 
prominent features. The experiencing of the Russians 
coming to life, so to speak, from mere images is a mani­
festation of imagination. The husband with his pronounce­
ment of the time of their honeymoon and the son being 
transported from one place to another manifest the problem
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of temporal and spatial relationships. The fourth event, 
whereby the urn and rainbow appear (present themselves) 
is confronted by a preoccupation with explaining phenomena 
in terms of symbols.
It is generally believed by psychologists and 
philosophers alike that when thinking about something 
that cannot be perceived by the senses, what takes place 
is a copy or representation of a sense perception which 
flashes before the mind or brain. Given this orientation, 
it would seem difficult to explain how these inner repre­
sentations could suddenly turn into concrete external 
objects within a dream. It could be that the theory of 
representational images does not adequately describe what 
is taking place but instead tries to force the phenomenon
96by attempting to explain it.
For Boss, as well as Heidegger, to imagine some­
thing or to think of an absent person or object is not to 
exist "in" some mental representation of the object but to
96 "In the entire history of the sciences, there 
has hardly been one creative investigator who did not mis­
take some speculative abstraction in his philosophy for 
the result of empirical investigation. Freud, for example, 
suddenly believed in the reality of his instinctual abstrac­
tions just as Jung suddenly considered his idea of the 
archetype as an actual fact." Ibid., p. $4. Further,
Boss has made this observation, there is, a ". . . tendency 
in our modern, technical way of thinking which leads us 
away from what is directly given towards an objectification 
of all phenomena. It urges us to make reality unreal by 
thinking only in terms of mere abstractions and to erect 
an artificial and calculable 'pseudo-reality'." Ibid.,
p. 74.
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exist "outside," with the thing, object, or person in 
97question. " . . .  If man were not so constituted that
by merely thinking of an object that cannot be seen by
the senses, he could overcome all distance so as to be
with it, he would never be able to imagine anything at
98all, i.e., to come into the immediate presence."
Our dreamer existed with the Russians from the 
very start , with them as relational possibilities both in 
her dream state and in her waking life as well. In the 
dream state, however, her whole being was concentrated on 
and towards the Russians and their possibility as aggres­
sors so that eventually the thought about Russians con­
densed into physically perceivable forms. It is because 
she was open and with the Russians as a possibility that 
she was able to relate to them at all. It was not the 
case that somehow the Russians were within herself.
The dream offers to man a special revealing of the 
primordial characteristics of time and space. Our dreamer, 
for instance, condensed ten years into one with no apparent 
apprehension or even awareness at having done so. If it 
is said that this, as well as other dreams, is merely a 
manifestation of a confused or disturbed sense of time (or
97This reflects a crucial ontological character­
istic of Da-sein--its characteristic of Being-in-the-world 
(in-der-Welt-sein) which is extensively investigated in 
Chapter IV, Section 11, under the heading of "non-immanence."
98Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 89.
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space) the primordial characteristics are denied and a 
derived sense of time and/or space becomes the standard.
In onr dream the contraction of time was a result of an 
attunement with happiness which brought the past closer 
since her present attunement corresponded with one felt 
in the past. So intense was this "bringing closer" that 
the dreamer managed to remember in detail the dinner she 
had enjoyed while being in that particular attunement.
In reference to space, our dreamer mentioned the 
"magical" and sudden proximity of her favorite son while 
at the same time mentioning the psychological factor of 
how close he was to her heart. Closeness, bringing closer 
are existential characteristics of Da-sein, i.e., they 
operate primordially and essentially. It therefore must 
be contended--based on the phenomenological disclosure of 
Da-sein--that such events in time and space as revealed 
by our dreamer, do not constitute a breaking down or deteri­
oration of temporal and spatial relationships, but to the 
contrary, reveal a more primordial, original sense of time 
and space that remain, for the most part, hidden from the 
activities of daily life.
Central to virtually all contemporary theories of 
dreams is the opinion that most dream content is symbolic 
in nature. In our dream example, the golden urn hovering 
above a rainbow-like bridge between the dreamer and her 
family would be seen by these schools of dream theories as
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highly symbolic. Did this urn, for instance, symbolize 
the heart of our dreamer going out to build bridges or 
bonds between the dreamer and her family? Can we legiti­
mately consider the dre^m urn as well as the bridge to be 
merely symbols which represent the dreamers inner subjec­
tive disposition? Or, could both the urn and bridge be 
considered objects themselves devoid of any symbolic repre­
sentation?
For Boss, all contemporary psychologies which 
utilize the concept of symbolic representation find them­
selves in difficulty because, "they consider the essence
99of things in themselves as much too impoverished." In 
essence, the richness of the object itself is leveled to 
a point of impoverishment whereby to see it meaningfully 
at all it must be covered up, undergirded, by symbolic 
representation.
Boss demonstrates the magnitude and depth of the 
objects themselves by referring to the description of a 
bridge as found in Heidegger's "Bauen Wohnen Denken" and 
that of an urn as found in Pindar's Isthm (Ode V, verses 1-3) 
Both give an elaborate description of the respective object 
revealing the rich, multifarious relationships and possi­
bilities of each.^®^ The point made by Boss and reinforced
99lbid., p. 100.
content amplification, at this point, of the 
respective descriptions by Heidegger and Pindar would 
push the essential core of this section into interesting 
but nevertheless unnecessary dimensions. The point brought
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by Heidegger as well as Pindar, is that objects themselves 
are capable of revealing their own meaning and content—  
a content that is often more rich and full than what is 
customarily thought or believed. Imposing symbolic forms 
and interpretive schemes on the dream phenomena does 
nothing but restrict the unfolding of the objects' own 
meaning.
In his attempt to investigate the nature of sym­
bolic representation and whether or not it actually helped 
or hindered the unfolding of dream content and meaning,
Boss conducted an experiment using five women of different 
behavioral propensities. The psychological conditions 
of all five women had been studied extensively through 
Daseinsanalytic sessions. Each woman was hypnotized and 
given the suggestion that she would dream about a man 
well-known to her who in fact loved her, but who would 
approach her nude and with sexual intentions. Since each 
woman had previously had spontaneous dreams of this nature, 
it was believed the experiment would be harmless. Three
out here is that the phenomena themselves are rich in con­
tent and can themselves be interrogated without recourse 
to some theoretical superstructure. It should be noted, 
however, that Heidegger's approach in this particular 
essay is phenomenological but the language and style are 
not that as found in Being and Time. The essay reflects 
Heidegger's phenomenological thinking (this expression 
would for him be redundant)--the thinking of the so-called 
later Heidegger. The essay can be found in Poetry, Lan­
guage , Thought, trans., Albert Hofstadter (New York;
Harper and Row, 1971), pt>. l45-l6l.
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of the women who were open and non-inhibited reported 
dreams which followed the suggestion explicitly and which 
were pleasant and openly erotic. The two remaining sub­
jects, neurotic, middle-aged spinsters, reported dreams 
that were so similar in content that Boss chose to relay 
only one. The elder of the two, 4? years of age, dreamed 
that she v a is confronted by an unknown, rather coarse 
soldier, dressed in a uniform, brandishing a pistol which 
when discharged nearly hit her. She awoke in a fright. 
After repeated and searching questioning it was concluded 
that the soldier was completely unknown to her. It was 
discovered that as a young girl she had been confronted 
by some soldiers who had been billeted in her village and 
that she had become so frightened that she had run home 
and had virtually been at her mother's side ever since.
It was disclosed as well that she had a deep, almost terri­
fying fright of guns and that she identified them with 
males.
Freudian interpretation of this dream would have 
undoubtedly seen the uniformed, unknown soldier who, 
according to the hypnotic suggestion, should have been 
unclothed and someone known, as an unmistakable disguise 
and distortion by the dream censor. Through this method 
the offensive nakedness could be hidden from the conscious­
ness of the dreamer. Freud would have been hard pressed 
to explain why a man supposedly well known to the dreamer,
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as had been suggested, would become transformed into a 
totally unknown soldier. Most likely he would have tried 
to explain this as a further attempt of disguising in 
order to disarm as completely as possible the "indecent" 
quality of the dream. The pistol naturally would have 
been seen by Freud as a symbol of the male genitalia--the 
phallic.
If the dream phenomena themselves are allowed to 
speak we get a much clearer image of the overall attune­
ment of the women involved in the experiment. The three 
non-neurotic women, following the suggestion, dreamed of 
a pleasurable, open, and sensual relationship with a man 
who was allowed to approach each woman naked. The two 
neurotic, closed down, and restricted women experienced an 
anxious relationship, dangerous and anonymous. The man was 
not allowed to approach naked. The elderly spinster was 
incapable not only in her dream but also in waking life of 
opening up to a mature love relationship. In a state of 
great anxiety objects generally appear as anonymous and 
this overall attunement meets and affects all objects and 
experiences in a similar manner. The man appeared, not as 
a friend, but as a threatening, uniformed anonymous person. 
The soldier's uniform is identified not only with maleness, 
but it also makes men anonymous, impersonal. It also, in 
this instance, reveals the dreamer's narrow, restricted, 
closed down, anxiety-laden relatedness to her world.
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The pistol, as well, reveals not some super sym­
bolic camouflage, but a threatening situation. The dreamer 
had been and was extremely frightened of firearms in any 
situation. They, for her, referred to a threatening 
situation which endangered life. The pistol manifested 
itself to the dreamer because of her attunement to anxiety. 
Tn this attuned state all that could appear and did appear 
was seen in the light of her attuned anxiety. Everything 
about her dream was attuned toward the "anxious" and the 
frightful. For Boss, dreams reveal existence not conceal 
existence. "Dream phenomena are therefore always just what 
they are as they shine forth, they are an uncovering and 
unveiling and never a covering up or a veiling of psychic 
content.
In a criticism of Boss' position regarding dreams, 
Richard M. Jones states that Boss has not held to the 
requirements of logical thinking. According to Jones,
Boss admonishes dream theorists and analysts for interpret­
ing dreams from the perspective of the waking state and 
then proceeds to do the same thing, i.e., see dreams and
Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 262. 
Boss says, as well, that things often dreamed of reflect 
the "pitch" to which the dreamer is attuned, making it 
unnecessary to appeal to an unconscious or a conscious­
ness. "People in the mood of anxiety are . . . open only 
to the perception of those features of the world that are 
a threat to them." P. 100.
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102interpret them via the waking state. Jones completely
missed the point Boss is attempting to make. For Boss, 
both dreaming and existing in the waking state are charac­
teristics of Being-in-the-world, yet each is autonomous.
To dream is to be open to the world in an understanding, 
meaning-disclosing relating to what is encountered. It 
is as "real" as the waking state yet with its own autonomy. 
To see the dream as a mere alteration of the waking state, 
as mere pictures or images within a psyche is to prejudge 
the dream phenomenon and hence destroy its autonomy.
This position by Boss does not preclude looking at the 
dream from the perspective of the waking state (as the 
analyst or patient must) as long as dream phenomena are 
allowed their own autonomous relationships. Jones' criti­
cisms reveal his complete misunderstanding of the ontologi­
cal disclosure of man as Being-in-the-world and pushes him 
back into a stance that can only be described as Cartesian; 
i.e., as viewing man as a subjective enclosed ego somehow 
relating to an objective order.
102Richard M. Jones, The New Psychology of Dreaming 
(New York: Grune and Strattonl 1970). "If then, we should
hold Boss to the requirements of logical thinking, it is 
difficult to see how we could avoid attributing to this 
position the suggestion that to truly understand a dream 
one should stay asleep. In practice, however. Boss does 
observe dreams from the standpoint of the waking state and 
he does interpret them." P. 107.
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b. Phenomenological analysis of repression. In 
Freudian theory the concept of repression achieved a rank 
almost equal in status to that of the unconscious into 
which something was being repressed. As Freud saw it, 
repression, as a concept, naturally follows the concept 
of the unconscious, for the repressed is that which is 
turned away from a consciousness and therefore resides in 
the unconscious. In Freudian language, repression occurs 
when an instinctual representative, such as an idea, mental 
image, or an affect or emotion is not ego-syntonic. These 
ego-dystonic images, or affects, are those which are not 
compatible with the overall integrity and/or ethical ideals 
of the ego. The mechanism of repression is described by 
Freud in these words:
The unconscious system may be . . . compared to a 
large anteroom, in which the various mental excita­
tions are crowding upon one another, like individual 
beings. Adjoining this is a second, smaller apart­
ment, a sort of reception room, in which consciousness 
resides. But on the threshold between the two there 
stands a personage with the office of doorkeeper, who 
examines the various mental excitations, censors them, 
and denies them admittance to the reception room when 
he disapproves of them. . . .  it does not make much 
difference whether the doorkeeper turns any one impulse 
back at the threshold, or drives it out again once it 
has entered the reception room. . . .  The excitation 
in the unconscious, in the antechamber, are not visible 
to consciousness, which is of course in the other room, 
so to begin with they remain unconscious. When they 
have pressed forward to the threshold and been turned 
back by the doorkeeper, they are "incapable of becoming 
conscious," we call them then repressed.1Q3
103 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho­
analysis , p. 260.
108
Although Freud refers to the analogy just cited as
crude hypotheses and ones that only . . indicate an
104extensive approximation to the actual reality," never­
theless, the mechanism underlying these hypotheses is 
clearly demonstrable. To compound the importance of this 
model, Freud refers to the doorkeeper as "what we have 
learned to know as resistance in our attempts in analytic 
treatment to loosen the repressions. The doorkeeper, 
or whatever that represents, is that which pushes ego- 
dystonic material way from entering consciousness when 
this repressed material is referred to, either explicitly 
or implicitly, the censor or doorkeeper offers resistance 
in the form of trying to maintain its repression.
The phenomenon of defense, non-admittance and 
resistance, in psychotherapy can be acknowledged without 
the explanatory hypotheses offered by Freud. "If we look 
without prejudice," says Boss, ". . . a t  defenses as well
as that which is defended against, at resistance and the 
resisted, we begin to see that they have nothing whatever 
to do with Freud's hypotheses concerning the inner struc­
ture of the psyche or with any of the rest of his abstract 
speculations. (Emphasis mine.)
l°^Tbid. 
^°^Ibid.
^^^Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. II7 .
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Boss offers the following as an example of repres­
sion ;
A nineteen-year-old girl passed by a flower 
nursery on her way to work every day. A young 
handsome gardener who worked there seemed obviously 
interested in her; each time she passed he would look 
at her for a long time. The girl became excited when­
ever she was near him and would feel herself peculiarly 
attracted to him. This attention bewildered her. One 
day she stumbled and fell on the street directly in 
front of the entrance to the nursery. From then on 
both her legs were paralyzed.^07
In the course of psychoanalytic treatment it was learned
that this girl'i parents were prudish to an extreme degree
which often manifested itself in hostility at the slightest
sign of sensuality. Also significant were the statements
by the girl herself that her attraction to the gardener,
a unique feeling of attraction, persisted even after the
paralysis.
The assumption of the Freudian mechanics of explana­
tion would allow the assertion that an "inner" struggle 
took place between unconscious instincts and the authorita­
tive censorship of the super-ego; somehow when the girl 
approached the gardener, "sensual" strivings welled up from 
her unconscious. These psychic or instinctual representa­
tions, unable to express themselves openly, appeared in 
the form of a paresis of the legs. This explanation is 
predicated on the assumption that within her brain or 
"mind" there exist areas which house conscious and
lO^Ibid.
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unconscious psychic representations or images from the 
external world. But what is the justification for such 
assumptions? The phenomenon? What does the phenomenon 
itself reveal?
Paralysis is a phenomenon that occurs only to 
beings who are mobile. A chair, or rock does not have or 
attain a state of paralysis. Paralysis occurs in a being 
when its movement has been stopped by some blockage.
At the time leading up to and including the paraly­
sis of her legs, the girl's whole existence was nothing 
else but her being open and drawn toward the gardener.
But also present was the protective attitude of her parents 
towards any kind of sexuality. "The paralysis of the 
girl's legs shows that she had surrendered herself to her 
parents' attitude and that she still existed under its 
spell completely.
Being caught, so to speak, between the pull of the 
attitudes of her parents and being drawn toward the gar­
dener, she was able to maintain herself in the love rela­
tionship only by warding off, blocking her movement towards 
him. Nevertheless, even with this blockage there remained 
a human relationship between the girl and the gardener.
There was no repression into the unconscious either of the 
gardener or his image; instead there was only the oppressive
^°®Ibid., p. 1 1 8 .
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presence of the gardener in the world of the girl. "With­
out his oppressive presence, her blocked relationship
toward him would not have taken such complete possession
109of her existence as her paresis shows it did."
Although the girl had become possessed by her 
being attracted to the gardener, this does not necessarily 
mean that she was intellectually or reflectively aware of 
it. In fact, the girl had "fallen prey" to the rigid dic­
tates of her parents' attitudes to such an extent that 
she could not, in any intellectual or articulated sense, 
recognize the oppressive presence of the gardener as oppres­
sion. In point of fact, without this oppressive presence 
of the gardener, the blocked relationship toward him would 
not have taken so complete a possession of her existence 
as demonstrated by her paralysis. The paralysis demon­
strates that the girl's openness was not her own, that any­
thing like an independent selfhood did not exist as her 
openness; " . . .  the blocked relationship in which her 
existence was so completely absorbed could only occur 
within the bodily sphere of her existence . . .  in the form 
of the paralysis of her legs."^^^
To assume that the hysteric paralysis was "some­
thing else," a disguised, unconscious, instinctual impulse.
lO^Ibid., p. 119 
^^°Ibid.
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is to degrade the paralytic phenomenon itself. The girl 
in fact existed "outside," within, the relationship toward 
the gardener. The paralysis only reflects the extent to 
which she was "outside" and with the gardener however 
inauthentic (open or closed down) her relationship to him 
was. This adherence to the phenomena in question only 
reveals how contrived it is to think of repression as 
thoughts and emotions being stuffed into an unconscious.
To the contrary, repression " . . .  can be understood much 
more adequately as the inability of an existence to become 
engaged in an open, free, authentic, and responsible kind 
of relationship to that which is disclosed in the relation­
ship.
c. Phenomenologically disclosing the "hallucina­
tion" of a schizophrenic. The reasons for including this 
particular case as an example of the phenomenological pro­
cedure of Daseinsanalysis are two fold: first, the history
of this case was used by Medard Boss in the seminars in 
which Martin Heidegger participated; secondly, the case 
itself is reported both in Boss' Psychoanalysis and Daseins­
analysis and in his new publication Grundriss der Medizin.
The Sun Man. In the spring of I96I , a young man 
was hospitalized in the psychiatric clinic of the University
l^^Ibid., p. 120.
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of Zürich because of an acute nervous breakdown. After 
several days of rest and with the administration of tran­
quilizers the man calmed down enough to give the following 
report to the doctor.
Doctor; Why were you in a state of such severe anxiety?
Patient: Shortly before I came to the hospital, I went 
through one entire night in which I saw the sun.
I lay in ray bed; the shutters were closed and it 
was quite dark in the room. Suddenly, around half 
past nine, the sun appeared on the wall opposite 
the bed. / k  man lay sleeping on the floor beneath 
the sun^yiTZ
Doctor: Can you describe that a little more precisely?
Patient: It was a round disk about fifteen or twenty
centimeters in diameter. It was on the wall at
about head level and it moved slowly during the 
night from left to right, gradually rising higher.
Doctor: Of what was the disk composed?
Patient: It was nothing but intense light, brilliant
yellow in color. There were no solid parts.
Doctor: Did you see that in the same way you would
have seen, let us say, the lighted lamp on the 
ceiling?
Patient: No, my attention was wholly taken by this
sun. It aroused a feeling of anxiety in me. I
could not let it out of my sight for one second,
or something terrible would have happened. It 
was something stronger than man. I had to be on
my guard lest it come after me.
Doctor: Didn't you wonder a bit when you suddenly saw
this thing?
112The English version omits this sentence. In the 
German texts the sentence reads: "Unterhalb dieser Sonne
lag auf dem Fussboden ein Schlafender Mann." Grundriss 
der Medizin, p. .
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Patient: No, because I knew from the very first moment
what it meant. I know that you perhaps would have 
gone up to it if you too had been in the room; you 
would have followed the disk with your eyes and 
touched it. However, I knew at once what it meant.
I was in a state of fearful anxiety and did not 
venture to get out of bed.
Doctor: Just why do you use the word "sun" in referring
to this phenomenon?
Patient: I had just that day been compelled to think
continuously of the sun. All the time I had the 
feeling that my sex organ was connectedvwith the 
sun in the sky and was being excited by it. If I 
had lost sight of the sun on the wall, the real 
sun would have come close to the earth and the 
earth would have gone up in flames. I was becoming 
more and more anxious about that.^^^
A follow-up interview with the patient a year after 
his schizophrenic attack, revealed that he felt himself 
well and under control. He had returned to his fairly 
lucrative job at a factory and still lived with his parents 
in an apparently congenial atmosphere. He spent most of 
his free time by himself either cycling or mountain climbing. 
While he could remember explicitly the details of his ill­
ness, they nevertheless remained for the most part incom­
prehensible to him; yet he sensed that there was great 
meaning in them. He then added, "It was something that is 
always there in ordinary life as well, but I cannot apply 
it to specific individual situations." He also insisted 
that the illness had not been a mere waste of time. "Because 
of the illness I have above all come to see clearly that
113 Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, pp. 219-
220.
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one depends on others. If one neglects his relationships
with others, one gets nowhere and one's life lacks all
„114 direction."
During the interview the patient corroborated a 
report given earlier by his relatives that a few weeks 
before his "nervous breakdown" a dear and close friend 
had not appeared at a prearranged rendezvous and had not 
contacted him afterward. The young man saw this as a 
betrayal on the part of his friend. The friend had been 
from earliest childhood the person closest to the young 
man who was still profoundly hurt by the "betrayal" and 
still concerned about it.
The mentioning of the friend brought an increased 
excitement during the interview so that the doctor changed 
the subject. In response to the question of his most vivid 
experience during the illness itself, the patient replied 
that it was the night the sun had appeared to him. When 
the doctor asked what significance these imaginations had 
for him, the young man smiled embarrassingly and said,
"'You must not get the idea that I idolize the sun. The
sun was for me the highest power from which proceeds all
energy and growth!'" In regard to the question of his 
state of panic and anxiety when confronting the sun, the
young man replied, "'Just because it can at the same time
ll4Ibid., pp. 220-221.
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scorch and annihilate everything.'" And immediately he 
added, "'Now I am going to stop talking. I don't want to 
become ill again'.
This patient's world prior to his psychosis was 
that of an inordinately reserved factory worker who still 
resided with his parents. No matter how constricted or 
restricted this world was, it nevertheless was the time- 
space open to him through which and with which our patient 
dwelled in security and contentment. Within this world 
relationship, the closest thing to our patient had been 
his long standing friendship. When this collapsed so did 
the dwelling place of his Da-sein within this world- 
relationship. There was no other to help support the open­
ness within his world. His words had been, "' If one 
neglects his relationships with others, one's life lacks 
all direction.' He therefore felt completely insecure, 
exposed, and in danger of annihilation, "because being-a- 
human-being never really occurs other than as an existing 
in and a£ this or that relationship with what at any given
time succeeds in showing itself in the meaning-elucidating
117light of man's primordial nature."
^^^Ibid., pp. 221-222.
^^^Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 222, 
117Ibid. The German version of this sentence is 
slightly different; it reads, " . . .  weil Mensch-sein sich 
nie anders als ein Existieren in diesen Oder jenen verste- 
henden BezUgen zu dem ihm Begegnenden ereignene kann, das,
117
The collapse and emptiness of his "world" following 
the "betrayal" by his friend required something to refur­
bish it, to fill it again. Since this loss of his friend 
was of such magnitude for the patient only another of 
great proportion--something "superhuman" or "supernatural"-- 
could fill the emptiness. Thus an uncanny sun broke into 
the emptiness of his world, a totally new reality for him, 
nonetheless real for him as shown by his answer covering 
his perception of the ceiling light or lamp. The cold 
emptiness which had been his world was now transformed 
into a warm brightness of unheard of power. Yet this sun 
identification would not have been possible unless he had 
had a previous understanding of the nature of the sun, its 
nourishing and growing potentialities as well as those of 
its destructiveness. In other words, the sun holds in its 
power being as well as the non-being of everything. For 
him he could immediately comprehend the meaningfulness of 
the sun-disc on his wall as the "highest power from which 
proceeds all vital energy and growth, but which can at the
J- X 3same time scorch and annihilate everything." From this
in den Weltereich seines offenstandigsenis hinein anwest."
". . . because being human can never come about other
than as an existing in the understanding relations and 
responsiveness to whatever encounters it, to whatever comes 
to be present in the world realm of being-open." Grundriss, 
p. 5 0 0. Translation provided by Dr. Brian Kenney.
1x8
Ibid., pp. 223-224.
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awareness he came to know of a coming up, a dawning, of
what had come to be present and of what would "go up" into
non-being. The sun also allowed him to perceive light-
being, an "enlightenment," a "dawning" of comprehension,
understanding perception of something as something. For
if the Da-sein were not of this nature of a "dawning," or
"rising," then "never a light over anything could have
dawned" on anyone. Without this primordial dawning or
coming-up--the comprehension of something as something--
then neither of the other two "dawnings" would have been
possible; that is, the awareness of sun-ness as such and
the "coming-up" dawning, of things in their being and
119"going into" nothingness.
Yet the patient was psychotic, "mad"! Wasn't his 
hallucination nothing but an illusion, sheer nonsense?
The patient himself, however, regarded the incident, even 
after it had occurred, as quite meaningful and as an event 
that had enriched his life. This experience enabled him 
to "see" that there was something quite incomprehensible, 
impenetrable, fundamental, "something which is also there 
in everyday life," but is "not applicable to specific 
individual situations. . . . "  Could it have been that this 
sun coming as a result of his psychotic unbound being-in- 
the-world, disclosed something of the hidden nature of that 
which pervaded everything, that merely "is" as a particular
^^^Ibid., p. 224.
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being? It is not ’’applicable to the specific situation,” 
but is nevertheless in "the everyday.” Yet being different 
from everything that simply is, it itself cannot be a thing 
that is simply observed as something definite and particu­
lar. That he sees this intangibility does not reduce it 
to a nullity as something void and empty. He "knows," 
although in a manner he is not able to articulate, that
what he has sensed has to do with the concrete being of
120all things; i.e., with Being-ness as such.
Most likely the hallucinated sun presented the 
patient, not with nonsensical illusion, but with a meaning­
fulness with which he was unable to cope. This is not 
surprising since his condition was psychosis, the opposite 
of an autonomous, energetically reflecting, mature self.
The boundaries of his Da-sein had been thrown open not by 
his own maturity but by the betrayal of his friend, a 
betrayal which left his already insecure, sensitive self 
to the mercy of the "Other" which would take his friend's 
place. The other, the "super-meaning” of the sun, over­
whelmed him to a certain extent that it robbed him of what 
little autonomy and freedom he had. At this point, the 
German description of this patient and schizophrenia in 
general adds something that is not found in the English; 
Boss says.
120 Ibid., p. 224. Grundriss, p. 502.
120
The psychotic description of a Da-sein, the widen­
ing of the being-open of an existence, often seems to 
go together with a "superhuman" penetrability for the 
address of what is not observable in the everyday, and 
yet is the foundation of the everyday. One can speak 
of a schizophrenic supersensitivity for what is other­
wise hidden. Nevertheless, schizophrenicly ill patients 
prove to be men who are not equal to their super­
sensitivity, If they could stand firm in the face of 
what they perceived, they would not be ill, but would 
become and remain a visionary with genius, a philoso­
pher , or a p o e t . 121
1 21
Boss, Grundriss, p. 503. (Translated by
Dr. Brian Kenney.;
CHAPTER III
DA-SEIN; ITS FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
The way to something, the method, of Heidegger and 
Boss is phenomenology. But that entity which uses phe­
nomenology needs to be revealed ontologically. The entity 
is Da-sein. In this chapter the basic characteristics of 
Da-sein will be investigated. In section 7, Da-sein's 
fundamental characteristic, openness (Lichtung),is revealed 
and described. Included in this section is a statement 
concerning Ereignis. In section 8, the description of 
Da-sein's equiprimordial characteristics is continued by 
looking into the "existentialia" as presented in Being and 
Time, but as interpreted by Boss. In section 9, it is 
revealed that Boss offers an interpretive expansion of the 
original "existentialia" to include spatiality, temporality, 
corporeality, being-together, memory and historicity, and 
being-mortal.
7. Da-sein as "Lichtung"
Being and Time is essentially an investigation 
into the characteristics of that entity which poses the 
question of Being-ness as such--Da-sein. While this entity
121
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is in fact "man” Heidegger prefers not to use this term 
because it comes already "loaded" with all kinds of supposi­
tions, assumptions, and prejudices. Instead, he uses the 
neutral term, Da-sein. But more specifically, Da-sein is 
used to designate the ontological characteristics that 
"is" man. It is therefore legitimate to speak of the 
Da-sein that "is" man; if, on the other hand, the expres­
sion "the Da-sein" "in" man is used, the "in" must be 
seen not in the sense of an immanence but more in the 
sense of "as," or "how" man is.^
The term, Dasein, (Da-sein is preferred in this 
essay for reasons explained below) has given readers, 
translators, and specialists in Heidegger difficulties 
since its initial use in Being and Time. The term itself
in ordinary German means; exist or existence, be there,
2
presence and life; and as Heidegger himself has pointed
out, the term has been employed in Metaphysics to mean
3
existentia, actuality, reality, and objectivity. Most 
translators of Heidegger's works into English have left 
the term untranslated; but a few have offered these as
The problem of the "immanence" of consciousness, 
the container theory, has already been alluded to and is 
treated further in section 11 below.
2
Cassel's German and English Dictionary, Cassell 
and Co., Ltd., 1970. London, pp. 97 and 100.
134.
3
Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground," pp. 133-
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possible English equivalents: Richardson's "there-being,"
Manheim's "being-there," Brock's professed equivocation 
"human life," Gelven's professed equivocation "to be here," 
Magda King's professed equivocation over the use of "fac­
tual existence, man's being, or man," Marjorie Grene's 
"human being," and Spiegelburg's "human being."
Heidegger complicates the understanding as well 
as the translation of Dasein by saying, "Any attempt, 
therefore, to re-think Being and Time is thwarted as long 
as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this 
study, the term 'being there' is used in place of 'con-
5
sciousness'."
This complication is due to what appears to be a 
deep-seated habituation on the part of man; that is, con­
ceiving himself as a subject which somehow relates to an 
objective order. When man is reflected upon and conceived 
in this fashion the conception is anthropological. Since 
it has been Heidegger's task to undercut this anthropologi­
cal (subjective) conception of man, it is not difficult to 
understand his abhorrence at being classified as a
4
Richardson, pp. 34-35; Manheim, p. xi; Brock, 
p. 14; Gelven, p. 22; King, p. 69; Grene, p. 24; Spiegel- 
berg, p. 3 0 0.
^"The Way Back into the Ground," Barrett and Aiken, 
Vol. 3, p. 134.
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philosophical anthropologist or an existentialist.^ As 
Joan Stambaugh has stated, "Man is, in the language of 
Being and Time, Being-there (Da-sein), man is the 'there' 
of Being. This has nothing to do with subjectivity and 
nothing to do with the concept of human existence of 
'existentialism'.
But what does Heidegger mean by the expression "sub­
jectivity" and, as well, the expression "substance" which
g
he conceives to be one and the same thing? The tendency 
of modern thought, which can be traced back to Plato, is 
to conceive of man as "rational." Reason here means the 
faculty of representing something as something. Reason 
then becomes the dimension of subjectivity in which what 
is, i_s only as an object for a subject.
In a footnote in Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger 
points out that the published sections of Being and Time 
had no other task than "a concrete, revealing sketch
Karl LOwith quotes Heidegger as saying, "'For the 
anthropological interpretation when taken ontologically, 
can be carried out only on the basis of a clarified ontologi­
cal problematic in general. . . . "  Karl Lbwith, "The 
Nature of Man and the World of Nature for Heidegger's 80th 
Birthday," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter,
1970), 311.
7
Identity and Difference, p. 12.
g
"We are faced with the fact that metaphysical 
thinking understands man's selfhood in terms of substance 
or--and at bottom this amounts to the same--in terms of 
subject." "Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," 
found in Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century, Vol. 3, p. 135.
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^project7 of transcendence. . . We have seen that the
10term "transcendence" for Heidegger means openness. If, 
however, transcendence is conceived as a consciousness 
open to objects in the world, a self, somehow relating 
to objects, then the message and intent of Being and Time 
is not only lost but is, in point of fact, pushed into 
the very sort of subjectivity which Heidegger attempts to 
overcome.
It is important to see that Heidegger in Being 
and Time was indeed attempting to undercut subjectivistic, 
representationalistic conceptions of man by revealing via 
a hermeneutic phenomenology the essential characteristics 
of man. Those characteristics, ontological traits, were 
designated by the term, Da-sein. To see Heidegger in any 
other way--specifically as seeing Da-sein as the essential 
nature of self or subjectivity, is to obliterate the essen­
tial task of Being and Time, the ontological disclosure 
of the characteristics of Da-sein, i.e., the disclosure of 
Da-sein as transcendence. Towards the end of the essay, 
"On the Essence of Truth," (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit) 
Heidegger makes this statement:
Not only is every sort of "anthropology" and every 
sort of subjectivity (of man regarded as a subject) 
abandoned, as was already the case in Sein und Zeit, 
and the truth of Being pursued as the "ground" of a
9
The Essence of Reason, p. 97. 
l°See p. 68.
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fundamentally new attitude to history, but an effort 
is made in the course of this lecture to think in 
terms of this "ground," i.e., Da-sein.
Following Heidegger's suggestion, it is essential
that the term Da-sein be seen not as a "what" man is but
as a "way" man is. To characterize Da-sein as a "what" is
to impose artificially on Da-sein the status of an object,
an extant (Vorhanden). Da-sein can only be understood by 
12its existence. Da-sein, hence, is non-objective; but 
neither is Da-sein subjective in the sense of an encapsu­
lated, self-contained ego.
13"Da-sein heisst sein bis Da." Da-sein means
the "Being-of-the-there" or "Being-the-there." But the
"there" is not a place in the vulgar sense of "over there"
or "over here"; "there" means "openness" (world-openness).
The Being of this openness is Da-sein. "Da-sein is its
disclosed-ness," .disclosedness in the sense of "illumina­
ittion." By illumination Heidegger means that realm into
"On the Essence of Truth," in Brock's Existence 
and Being, pp. 323-324.
12". . . Because we cannot define Dasein's essence
by citing a 'what' of the kind that pertains to a subject 
matter, and because the essence lies rather in the fact 
that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as 
its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as 'Dasein,' 
a term which is purely an expression of its Being." B & T, 
pp. 32-33; H, 12.
13Medard Boss, personal interview. The expression 
Da-sein is used in this dissertation (instead of Dasein) 
in order to emphasize the notion of Being-the-there. Also 
see Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, 
2nd ed., (New York; John Wiley & Sonsl Inc., 1970), p. 559-
14B & T, p. 171; H, 133.
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which all beings, assents, may come forth, make their
appearance, or become p r e s e n t . " T o  say that it /0asein7
is illuminated ^^rleuchtet7 means that as Being-in-the-
world it is cleared /^elichtet7 in itself, not through any
other entity, but in such a way that it itself the
clearing. ( E m p h a s i s  on "cleared" and "clearing" are
mine.) Further, "The entity which bears the title "Being-
17there" is one that has been 'cleared'." (Emphasis,
Heidegger.) The term "cleared" as noted by the translators,
MacQuarrie and Robinson, comes from the German term, Lich-
X 8tung, which generally means a "clearing" in the woods.
In the same reference they stress the importance of the 
fact that the terms erleuchtet and gelichtet are cognates 
of the noun Licht which means "light."
Although mentioned only sparsely by Heidegger in 
Being and Time, the terms "cleared" and "light" are never­
theless of central importance in that treatise. Both of 
these terms refer to the fundamental characteristics of
Da-sein. "The entity which bears the title "Being-there"
19is one that has been 'cleared'." To be cleared is at 
the same time to "be light."
^^Boss, P & D, p. 39.
^^B & T, p. 171; H, 133.
^^B 8c T, p. 401; H, 350.
1 O
B & T, p. 171; H, 2.
*^^ 8 & T, p. 401; H, 350.
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The light which constitutes this clearedness /Selichtet- 
heitZ of Dasein, is not something ontically present-at- 
hand as a power source for a radiant brightness occur­
ring in the entity on occasion. That by which this 
entity is essentially cleared--in other words, that 
which makes it both "open" for itself and "bright" 
for itself--is what we have defined as "care," in 
advance of any temporal interpretation.^®
The importance of this passage, and those previously
cited as dealing with the term "Lichtung" can easily be
21missed by casual and superficial reading. What Heidegger 
has done here is to reveal the fundamental characteristic 
(ontological) of Da-sein in a single but all pervasive 
term--Lichtung. The existential analytic has the task of 
revealing the equiprimordial traits of Da-sein as Lichtung 
which is as Being-in-the-world. That this was done in 
Being and Time should not be overlooked.
Heidegger's use of primordial word meanings is 
clearly exemplified with his understanding of the important
20
B & T, pp. 401-402; H, 350.
21Heidegger is acutely aware of the flagrant mis­
understanding of his overall thinking and specifically 
that found in Being and Time. In his essay, "The Way Back 
into the Ground of Metaphysics," he refers to the oblivion 
of Being manifested by philosophy, "by the somnambulistic 
assurance with which it has passed by the real and only 
question of B & T. What is at stake here is, therefore, 
not a series of misunderstandings of a book but our abandon­
ment by Being." P. 137» Heidegger is not always so subtle 
in his characterizations of those who would fit into the 
category of "somnabulistic." In Identity and Difference 
he refers to his essay "What Is Metaphysics?" as defining 
metaphysics "as the question about beings as such and as a 
whole. The wholeness of this whole is the unity of all 
beings that unifies as the generative ground." He then 
adds, "To those who can read, this means: metaphysics is
onto-theo-logy." Identity and Difference, p. 54.
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German term Licht. In its primordial sense, as used by 
Heidegger, the word has a double meaning. First, what is 
in German Lichtung means essentially an opening, a clear­
ance (as in the forest) or a vacancy. The relationship 
of these terms with "space” should not be overlooked, in 
point of fact, in this context Lichtung means "giving 
space" or "giving room." Thus "light" is seen as an open­
ness, a "space," an emptiness, in which something may enter 
or appear. The second sense of the word licht is this 
entrance of "light" itself into the openness or cleared­
ness. The second sense presupposes the first, for without 
the openness to light, light would not be seen.
Da-sein as "cleared" is an openness to and within 
the world. Thus Da-sein is an openness to which the phe­
nomena of the world may enter, the Beingness of beings and 
this openness itself is revelatory of Beingness as such.
As Heidegger states, "To characterize with a single term 
both the involvement of Being in human nature and the 
essential relation of man to openness ('there') of Being
as such, the name of 'being there /OaseinT' was chosen for
22that sphere of being in which man stands as man." Da-sein 
is as "world-openness." But "world" in this sense does 
not mean something other than Da-sein, something "over
22
Heidegger, "The Way Back," p. 133- Also in 
Walter Kaufman's Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, 
p. 213.
130
there;*' "world" is the openness of Beingness. "'World* is
the clearing of Being, wherein man stands out from his
23thrown essence." The openness of Da-sein stands "prior" 
to anything, any light that appears "in" that openness.
But priority here is to be seen in the primordial sense of
Licht.
Da-sein, in the sense of Lichtung as openness or 
clearedness, is not an object. As the "there," openness, 
of Being, Da-sein is that through which beings in their 
Beingness become manifest as such. It, Da-sein- is unob- 
jectifiable.
Q L
In 1 9 6 9 , Heidegger's work, Zur Sache des Denkens, 
was published. In that work an essay entitled, "Das Ende 
der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens," contained 
important elements covering the topic now under considera­
tion. This work has recently been translated by Joan
23"Letter on Humanism," p. 21$. Boss states, 
"Synonymous with 'there*— the * Da * of * Dasein *— Heidegger 
also uses the terms Welt (world), Weltenwurf, in the sense 
of Welterwurf (the 'throwing open of the lightened realm 
of the world'), and Welt-Entschlossenheit, in the sense 
of Welt-Erschlossenheit (world disclosure)." P & D, p. 39< 
It will be recalled that the term, Entschlossenheit, is 
generally translated "resoluteness." Boss has stated that 
the suggestions for altering Entwurf and Entschlossenheit 
to Erwurf and Erschlossenheit, were made by Heidegger him­
self. Personal interview. See also Heidegger's "Letter 
on Humanism," p. 215*
2(lHeidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: 
Neimeyer Verlag, I9 6 9 )•
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2'5Stambaugh under the title On Time and Being. In this 
essay, Heidegger identifies openness Æichtun^T as that 
which grants a possible letting-appear of something. It 
is that which is the clearing. The German term licht 
also means open, but not in the sense of clearing. ’’But 
light never first creates openness, rather,light presup­
poses o p e n n e s s . I n t o  this openness, or clearing, not 
only light is free to enter in the form of a brightness 
and/or darkness, "but also for resonance and echo, for
sounding and diminishing of sound. The clearing is the
27open for everything that is present and absent."
Also from the "later" Heidegger can be found numer­
ous references to openness, clearing, and light. For 
instance, in Identity and Difference, Heidegger states that 
"it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive 
as presence. Such becoming present needs the openness of 
a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human
28
being." For Heidegger, Man and Beingness are appropriated
25Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York; Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 1972). The translated text bears no 
mention of the source, Zur Sache des Denkens.
^^On Time and Being, p. 6 5 .
27
Ibid. The similes, brightness, darkness, reso­
nance and echo will be met again when discussing the exis- 
tentalia in the next section.
28
Identity and Difference, p. 31. See also p. 67  
in that work where Heidegger refers to the way Beingness 
gives itself in the way in which it clears itself. This 
means that Beingness reveals itself historically and 
epochally.
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to each other. From "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger
states , "The standing in the clearing of Being I call the
29ex-sistence of Man."
The use of "light" in a descriptive as well as 
explanatory sense is not new to the history of philosophy. 
It is probably best known in the sense of the light of 
reason, or lumen naturale. But, according to Heidegger, 
the lumen naturale does not inquire into the openness or 
clearedness that is free for "light." Lumen naturale, 
reason's light, "throws light only on openness. It does 
concern the opening, but so little does it form it that 
it needs it in order to be able to illuminate what is 
present in the o p e n i n g . I n  other words, lumen naturale 
has failed to investigate the ground of that which pre­
sents itself in and to this ground. But this sounds 
familiar. In "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger says that 
metaphysics knows the "clearing of Being" only as the 
looking at what is present within it. ". . . the truth of
Being as the clearing itself remains concealed from meta- 
31physics." And in Being and Time, lumen naturale is 
referred to by Heidegger as an "ontically figurative" way 
of referring to the existential-ontological structure of
OQ
"Letter on Humanism," p. 100. See also that 
essay, pp. 204, 207, and 2 1 5.
30On Time and Being, p. 6 6 .
^^"Letter on Humanism," p. 204.
133
3 2Da-sein, "that it in such a way as to be its 'there'."
It turns out that Lichtung, the "clearedness" (openenss)
of Da-sein, the "clearing of Being" is that ground from
which the roots of the tree of metaphysics takes its 
33nourishment. The charge made by Heidegger in Being and
Time, and up to the present is that metaphysical thinking,
philosophical thinking, has failed to take into account
34this "openness."
^^B & T , p. 171; H, 133. Even in Being and Time, 
Heidegger is not denying the image of lumen naturale but 
relegating it to the ontic order which for him sees this 
image as implying an opposition between a subject who knows 
and the object of its knowledge. This involves the sub­
jectivism to which Heidegger takes exception. See Richard­
son, p. 5 9 , ftn. 8 6 .
33Heidegger uses the analogy presented by Descartes, 
that philosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, 
the trunk is physics, and the branches are other sciences, 
in order to reveal the unthought bases of thinking ("The 
Way Back," p. 129). This particular essay is considered 
by Heidegger himself as a good introduction to his thought 
(Personal interview with Medard Boss).
34One of the central themes of the "thinking" of 
the "later" Heidegger has been to elucidate the viability 
of metaphysics (philosophy) to see the clearing, the open­
ness, of Beingness. Metaphysics always thinks of beings 
in reference to other beings. When asked what beings are, 
metaphysics always answers with beings. This basic repre­
sentational thinking, however, owes its sight to the light 
of Beingness. "The light itself, i.e., that which such 
thinking experiences as light, docs not come within the 
range of metaphysical thinking; for metaphysics always 
represents beings only as beings." ("The Way Back," 
p. 129). When metaphysics thinks of beings as beings it is 
oblivious to Beingness as such. This means that it is
oblivious to the difference. (Hence, "difference" refers
to what Heidegger in Being and Time referred to as the 
"ontological difference"--see pp. 51-53 above.) By being 
oblivious to the difference, metaphysics fails to see
Beingness as the clearing, that which gives light to beings
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In a letter to Medard Boss, Heidegger stated that 
the "whole road" of his thinking could be discerned within 
the sufficient distinction between Seiendheit, the mode of
being of individual things--béing-ness, lower case--and
35Seyn, Being-ness as such. This distinction is what has 
been referred to as the ontological difference. Philosophy, 
as metaphysics, has not interrogated this difference; it 
reposes in the Beingness of what is present. This means 
that it thinks in terms of representing objects as objects. 
It also means that it has failed to see that which gives 
presence, the light or clearing of Beingness, in which
as such; it fails to see its essential nature. Only through 
a leap (spring) can thinking think the essence of meta­
physics. (See Identity and Difference, pp. 50-51 and 72. 
Heingness gives ! By this, Heidegger means the es gibt, 
the "it gives" in the sense of "there is." Beingness is 
that which gives. But the tradition of Western philosophic 
thinking (metaphysics) has been exclusively concerned with 
the "what," represented by what is given. The "It gives," 
"withdiaws in favor of the gift which it gives. That gift 
is thought and conceptualized from then on exclusively as 
Being with regard to beings." (On Time and Being, p. 8 .)
The gift is what is present and metaphysics asks only 
about what is present in regard to its presence. It does 
not raise the question about how there can be presence, or 
presencing, at all. (See On Time and Being, p. ?0.) The 
presencing of what is present refers to the openness (Lich­
tung) which allows the present to appear. Presencing, 
openness, and the allowing to appear remain unthought in 
metaphysics and for Heidegger this extends to philosophy 
as well. (See "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking," in On Time and Being, pp. 55-73.)
3 5Portions of this letter can be found in Psycho­
analysis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 36, ftn. 4. See p. 
above.
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things make their presence, thus coming into unconceal­
ment (UnVerborgenheit).
If the clearing is heeded--and this requires the 
leap (spring) from metaphysical thinking to that thinking 
as letting-be (Gelassenheit)--what is revealed is not only 
the clearing, the presencing of the present but also the 
relationship of Beingness and man. This is Ereignis.
", . . in allem Verstellen des Gestells lichtet sich der
Lichtblick von Welt, blitzt Wahrheit des Seins.” (Emphasis 
added)
" . . .  in every displacing of Gestell, the clearing-
g ^
emerging of world opens up ; the truth of Being flashes."
(Emphasis added) With Ereignis, the thinking of Heidegger
moves into its latest stages. Yet it must be emphasized
that this is not an alternation on his part of previous
thinking, but indeed an extension along the path. In
Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger notes that it will probably
come as a shock to many who follow his thought to realize
"that the author has been using in his manuscripts the
37word Ereignis . . .  for more than twenty-five years." 
Nevertheless, Ereignis marks a significant deepening of
Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," trans.,
Kenneth R. Maly, Research in Phenomenology, Vol. I, 1971i 
pp. 3-1 6 -, p. 13 1 ftn. 22.
37Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache 
(Pfullingen: GUnther Neske Verlag, 1971» originally 1959),
p. 2 6 0 . This note can also be found in J. L. Mehta's The 
Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p. 213, ftn. 30.
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Heidegger's original Seinsfrage and at the same time it is 
an understatement of sorts to say that Ereignis is not 
easily understood but easy to misunderstand. As Heidegger 
states in Identity and Difference, the term Ereignis 
should be taken as a key term in the service of thought 
and "it can no more be translated than the Greek
38(Logos) or the Chinese Tao."
The term Ereignis simply means "event." Yet
Heidegger uses it, as he does so many of his terms, in
the etymological sense of "the occurrence of owning"--
Er-eignis. Translators of Heideggerian works tend to use
the expression "disclosure of appropriation" or the "event
39of appropriation" or simply "e-vent." The term appropria­
tion, while catching the flavor of the meaning of Er-eignis. 
may indeed be too harsh.
Er-eignis refers to the relation belonging to 
Beingness, time, man, and essents as such. Yet it is not 
a relationship in the traditional sense of something 
relating to another thing. The "es gibt," the "there is," 
or "it gives" is understood by Heidegger as "there is some­
thing which grants." And the "something which grants is
O
Identity and Difference, p. 3 6 .
39See Richard Hofstadter, Poetry, Language, Thought 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), P« xxi; Heidegger,
Identity and Difference, p. l4; and Richardsons,
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (Ni.ihoff,
196'3'J, p. '6"i4.--- ^ ^
137
koEr-eignis." But there is an immediate difficulty;
"that" (the "it") which grants is no "that" or "it" in 
the sense of being a thing. Our language, and hence our 
thought, tends to isolate Beingness and man into independent 
existing entities, even though they are in relation. 
Er-eignis is the identity which grants, makes possible as 
well as pervades both (as well as time) in their differ­
ence. In this case Er-eignis supercedes both the expres­
sion Beingness and man. As Heidegger expresses it, "when 
Beingness is thought in its truth it undergoes a transfor­
mation and in consequence loses its name; in the Er-eignis
4lBeing itself is 'got over'."
It should not come as a shock to find Heidegger 
saying that Beingness thought in its truth loses its name. 
For years Heidegger has been trying certain locutions 
which would convey the uniqueness of Beingness as such.
This has been prompted as well by this term's repeated 
associations with traditional metaphysical thinking. 
Heidegger has used the German expression Sein, for instance, 
as and the old German term Seyn. Er-eignis as e-vent
should not be conceived as an entity or even a "happening"
^0See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on Time and 
Being," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter, 
1 9 7 0 ), 3 3 1-3 3 2 . Also see On Time and Being, p. 19 and 
pp. 38-41.
4l
Quoted in Mehta's The Philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, p. 214. This quote comes from Heidegger's 
Vortrhge und Aufsatze, p. 71.
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between entities; it is as the sphere of primordial Identity 
whereby Beingness and man (as well as time) attain their 
own essential natures (Eigen) as well as bje one with the 
other in mutual owning and unity. "Being belongs, along 
with thought, in an Identity of which the nature has its
source in that letting belong-together which we call the
42Er-eignis."
Was ist der Er-eignis? What is the Er-eignis ?
The question itself is inadequate since by the very nature
of grammar the question asks about Er-eignis as if it were
a something which is present. Our grammar is suited to
asking questions about beings; but Er-eignis is no being
and as such cannot be seen as an event or happening (of
something) or an appropriation or Identity (of something)
or is "it" an emanation from anything. "Heidegger clearly
states that Ereignis cannot be described by any grammatical
43form of sentence; it only can be experienced." The ques­
tion "what is Er-eignis?" not only asks about a something 
but asks about the way of beingness of the Er-eignis. But 
Beingness as such belongs within Er-eignis in that Beingness 
"emanates" out of Er-eignis. Thus the question "what is 
Ereignis?" is doomed from the very start.
42Ibid., p. 212. Supposedly this statement, as 
found in Mehta's work, comes from Heidegger although it is 
not footnoted.
^^Medard Boss, personal letter, Feb. 9, 1974.
See Heidegger's On Time and Being, pp. 19-20.
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Despite this bleak forecast, Er-eignis can be
described in a periphery manner. Er-eignis is that which
brings Beingness, Man, Time, essents, and so forth, into
their own (eigen) "natures" as well as belonging together.
In other words, Er-eignis bestows, grants, the area of
openness (Lichtung). To repeat, it must be understood that
Er-eignis in granting (the "it" of es gibt) supercedes
both Beingness and Man. Seeing or understanding Er-eignis
as "appropriation" might give one the impression of an
"after the fact" phenomenon; i.e., something happening on
this side of Beingness, man, and the others. But Er-eignis
is not to be seen as a "coming before or after" but as a
"giving," a granting of the essential nature. As Boss
says, "The English translators seem to have misunderstood
the 'Ereignen' and the 'Eigenes' of things by deriving
their meaning from 'Sich-aneignen' which is to appropriate.
The Heideggerian 'Eigen' and 'Er-eignen' however, have
'only' to do with what you call 'the essential,' the proper
44
nature of something."
Primordial Er-eignis is that whereby man is
45
allowed to challenge and be challenged by Beingness.
44
Medard Boss, personal letter, Feb. 9, 197^»
45
Er-eignis is also seen as, and holding open, 
the Geviert which is translated and means the "four regions 
of the Square," sometimes referred to as the "Four-fold," 
or "Quadrate." Heidegger has not elucidated the Four-fold 
with the detail and development as he has Er-eignis and 
hence this relationship remains somewhat obscure and
l40
This mutuality of challenging reveals itself historically
problematic as to its meaning. Specifically, Heidegger 
discusses the Geviert in "Bauen Wohnen Denken," "Das Ding," 
and "Holderlines Ërde und Himmel." The Four-fold regions 
are those of Earth, the Heavens (Sky), Gods (Divinities), 
and Mortals. The Earth is that from which and out of 
which everything emerges. In ancient times this was called 
Physis by the Greeks. "'The Earth is that into which the 
emergence of all that comes forth is as such referred back' 
in which it remains embedded as its sustaining principle." 
(Taken from "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, 
quoted in Mehta, p. 218.) Heaven is the pure principal of 
light in which everything that emerges into unconcealment 
shines forth. The Gods, or Immortals, are the messengers 
of divinity which usher in the area of holiness in which 
God may appear, even if but through his absence. The 
Mortals refers to man as that which takes upon himself his 
own death a^ death. Each of these four belongs to, is 
in relation to, the others and as such involve an insoluble 
unity. "But 'on the earth' already means 'under the sky.' 
Both of these also mean 'remaining before the divinities' 
and include a 'belonging to men's being with one another.'
By a primal oneness the four--earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals--belong together in one." (Building Dwelling 
Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. l4g.) The cen­
tral core of the unity of the Four-fold is Er-eignis itself.
In the essay "the thing" (found in Poetry, Lan­
guage , Thought, pp. 1 6 5 -1 8 2 ), Heidegger illustrates the 
gathering together and holding in unity of the Four-fold 
by reference to a jug or pitcher. The pouring out of the 
wine or water from the jug combines the four aspects of 
the Four-fold. Water comes from the earth in the form of 
rain or from springs--wine comes from the vine and the sky 
is that which gives rain as well as growing nourishment of 
the sun. Mortals use the water or wine to quench thirst 
or to warm their hearts and as for the Gods, the liquid is 
used often as a libation. All four entail the other, 
mirror each other (Spiegel--Spiel--mirror game). "The 
mirroring even grants to each of the four their own respec­
tive freedom, yet, at the same time, binds each (of the 
liberated) to the unity (singleness or simplicity) of their 
essential mutuality." Heidegger, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze 
(Tubingen: Neske Verlag, 1954), p. 178 (My translation).
This mutual interdependency and "owning" is reminiscent of 
Hegelian dialectics, at least dialectics as understood 
devoid of the "Hegel myth" of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. 
/See Hegel: The Man, His Vision and Work, by Gustav Mueller
TWew York: Pageant Press, I9 6 8), pp. 4-lOjJ/ It is enough
here to point out these similarities without pursuing them 
in detail.
I4l
in the configuration of various epochs. As man, Da-sein 
is open, cleared (Lichtung) for the challenge of things; 
he sees these in the "light of truth" of various epochs,
"as a-lethia, as nomoiosis, as doctrina, as certitude, as
46the Eternal Presence of the same, as Ge-stell," Thus 
truth reveals itself, therefore, not only as history but 
as destiny (Geschick). This means that man finds himself 
"thrown" into and within the grip of the prevailing form 
of truth manifested within a particular epoch. Yet truth 
in its primordial sense, truth as Er-eignis, that which 
bestows the clearing, remains hidden; indeed, it is pro­
gressively pushed further into oblivion via the various 
historical epochs. Primordial truth in the sense of 
Er-eignis remains hidden because Er-eignis cannot "present" 
itself, be given as an object of thought, categorized 
within a concept, represented as some-thing. It is 
un-objectifiable since it is "that" which gives the light, 
gives and is the Identity, which enables the present to be 
present.
Historically, Beingness has been seen in the sense 
of the present, being present. The meaning of present, 
the presencing of the present, has not been seen. The 
epoch of contemporary history is the Ge-stell. For Heidegger 
this is the age whereby the configuration of man and
46Mehta, p. 232.
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Beingness, the mutual challenge of both, is the age of
Techne, Technology. In this age that which presents itself
is basically seen via representational thinking; i.e., man
represents essents in respect to what they are, how they
are, why they are. But all representing is thinking in
terms of grasping (Be-greifen). In this sense, thinking
is a chasing, a pursuing and a derogation of what is.
But thinking can become more thoughtful. It can
return to and reveal that which gives the presencing.
The nature of man, as disclosed through fundamental ontology,
reveals that he is as a turning away and turning towards.
As such, man is capable of turning towards that from which
he has turned away. This, as has been seen, requires the
leap, or the step back. But this type of thinking, thinking
that thinks Beingness, must be initiated in terms of the
truth of Beingness itself, not in terms of the represented.
To do the latter would be to fall into subjectivity. To
reveal the essence of thinking, as well as that of man as
Da-sein, must be attempted, "from the side of Being and so
must be described in terms of Being itself rather than of
47man as metaphysics invariably does."
Thinking, in the sense that Heidegger sees it, "is 
not a grasping, neither the grasp of what lies before us.
^^Mehta, p. 241. These are the words of Mehta,
not Heidegger.
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48nor an attack upon it." Thinking does not mould into 
shape by gripping; it does not re-present that which it 
thinks. Thinking which ceases to be representational and 
conceptual simply "lets-be." It is a waiting which by
49waiting leaves itself open for what is being waited for.
In so waiting man stands within (Instancy--Instandigkeit) 
what is nearest; i.e., Er-eignis, as primordial truth, the 
nearness (Ndhe) itself.
It is important to see thinking in the sense of 
Gelassenheit, in its own-mostness; i.e., as it is in itself, 
not as the opposite of some already preconceived notion of 
what thinking should be. If thinking is conceived in this 
fashion as an opposite, it would be an abdication of thought, 
a leap into the mystical or some kind of intuitive, unmedi­
ated cognition. But this is not what Heidegger means by 
thinking.
As Heidegger points out in his "Letter on Humanism" 
when one hears about the opposition to such things as 
"humanism," "logic," "values," "world," "God," it is immedi­
ately assumed that the negative of these "positive" phe­
nomena is e n d o r s e d . T o  be in opposition to logic, for
48What Is Called Thinking? p. 211. Was Heisst 
Denken? It would better fit Heidegger's meaning as devel­
oped in this work if it were translated, "What demands 
thinking?" or "What e-vokes thinking?"
49See Discourse on Thinking, p. 68.
^^"Letter on Humanism," p. 213.
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instance, does not mean to ru^ i headlong into the illogical 
or to proclaim irrationalism as truth. Thinking "counter 
to logic" means returning to the essence of logic (logos), 
and thinking through this essence by letting this essence 
shine forth in its ownmost phénoménologie content.
Thinking in this manner is a leap which merely 
transforms the nature of thought, so that "surrendering its 
conceptuality, its will to grasp, it becomes a simple 
co-respondence to the Ereignis, content in its function of 
letting what is reveal itself, of letting truth shine forth 
in all its obscuring-revealing mystery.
To recapitulate, the central theme of this section 
is the term Lichtung. The Lichtung, which is Da-sein as 
openness, is granted by Er-eignis. The openness of Da-sein, 
the unobjectifiable essence of man, allows for the "entrance" 
and "exit" of things into or within the openness. And at 
the same time, those things which manifest themselves are 
integral with the essence of Da-sein, for without those 
"things" the openness would not be open to be filled, the 
clearing would not be cleared for things to manifest them­
selves and ^2" The mutuality suggested here of openness 
and that which comes into the openness as unconcealment 
suggests that man is owned by Beingness as that clearing 
"into" which Beingness manifests itself. This suggests
^^Mehta, p. 24?.
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that man as Lichtung is needed by Beingness and that man 
in turn tends the openness. "Man is the Shepherd of Being­
ness . "
Heidegger states in Sein und Zeit, "Erschlossen- 
heit aber ist die Grundart des Daseins, gemBB der es sein 
Da ist. Erschlossenheit wird durch Befindlichkeit,
Verstehen und Rede konstituiert und betrifft gleichur- 
sprUnglich die Welt, das In-sein und das Selbst." (.Æut7 
disclosedness is that basic characteristic of Da-sein 
according to which it is its there. Disclosedness is con­
stituted by attunement, primary comprehension, and human
language, and refers equipriinordially to the World, Being-
c o
in and the Self.) He also says, in reference to dis­
closedness, "In the following, 'disclose' and 'disclosed­
ness' will be used in a special terminological sense to 
signify 'to lay open' and 'to have been laid open.' 'Dis­
close, therefore, never means something like obtaining some-
53thing indirectly through inference'."
"Disclose" (Erschilessen) in the sense of laying 
open needs to be seen as erleuchtct, illuminated. Da-sein 
is the realm of lumination into which all beings may shine 
forth. This realm of lumination refers to the cleared, 
open realm of the "there." As Heidegger says of Da-sein,
5 2Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 220. (My translation.)
53Ibid., p. 75* (My translation.)
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"To say that it is illuminated ('erleuchtet') means that
as Being-in-the-world it is cleared ygelichte^ in itself,
not through any other entity, but in such a way that it
54itself the clearing." Luminosity, however, occurs only
when there is something to illuminate. The primordial
unity of man as Da-sein and his world is "the inseparable
one of a luminating realm and what shines forth in the 
5 5luminosity." The resemblance between Lichtung as gelich- 
tet (light) and erleuchtet (illumination) needs to be seen.
8. The Existentialia
Jacob Needleman's Being-in-the-world contains an 
elaborate argument, as has been seen^^ that attempts to 
demonstrate the "fiat" nature of both Kant and Heidegger.
In addition, Needleman argues that Heidegger's Being-in- 
the-world involves the "constituting," through the endowing 
of meaning of the being of the world as well as the self. 
And further, "Care and its components, the existentials, 
function for Heidegger in a manner analagous to the Kantian 
categories in that they are the forms through which ontic
54
B & T, p. 171; H, 133» Richardson says, "To 
say that there-being is 'lit up' (erleuchtet) means that, 
insofar as it is to-be-in-the-world, there-being is 
illumined not by some other being but rather is itself the 
lighting process (Lichtung). This luminosity of the there 
(disclosedness of the world) is not something added to 
there-being but it is its innermost constitution." (Emphasis 
mine.) p. 59.
& D, pp. 84-85.
cf.
See above, p. 57.
147
*57reality can manifest itself to the Dasein.” ' (Emphasis 
added.) Yet, Needleman concedes that there is a difference 
between Kant and Heidegger on this point; the former saw 
the forms as creating objects to be encountered as "not- 
self" in the world, whereas the latter regards "care and 
its components" more in the sense of "matrices" which 
represent possible modes of relationship between Da-sein 
and world. As matrices, "care and its components," form a 
place, or an internal relation among possible groups of 
variables. It is with this conception that Binswanger 
moves on to his notion of "meaning-matrix" and "world- 
design."
Needleman's overall argument falsifies Heidegger's 
description of the existentials in the sense that it views 
them as a priori structures that somehow mold the "phe­
nomena" into meaningful ontic activity. This presupposes 
that the existentials somehow meet and alter "external" 
experience. By doing this, not only is the distinction 
between ontological and ontic radically bifurcated but the 
scepter of subject-object relationships is "allowed to
58
re-enter." If this occurs, the meaning of Da-sein as
^^Being-in-the-World, p. 22.
^^Note in the previous quote from Needleman (Ibid., 
p. 22), that the use of the expression "ontic reality" 
indicates the attempt to radically separate the ontic from 
the ontological, thus re-introducing a subject-object 
imbalance. This is most emphatically antithetical to 
Heidegger's description of ontological and ontic realms.
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Being-in-the-world is thwarted in its intent and in its 
place re-enters the idea of Da-sein as a Being that relates 
to, and hence is over against, a world. But Da-sein does 
not relate to a world, Da-sein is already "in" the world 
as being with the world. Da-sein is Being-in-the-world 
and this is a fundamental, primordial characteristic. If 
the existentials are regarded in this manner, as a priori 
structures or matrices which meet and mold, then the ontic 
characteristic of existing human beings would, by neces­
sity be seen as a posteriori realization of these molding 
structures. It is this type of "metaphysical" thinking 
that Heidegger particularly in Being and Time is trying to 
reveal as a distortion of the phenomenological findings.
As Boss says about Heidegger,
He emphasizes continually that one must not pic­
ture the essential condition of Dasein (as he has 
shown it) as something which exists in itself, forms a 
background, and is of the nature of a design (in the 
sense of 'Platonic Ideas'), a design which has to be 
deduced, by logical procedures, from observable human 
phenomena which always fall short of the design it­
self. 59 (Emphasis added.)
P & D , p. 40. Heidegger states in Being and Time, 
ftn. 10, p. 75; H, 5 0 : ". . . to disclose the a priori
is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction." (Emphasis 
added.) Boss has said* "What is Anwesenheit, coming to the 
present, is not molded by existentialia, but they merely 
serve the objects to shine forth, they give the light."
(Personal interview.) And Heidegger has also said, " . . .  the 
significance-relationships which determine the structure 
of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless 
subject has laid over some kind of material." B & T, 
pT 417; H , 3 6 6 . (Emphasis added.)
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In short, the existentialia do not refer to capaci­
ties that man has but refer to what Da-sein i^. Da-sein 
is only as Being-in-the-world, not as some potential or 
capacity that shapes the world as Kant's forms and cate­
gories did. Da-sein is a meaning-disclosing entity in the 
world but the emphasis is on is, not has. Da-sein does not 
have a capacity to endow meaning. Da-sein is the disclosing 
of meaning. But meaning is always to be seen as meaning of 
something, not meaning as an abstraction in and of itself. 
The position argued for by Needleman tends to separate 
ontological and ontic "reality" into two distinct regions. 
Needleman states for instance, " . . .  the expression Being- 
in-the-world is an empty formula that says nothing about 
human beings, but only about human being. . .
Sartre says in Being and Nothingness that the onto­
logical realm and the ontical realm are "two incommunicable 
levels" which create two problems requiring separate solu­
tions.^^ For Sartre, the ontological realm is an abstrac­
tion which has little or nothing to do with the actual 
observable concrete behavior of the ontic realm. In
^^Needleman, p. 20.
^^Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 248. 
The use of the phrase "ontological structures" by Sartre 
reveals a tendency to think of ontological characteristics 
that Da-sein has as properties or things. Yet the ontologi­
cal characteristics are revelatory of ways of Being. See 
Being and Nothingness, pp. 247-24?.
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essence, as Sartre sees it, these two realms exist on radi­
cally different and incommunicable levels. This argument 
misses Heidegger's own explicit assertion that the ontologi­
cal characteristics must never be severed from ontic, 
concrete phenomena. ". . . the roots of the existential
analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that 
is, o n t i c a l . A  philosophical interrogation of the exis- 
tentiality of existence in order to provide for an ade­
quately founded ontological problematic must, and can only 
be seen as an existentiell, ontic possibility of each 
existing Da-sein.
To distinguish radically ontological characteristics 
from ontical behavior and concrete action is to perpetuate 
a conception as old as Plato who distinguished between the 
world of "ideas" and the "physical" world perceived by the 
senses. And, as well, it perpetuates the legacy of Descartes' 
bifurcation of reality into res cogitan, again "idea" or 
"mind," and res extensa, the world of measurable, quanti­
fiable, and hence "real" things. With their radically 
split "realms of reality" both Plato and Descartes faced 
the dilemma of getting these two realms into some kind of 
harmonious relationship. The former had the problem of 
"participation," the latter that of "interaction."
& T, p. 34; H, 13.
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The phenomenological disclosures of Heidegger's 
works reveal the opposite of the tendency to make distinct 
the two basic structures of human existence. It is only 
as ontological that ontic phenomena are and only as ontic 
that ontological phenomena are. It is not only the case 
that ontological characteristics of human existence "make 
possible" ontic or concrete phenomena, but that these 
ontological characteristics are found "in" and "alongside" 
ontic phenomena. This point cannot be over-emphasized!
Existentialia as ontological characteristics of 
human existence are found "accompanying" all ontic phe­
nomena. Heidegger describes this accompanying relation- 
ship with the use of the German expression waiten. The 
term itself means basically to rule, govern, control, or
6 kmanage. Richardson translates waiten as "holding sway." 
But this has the connotation, as do the other meanings, of 
suppression or stifling and this is not what Heidegger 
moans by the term. He means, on the contrary, pervading 
something as its essence, an essential or proper charac­
teristic. This is the opposite of suppression in that it 
is not holding something down but instead is allowing or
^ g
See Identity and Difference, pp. 36 and 100. Also 
Heidegger's, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit {Frankfurt; Klosterman, 
1959) 1 p. 21.
6 k Richardson, p. 223• Whereas the use of this 
expression is found particularly in post Being and Time 
works, its meaning can be used to describe the relation of 
ontological existentialia and concrete phenomena. (Medard 
Boss, personal interview.)
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enabling something to appear in what it actually is. This 
is not a molding, a fabricating, or a design of matrices 
or patterns, but rather a letting of phenomena come forth 
in more or less complete or covered-up fashion. For an 
example, the existential of attunement (Befindlichkeit) 
is not a thing or particular being but an ontological fea­
ture, trait, or characteristic that pervades each ontic 
manifestation of attunement— a particular mood. For instance, 
it can be stated Daseinsanalytically that for each particu­
lar depression waltet the existential of attunement.
Attunement in this case is revealed as the essence of 
depression. Thus every ontic manifestation of concrete 
(ontic) behavior is revelatory of the essence or trait 
pervading that behavior. Any attempt to make these two 
realms radically distinct and "incommunicable" not only 
falsifies the phenomenological disclosures but, if inter­
preted as coming from Heidegger, misreads and falsifies 
Heidegger's intent.
Perhaps one of the major reasons for this kind of 
erroneous interpretation of Heidegger's thought can be 
found in the tendency of Western thinking to reify concepts, 
abstractions, and "word-signs." It would appear that this 
tendency is especially prevalent when considering the exis­
tentialia as found in Being and Time. In Was Heisst 
Denken? Heidegger alludes to a type of behavior he calls 
"Blink." The term evidently comes from Nietzsche, but
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Heidegger interprets it as meaning "to play up and set up 
a glittering deception which is then agreed upon as true 
and valid--with the mutual tacit understanding not to 
question the s e t - u p . A c c o r d i n g  to Heidegger, this type 
of thinking forms the metaphysical basis of the modern age. 
Whether it is the "blink" or not, Western man seems pro­
pelled towards a repeated hypostatization of abstract, 
conceptual phenomena. Even though steps may be taken to 
guard against this behavioral trait, it is nevertheless at 
times seemingly difficult to maintain a posture of open­
ness.
The existentialia are easily mistaken as something 
that Da-sein has, rather than the way Da-sein To
fall into this trap is to reintroduce those elements of 
thought which the hermeneutic phenomenology of Being and 
Time has attempted to make transparent. To do so is, for 
Heidegger, a perpetuation of the oblivion of the question 
of Beingness.
What Is Called Thinking? pp. and 82. Heidegger 
uses the example of the "invention" of happiness to illus­
trate blinking. " . . .  despite this invention of happi­
ness, man is driven from one world war into the next. With 
a wink the nations are informed that peace is the elimina­
tion of war, but that meanwhile this peace which eliminates 
war can be secured only by war. Against this war-peace, 
in turn, we launch a peace offensive whose attacks can 
hardly be called peaceful. War--the securing of peace; 
and peace--the elimination of war. How is peace secured 
by what it eliminates? Something is fundamentally out of 
joint here, or perhaps it has never yet been in joint."
P. 83.
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In terms of architectonic, Being and Time specifi­
cally concerns itself in the existential analytic with the 
primordial and all encompassing existential Being-in-the- 
world (in-der-WeIt-sein). It then turns attention to the 
equiprimordial characteristics of Being-in-the-world.
These characteristics are then repeated on an altogether 
higher and "more ontological" descriptive basis due to a 
unification of all existentials, including the modes of 
Da-sein, i.e., authenticity and inauthenticity, in Care 
(Sorge).
The fundamental concern in this section will be 
the elucidation of the existentialia as those character­
istics which constitute, equiprimordially, Being-in-the- 
world. It is apparently easy to convince oneself, when 
considering "the" existentialia, that Heidegger has pre­
sented an exhaustive description of Da-sein. From this 
conviction, one can jump into a full-fledged critique of 
Heidegger's project for so-called missing aspects of man's 
b eing.Neve r t h e l e s s ,  this represents Heidegger's inten­
tion as stated in the beginning of Being and Time to pre­
sent an existential analytic of Da-sein oriented primarily
Criticisms that center on Heidegger's deletion of 
a social and/or political theory are too numerous to men­
tion in total. However, the introduction provided by the 
translators of "The Question of Being," Jean T. Wilde and 
William Kluback, is a good example as well as the disser­
tation by Renee Weber, "Individual and Social Being in 
Heidegger's Being and Time." Both of these are referred 
to in section 12.
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to working out the question of Beingness as such. The
analytic of Da-sein, therefore, "cannot attempt to provide
6 7
a complete ontology of Dasein. . . . "  He further states 
that the existential analytic is not only incomplete but 
is also "provisional."^^ Even when the meaning of Da-sein 
is seen as temporality, the leading question of the meaning 
of Being will not have been reached, but a necessary step 
in preparing the ground for arriving at such an answer will 
have been taken. Being and Time is incomplete as the 
author gives notice.
Being-in-the-world is as Erschiiessenheit (dis­
closedness) , Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, Verfallenheit, and 
Rode. Since Erschliessenheit (disclosedness) has already
69been discussed as Lichtung, clearedness and lumination,
the following will deal with the remaining four existentialia
(referred to in Being and Time as existentials).
(a) Being-in-the-world as Verstehen 
Verstehen, as an existential, has been translated 
by Macquarrie and Robinson as "Understanding." Richardson 
prefers "comprehension" in that it allows an etymological 
sense of grasping or seizing whereby Da-sein seizes Being.
^^B & T, p. 3 8 ; H, 1 7 .
^^Ibid.
69
See p. 167 below.
70Richardson, p. 34, Ftn. 15*
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The term Verstehen conveys the meaning of a thematic, con­
ceptual understanding, whereas the existential described 
by the term is not this at all. It has been suggested by 
Boss that Vernehmen be used instead of Verstehen.
Vernehmen also means to understand but it also means to 
perceive or become aware of and/or to "hearken to." 
Vernehmen in terms of the existential Verstehen means an 
apprehension of significations which are more or less 
thematic. With this meaning, feelings, "intuitive" and 
so forth are also included so that the existentialia of 
Verstehen turns out to be not a cognitive, intellectual 
operation but more or less an apprehension in the sense of
apperception. Boss has used the expression, "primary com-
72prehension," to designate this existential.
Heidegger himself expresses the importance of 
seeing primary comprehension as belonging to and consti­
tuting the Being of the primordial "there." As such it 
is not a "what" that somehow resides in or is added to a
subjectum, nor is it a kind of knowing that comes from
73within an immanent self-perception. As openness Da-sein 
discloses to itself possibilities and it is this disclosure 
of possibilities that "is" primary comprehension. Thus as
71Private communication corroborated by the use of 
Vernehmenda in Grundriss.
72Boss, P & D, p. 40.
^^B & T, p.. 184.
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an existential it is always pressing forward into possi­
bilities. This "pressing forward" of primary comprehen­
sion occurs because it "is as" Entwurf.
The term Entwurf is easily translated from good, 
workable German as "projection" from the verb entwerfen 
which means to project, sketch, trace out, draw up. But 
Heidegger uses the word, as he does many of his words and 
particularly with regard to the existentialia, in a pri­
mordial sense. The translators of Sein und Zeit call atten­
tion to this primordial sense by writing that the basic 
meaning of this word "is that of 'throwing' something 'off 
or 'away' from one." They close their footnote by adding 
a word of caution to the English reader that he should 
"bear in mind that the root meaning of 'throwing' is
74more strongly felt in the German than in the translation." 
Nevertheless, translators and commentators persist in 
their use of this word as "project" or "projection," espe­
cially in the sense of a projection by a subject.
& T, p. 1 8 5 , ftn. 1.
75A few examples of this tendency are Thomas 
Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York; Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1 9 5 9 )> p% 32- "Dasein exists by projecting 
himself toward a future that is not yet (noch nicht) . " 
Richard Schmitt translates Entwurf as "design." Joseph J. 
Kockelmans, Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His
Philosophy (Pittsburgh; Duquesne University Press, 19&5)» 
p. 7 0 . "In its primordial understanding Dasein projects 
itself also to a certain significance. . . . "  And William A. 
Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh; Duquesne 
Studies, Philosophical Series, Vol. 12, Duquesne University 
Press, i9 6 0 ), p. 40. "Existence is oppositional unity,
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Entwurf as an existential characteristic of "pri­
mary comprehension" needs to be seen as a throwing open 
of the lighted r e a l m . " L i g h t e d  realm" refers not only 
to the openness of Da-sein but what fills this openness 
as well. So that the openness is "world-openness" and 
Entwurf if throwing open the lighted realm of the world.
As Heidegger states, this throwing open (projection) has 
nothing to do "with a comporting oneself towards a plan
that has been thought out, and in accordance with which
77Dasein arranges its Being."
Da-sein as primary comprehension is an openness
that is throwing open the lighted realms of possibilities
within the "world." Da-sein this throwing open so that
as long as any Da-sein is, it as a throwing open and
holding open. Perhaps Heidegger states it best. In
"Letter on Humanism," he writes:
If one understands the "project" (Entwurf) alluded to 
in Sein und Zeit as a representative concept ^^n idea 
in the mind of an agent/ then one considers it as an
unity in opposition of what de facto is and what can be.
As such, man's existence is called project or plan." See 
also Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought, pp. 6 0-6 1 .
^^This refers to the meaning of the word Lichtung 
as discussed on p. 129 above. "Throwing open of the lighted 
realm" is an expression used by Medard Boss in Psychoanaly­
sis and Daseinsanalysis, p. 391 where he says that Heidegger 
uses ' the term Welt (world) as synonymous with the term 
"there" of the "Da" of Da-sein and uses "Vfeltentwurf, in 
the sense of Welt-Erwurf (the 'throwing open of the lighted 
realm of the world'). I . ."
77b & T, p. 185; H, 145.
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act of subjectivity and does not think of it as one 
should within the realm of the existential analysis 
of the "Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-Sein), i.e., 
as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of Being.^
Heidegger notes that primary comprehension in its 
throwing open (Entwurf) character constitutes what is 
referred to as ’’sight” /Sich_t7. Da-sein this sight 
equiprimordially as its basic ways of Being. These ’’ways” 
are: circumspection (Umsicht) of concern, considerateness
(Rücksicht) of solicitude and as the sight directed upon 
Beingness as such (Sicht auf das Sein als Solches). Sight 
related to existence is called transparency (Durchsichtig- 
keit).  ^^ However, ”sight” must be seen in its essential 
sense as "clearedness” and should not be confused with 
perceiving.
When Verstehen is seen in the manner just presented,
it becomes easier to see the confusion of some philosophers
in their attempt to say, despite Heidegger's protestations
to the contrary, that the existentiels function in a manner
analogous to the Kantian categories. For instance, in
referring specifically to Verstehen, Schrag states:
It is always in some sense practical and projective, 
"shaping” its object in the process of knowing it.
Hence, it would seem that in spite of his insistence 
on the rejection of any a priori construction in the 
knowing process, he remains within a Kantian mold of
7 8"Letter on Humanism,” p. 201. Barrett and Aiken. 
^^B & T, p. 186; H, 146.
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thought in which the categories of the understanding 
shape the data given in experience.
(b) Da-sein as Befindlichkeit
Befindlichkeit as the state in which one is to be 
found has variously been translated as state of mind, dis­
position, and f e l t - p o s i t i o n . M a c q u a r r i e  and Robinson 
again, in a footnote, state the closeness of their transla­
tion to what is meant by the German, but reveal its weak­
ness in stressing the important connotation of finding 
oneself. They also made the important observation that 
"of mind" is an English idiom and has no literal relation-
82ship to the German term itself. The use of the word 
Disposition carries with it unfortunately the connotation 
of "good" or "bad" dispositions, a point which is assuredly 
antithetical to Heidegger's meaning of the term. "Felt- 
position" has an overly spatial connotation which reinforces 
the conception of an encapsulated, immanent subject relating
Ô 0 Calvin 0. Schrag, "Phenomenology, Ontology, and 
History in the Philosophy of Heidegger." As found in 
Joseph J. Kockelmaus (ed.), Phenomenology (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1 9 6 7 ), p. 292.
^^In order of appearance, Macquarrie and Robinson, 
translators of Sein und Zeit; Richardson, Heidegger ;
Through Phenomenology to Thought ; and Michael Gelvin,
"Martin Heidegger's Theory of Fundamental Ontology, (Unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, 
Mo., 1 9 6 6 ).
82 B & T, p. 172; ftn. 2. The importance emd use of 
this idiom "in" or "of mind" is discussed later. See sec­
tion 11 below.
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to an objective, external world--a conception antithetical
to the description Being-in-the-world. Boss suggests that
Befindlichkeit is best understood in the sense of
Gestimmtheit in the primordial signification of Being-
8 3attuned, or attunement.
Da-sein as the "luminous" (Lichtung) realm of 
openness, is always attuned in some way or another so that 
things which appear through this openness do so in terms 
of Da-sein's particular attunement or pitch. Just as a 
physical light reveals objects in greater or lesser degrees 
of clarity depending on the brightness, so Da-sein relates 
to the world according to its various manifestations of 
attunement, i.e., through its various moods. Moods not 
only manifest how Da-sein relates to things but also how 
one is, and how one is faring. "In this 'how one i s , '
Q /,
having a mood brings Being to the 'there'."
To reveal the "there" to Da-sein is to disclose 
"that-it-is" and has to be, and this "that-it-is" consti­
tutes its "throwness" (Geworfenheit). Through throwness 
Da-sein reveals itself to itself; or expressed differently, 
Da-sein reveals its "there." Yet moods, the ontical mani­
festation of Dasein's attunement, for the most part reveal
ft 1
P & D, p. 40. Although the translator of that 
work translates Gestimmtheit as "pitch," Boss himself is 
more likely to use the word attunement.
84
B & T, p. 173, ftn. 134.
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the "there” by turning away from it. In doing so they 
reveal Being-in-the-world as a whole. Da-sein thus 
relates to the "world" through--or better, "as"--attunement. 
Thus only something that is attuned to fearing can dis-
Q g"
cover the "fearful" in the "world" as ready-to-hand.
The ontological characteristic of attunement is 
that which pervades all passions, feelings, and emotional 
s t a t e s . A t  any given moment man (Da-sein) is attuned in 
some way or another. To a certain extent this particular 
attunement will determine in advance what the individual 
is open to and conversely that to which he is closed. For 
example, a person attuned to anxiety will be open to, pre­
disposed toward, seeing the world anxiously or fearfully 
and at the same time will be closed to, with varying 
degrees, seeing the world as joyful, friendly, or peaceful.
Essential attunement is not to be seen as a property 
or a particular being but as a basic characteristic, an 
ontological feature, which pervades all particular moods as 
their essence. Attunement, in other words, cannot be seen 
as something over against or other than ontic, existentiell, 
moods, but is "found" in each particular mood as being the 
essential characteristic of that mood. Man, ontologically, 
is attuned, which means he sees, experiences' the
& T, p. 1 7 6 ; H, 1 3 2 .
^^This is a paraphrase of Boss' statement as found 
in Grundriss, p. 291. My translation.
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world critically "in" various moods, emotions, and/or feel-
87m g s .
(c) Da-sein as Verfalien
The "world" itself belongs to the Being of Da-sein 
as a particular Being-in-the-world, but for the most part 
Da-sein is as being alongside the "world" of its concern.
In so being, Da-sein tends to lose the ownmost quality of 
its "there" to an average publicness. This describes the 
existential, "fallenness of Da-sein." It is a falling 
away from the ownmostness of one's Da-sein "into" the 
leveled off, covered-upness of publicness.
In Being and Time, Heidegger goes to considerable 
lengths in describing what "fallenness" is not. He says, 
for example, that the term does not express a negative 
evaluation; it should not be seen as a fall from a pure cr 
higher status. Falling does not refer to a spatial dimen­
sion of, say, going from a self (subject) to an object. 
Also, falling does not have the connotation of a bad or
deplorable ontical property which somehow will be overcome
88by future more enlightened generations.
Fallenness is an ontological characteristic of 
Da-sein and contributes to its essence as Being-in-the- 
world. Da-sein falls not into any particular entity in the
O ^
Boss, Grundriss, p. 290.
88
B & T, p. 220; H, 175-1?6.
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world but into (at or against) the "world" itself. Yet 
"world" belongs to the Being of Da-sein as Being-in-the 
world. This is not to say that Da-sein falls out of itself 
into itself, nor that Da-sein falls away from itself as 
subject into itself as object.
Da-sein as Da-sein is always "in need" or "depen­
dent" (angewiesen); i.e., Da-sein only as its relating 
to that which is encountered so that the encountered is 
necessary for Da-sein to be as Da-sein; thus, Da-sein is 
"in need." Yet the encountered and "that which encounters" 
must not be seen as separable. They are in fact inseparable, 
"Da-sein and that encountered are inseparable, a unity. 
Ontologically, then, Verfalien, fallenness refers to this 
angewiesen or dependence on that which shines forth "in 
the openness of the there." Ontically, Verfalien refers 
to falling prey to things.
"World" refers to "world" which is lighted by 
Da-sein and upon which Da-sein is "thrown." In falling, 
Da-sein is falling away from that which is as its "there" 
to that which is "lighted" by the "there"--the "world" of 
Being-in-the-world. "In falling, Dasein itself as factical 
Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already
89
See the translators' footnote regarding "an die 
Welt" idiomatically expressed in English as "into" the 
world. From the German, however, it is more appropriate 
to say a_t the world or collapsing against it. B & T, 
p. 2 2 0 , ftn. 1 .
90Medard Boss, personal interview.
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fallen away. . . .  it has fallen into the world, which
91itself belongs to its Being."
As a luminated (lichtung) realm, Da-sein is 
dependent upon what is luminated "by" that realm; it is 
this to which it has fallen. It has fallen prey to the 
phenomena. Boss gives the example of the cobbler who thinks 
of himself primarily as a maker of shoes. Yet the cobbler 
as Da-sein is also, and originally, a luminated realm,
". . . in which world is disclosed, in this case, a 'world'
consisting of the whole frame of references belonging to 
his shoes.
In falling prey to things, Da-sein's freedom (frei-
heit) and independence (eigenstdndigkeit) are reduced.
It is not a question of the abolishment of freedom but one
of constraint or restriction. Psychologically, freedom and
constraint belong together. As Boss says, "A stone cannot
93develop a compulsory neurosis."^ For a compulsive neurotic, 
the world occurs compulsively and at a distance. He tries 
to keep the world at a distance by performing certain ritual­
istic acts, but he is, in fact, constantly controlled by 
what he is holding back; i.e., he is in captivity by those 
things which he is trying to resist. The compulsory
^^B & T, p. 220; H, 1?6.
92
R & D, p. 42.
93Medard Boss, personal interview.
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neurotic whose ’’openness” is openness as compulsory is an 
extreme ontical example of the ontological characteristic 
of fallenness.
(d) Da-sein as Rede
The ontological existential Rede refers to a funda­
mental discourse which cannot be equated with language or 
speaking but, in fact, grounds, and thereby, makes these 
phenomena possible. Rede, therefore, refers to fundamental
human language or discourse in an essential, i.e., ontologi- 
94cal manner. If Da-sein were not "as” Discourse then 
Da-sein would not be able to differentiate various phe­
nomena into distinct entities. The Discourse described 
here is not necessarily a verbal utterance of words but 
more like a being claimed by phenomena other than a particu­
lar Da-sein. It is not surprising therefore, that Heidegger 
states that Discourse underlies both interpretation and
assertion and, as well, is that which gives rise to ’’mean- 
95ing.” Yet meaning in this sense does not necessarily 
entail verbalness or thematic significations. Primordial 
Discourse is the disclosure of phenomena in their distinct
94’’Discourse” is usually used to translate the term 
Rede as used by Heidegger (Macquarrie and Robinson, Thomas 
Langan, etc.). Some prefer other terms; for example, 
Richardson uses Logos , Magda King, ’’speech, ” and Gelven, 
’’talk.”
& T, p. 204; H, l6l.
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phenomenality and the laying the ground for this disclosure 
to become thematically articulated in verbal speech.
Boss offers the example of the small child who may 
for instance know no other names than "papa" and "mama" 
but nevertheless is still capable of perceiving and under­
standing that a table in the room is different from his 
parents. The child may even be able to point at it, indi­
cate it, without uttering a sound. Yet if the child did 
not already exist in the realm of Discourse (or "language") 
he would not be able to indicate a thing as something par­
ticular. "For understanding something a_s something, marking 
it, spotting it, denoting it, indicating it necessarily 
presupposes language, even though the perceived character­
istic of the thing cannot be named as yet by audibly per-
96ceptible names."
9. Boss and "Existentialia"
Being and Time is incomplete not only in that its
projected second part was never published but also in itself
it is provisional and preparatory. "Our analysis of Dasein,
however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first
97instance, provisional." The analysis of Da-sein does 
not provide a complete ontology but merely "pieces" of one, 
albeit essential pieces. Since the "purpose" of Being and
96
 ^ P & D, p. 2 1 5 .
^^B & T, p. 38; H, 17.
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Time is to investigate the "existence" of Da-sein, the 
characteristics which are disclosed in terms of this exis- 
tentiality are called "existentialia."^^ Yet, even the 
delineation of the various equiprimordial existentialia as 
given by Heidegger in Being and Time is incomplete in that 
a full "listing" was not the intent.
Existentialia characterize Da-sein's ways of Being. 
As such, they characterize the essence of observable, 
concrete human behavior and hence, as has been demon­
strated, cannot be seen apart from their concrete manifes­
tations. With this description and definition of existen­
tialia it would be a mistake to assume that "the existen- 
tials" are all and totally included under the heading 
"Being-in" and are described as primary comprehension 
(Verstehen), attunement (Befindlichkeit or Gestimmtheit), 
falling prey to objects (Verfallenheit) and human language 
(Rede). Being-in-the-world as well as lumination or dis- 
closedness are also existentiels. But if the fundamental 
characteristics of man are "found" within observable con­
crete human behavior, there must be essential character­
istics other than those primarily denoted as existentialia. 
Boss expands this denotation by listing the following as 
fundamental characteristics of being human (Mensch-seins):
9&ibid.
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spatiality, temporality, corporeality, being-together,
attunement, memory and historicity, and death or being- 
99mortal.
From our perspective, man's Da-sein shows itself as 
basically a standing openness. This means: it shows
itself as an Eksistenz, a standing out in the illumined- 
free world-openness of a being-able-to-perceive and as 
well a confirmation of it. Such being-standing open is 
the unified ground possibility and as well the particu­
lar essence of man's being-spatial and being-temporal 
and also his being-historical, his being-bodily, his 
being-with with others, his being-attuned and his 
being-mortal
(a) The spatiality of Da-sein
The equiprimordial characteristics of Da-sein refer 
to "ways of being," not things that Da-sein "has." Da-sein, 
as spatial does not, therefore, refer to Da-sein as existing 
within a spatially determined sphere. This would make 
Da-sein an extant (vorhanden). Nor does it mean that Da-sein 
is at a particular location in space along with other 
"things." This would mean that Da-sein was at hand 
(zuhanden). Both extantness and at handness refer to modes 
of being of objects and Da-sein is not an object. Further, 
the distinction between the spatiality of an extended thing
99Attunement has been reviewed in section 8 and 
being-together will be examined in section 1 2 ; both, there­
fore, will be excluded from the present analysis.
^^^Medard Boss, Grundriss, p. 3l4. In presenting 
this expansion of the "fundamental characteristics of man," 
Boss distinguishes between those for Da-sein and those for 
Mensch-sein; e.g., spatiality, temporality and attunement 
refer to Da-sein and body; being-together, memory and history 
and death refer to Mensch-sein. (My translation.)
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and that of Da-sein does not rest in Da-sein's knowledge 
of space. The ability to think or imagine space presup­
poses a taking up, or being in, space.
Da-sein is spatial because it is "spiritual."
". . . because Dasein is 'spiritual,' and only because of
this, it can be spatial in a way which remains essentially 
impossible for any extended corporeal t h i n g . T h e  
"spirituality" refers to Da-sein's ek-static dimension; 
i.e., Da-sein is open to and within "world" disclosiveness. 
The term "Ekstatic" in its original Greek means "standing 
out into." As ek-static, Da-sein is open to and with rela­
tional possibilities, emd this is not a mediated existing 
but an immediate, essential existing. Spatiality, there­
fore, is a relation and responsiveness; first Da-sein is 
with something and "understands" this something in the 
sense "that it is" and then responds as "seeing" it as a 
house for instance. In other words, "house-ness" could not 
be known or intended unless Da-sein were already open to
and encompassing "^house" in its thatness. Intentionality,
102therefore, presupposes openness.
Da-sein as spatial is "out there" within the "world" 
of its "concern." As such, the closeness or remoteness of
& T, p. 419; H, 368. See also p. 138; H,
104-105.
102 See p. 68 above. This particular example was 
provided by Boss. (Personal interview.)
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"things” encountered existentially corresponds to the sig­
nificance these "things" have. For instance, a person 
existentially may be loser to someone he loves in another 
continent than to the table which is right in front of him. 
The existential spatiality of Da-sein is a more "original" 
spatiality than measurable space for the latter presupposes 
the former and the former itself can never be derived from 
the latter.
For Heidegger, the existential spatiality of Da-sein 
in the sense of the closeness or remoteness of things 
encountered is governed by de-severance and directionality 
(Ent-fernung und Ausrichtung) A s  Da-sein relates to 
possibilities encountered in its openness, these possi­
bilities hold relational significance for the particular 
Da-sein. At this point, Da-sein, as ontological, gives way 
to man as ontic. A man is more concerned with a particular 
possibility than with another, it is more worthier or has 
more value (non-moral). Yet, concern operating on a par­
ticular possibility is pervaded by the ontological de­
severance as its essence allowing the possibility to come 
closer. One of Heidegger's examples is of a man walking 
down the street and seeing a friend walking towards him.
lO^ibid., pp. 138-139; H, 1 0 5 . Note the prefix 
"ent." Ent-sChiossenheit as "resoluteness" and Entwurf as 
projection need to be seen in the etymological sense of 
"opening up." See p. 223 below.
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At that moment the friend is "closer" to the man--even
though in "measured" space he is twenty paces away--than
104to the pavement beneath the man's feet.
Original or existential space is based on man's 
relationship to things encountered, and the relative sig­
nifications these relationships have are determinative of 
their original distance from man. Boss quotes a line from 
Rilke where the lover says to his beloved "Nur wo du bist, 
entsteht ein ort." (Only where you are does a place 
a r i s e . O r i g i n a l  space happens as a result of man's 
relation to people and things.
In his essay "Bauen Wohnen Denken" (Building Dwelling 
Thinking) Heidegger reveals how the modern conception of 
homogeneous space arose out of man's original or existential 
s p a c e . A n  object reveals to a particular man many things 
and places having various existential meanings and closeness. 
Yet, these places can also be considered as mere points 
between which there is a measurable distance. That which 
is determined by points is a particular space. This is 
designated by the Latin word spatium which signifies an
lO^Ibid., pp. 141-142; H, 10?. See p. 198 below.
^^^Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 195-
^^^Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" 
in Poetry, Language, Thought. trans. Albert Hofstadler 
(New York; Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 155-156. This par­
ticular section was quoted by Boss in Analysis of Dreams,
pp. 195-196.
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inter-space. The distance, therefore, between people and
objects becomes one of interspatial distances. The object
appears as something at a point. But a point can at any
time be occupied by something else including a mere mark.
But S p a c e  as spatium can further be isolated into mere
extensions of height, breadth, and depth. Thus, what is
derived is seen as the multiplicity of the three dimensions.
This is no longer distance as spatium but extensio--
extension. Even extension can further be abstracted into
analytical algebra which can formulate as many dimensions
as are desired since these dimensions are mathematical
constructions. "We can call this mathematical system
'space,' but 'space' in this sense contains neither room
nor places. . . . Spatium and extensio create the
possibility of calculating the position of objects and
points by means of distances and directions.
But the fact that they are universally applicable to 
everything that has extension can in no case make 
numerical magnitudes the ground of the nature of
spaces and locations that are measurable with the aid
of mathematics.lOo
Da-sein is spatial. But space in this sense is 
not "in" a subject nor is it observed "in" a world as if
the world were in space. On the contrary, as Da-sein
107 Analysis of Dreams, p. 195» This is a transla­
tion of Heidegger's statement and differs slightly from that 
provided by Hofstadler.
jlo3Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. I5 6 .
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is Bein^-in-the-world so space is iri the world. The 
a priori character of space, as the a priori character of 
Being-in-the-world, is not to be seen as somehow residing 
in a worldless subject that imposes space out of itself 
onto the world. On the contrary, a priori means "the 
previousness with which space has been encountered (as a 
region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environ­
mentally .
(b) The Temporality of Da-sein
The translation of the Greek term £ l Y C L ^ a s "being"
is linguistically correct; however, the word means "to be
present" (anwesen). In "being present" there is concealed
"a present time and duration--in one word Time. Being as
110such is thus unconcealed owing to time." The word
"presence" is derived from praeesse which implies an emer­
gence and a sojourn, and both imply a duration or lasting. 
The truth of Beingness as such, unconcealedness, is revealed 
by Time.
Man is a temporal being in that he is present (ein 
Anwesender) and he lasts or has duration. Yet, this tem­
porality does not consist of a sequence of "nows" which
^^^B & T, p. l46; H , 112. Regarding the nature of 
the a priori, see the next section.
^^^Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of 
Metaphysics," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, III, 
eds. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York; Harper 
& Row, 1 9 7 1 )1 p. 1 3 6 .
& D, p. 4 3.
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refer to a derived sense of Time and hence what Heidegger
112would call extant-ness (vorhanden). As a derived time,
the original temporality is "leveled off." Datability is 
that which is covered up. Datability occurs in what 
Heidegger distinguishes as the "now that . . .," and "sig­
nificance." Together these refer to the primordial 
assigning of and by Da-sein to a "for-the-sake-of-which."
This latter reveals an "in-order-to" a "towards-this," 
an "in-which," and a "with-which." All of these refer to 
relational possibilities of that which is "present."
The original temporality, based on the ontological 
character of Da-sein, is always a disclosing of, and a 
taking care of something. Since Da-sein is defined essen­
tially as Being-in-the-world it is always and already 
"taking care of something" (in relation with something, 
the definition of Care ySorge/) and hence is fundamentally 
temporal. "Such original temporality is dated at all times
by his meaningful interactions with, his relating to, that
113which he encounters." The primordial or original "now
that" is always a "now as the wind blows," a "now when the 
book is being read," a "now when something needs to be 
done," in other words, every "now" is relational. "Every 
'now' and every 'then' refers to a man's caring for something.
112
See Heidegger, B & T, pp. 4?3-475; H, 421-423- 
& D, p. 45.
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114and it lasts as long as this caring-for lasts." This
amounts to saying that man "consumes" time by carrying 
out his existential possibilities.
Boss states that the view of Time in its "original 
timeness" as given by Heidegger is of paramount importance 
for understanding so-called unintelligible or irrational 
time (and space) phenomena. He is particularly referring 
to the phenomena associated with dreams, experiences of 
schizophrenics, drug addicts, and so f o r t h . I n  his 
dream book, for instance, Boss reports a similarity of 
dream phenomena related to drug addicts. They consistently 
dreamed of being bogged down in mud or of being buried for 
centuries, of not being able to move even though they 
wanted to. They reported dreaming of a lack of mobility 
and an inability to respond to stimuli. Temporally 
speaking, these individuals had brought their own life- 
histories to a standstill; they had thwarted their own 
temporal possibilities, living a life of "unhistoric vegeta­
tion," a life devoid of past and future.
It would be difficult indeed to understand these 
and other dreams involving temporality from a traditionally 
based conception of Time as a continuous succession of
ll^Tbid.
^^^Ibid., p. 46.
^^^Boss, Analysis of Dreams, pp. 201-202.
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momentary points. Time, as manifested in dreams, is based
on the quality of the relationships the dreamer has towards
the things within his dream world. "The time of the dream
event was always referred to the possibility of occurrence
or non-occurrence of dream things and to their signifi- 
117cance." In other words, this statement paraphrases the
disclosure that man is fundamentally in relationship with
things which constitute his existential possibilities.
What is the essential characteristic inherent in
the statement "I have time?" What does "having time" mean?
To say that we (man) have time does not entail having time
as a possession, nor is it the same as saying, "I have
anxiety," or "I have fear." These latter refer to "states
which one finds oneself in, or moods; but Time is not a
mood. To say "I have time," is to say primordially I am
occupied with what calls out and addresses me, with what
approaches and is present (gegenwartig) for me. In this
being addressed by what is present, I await the future by
perceiving the present (Anwesende) and retain what has beeu
given in the past. All of these occur together. "Diese
dreifaltige Weise, in der ich bin, ist das 'Haben' der Zeit
fur das und das." (These three ways in which I am are the
H  8'having' of time for something.)
^^^Ibid., p. 2 0 2 .
X J_ 8Boss, Grundriss, p. 267» This paragraph repre­
sents a paraphrase of Boss' statements as found on this 
page in Grundriss. (My translation.)
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The important point is that, ontologically speaking,
man (Da-sein) is relation to something and this being
in relation to something occurs temporally. ’’The temporality
of man not, it comes about as a result of the carrying-
119out-^erforming-of his existence." This "carrying out"
in terms of temporality is a manifestation of the three
dimensions (ecstases) of time, none of which can be denied
but any "one" of which can be "covered" (verdeckt).
Da-sein is open and with things not only spatially
but also temporally. Thus "space-time" is a pre-spatial,
pre-historic openness, light (Gelichtete) which makes the
where and the when to appear. Da-sein is a standing open
and having the ability to be addressed (Ansprechbarkeit).
Being human is a standing (and holding) open. It is 
the open-standingness of a Being-able-to-perceive and 
a Being-addressed by that which is present in its 
presence and a Being-able-to-respond to that which is
present respectively.
(c) The Corporeality of the Human Being
In Section 2 corporeality was revealed as a basic
characteristic of Being-in-the-world, i.e., man partiel-
1 P Ipates "bodily" in all of his relational possibilities.
Just as Da-sein is open to and with relational possibili­
ties so the bodily realm is oriented (open) to that which
^^^Ibid., p. 2 6 9. (My translation.) 
120Ibid., p. 270. (My translation.)
121
See p. 41 above.
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confronts it. Being open this way the bodily aspect of 
Being-in-the-world is open on all levels, hormonal, corti­
cal, muscular and skeletal.
Should one object that man is incapable of seeing,
hearing and so forth unless the organs function properly
in a physiological sense, he would be correct. Yet, exis­
tentially, not physiologically, these sense organs function 
only because man's essence is that of a lucid world- 
openness with which relational possibilities, meanings, 
make their appearance. "In other words, man cannot see, 
hear and smell because he has eyes, ears, and a nose; he is
able to have eyes, ears, and a nose because his very
122essence is luminating and world-disclosing."
Man exists bodily. But does this mean man "has" a 
body, or "is" a body? This latter question is the same as 
saying "I am my body." From the Daseinsanalytic perspec­
tive both statements are unacceptable. The two expressions
"to have" and "to be" refer to "two possible ..nd different
1 23mental approaches," to the idea of body. The corporeal 
is an inseparable characteristic of Being-in-the-world; i.e., 
man participates bodily with all relational possibilities. 
Should man be seen exclusively as^  body--either in the sense 
of "having" or "being"--then the result is a metaphysical 
assumption not an ontological disclosure.
& D, p. 140. 
l^^Ibid. , p. 142.
i8o
This inappropriateness can be exemplified by
124looking at Sartre's statement, "I am my body." Natanson
has restated the Sartrian position by saying, "I am neither
'in' my body nor 'attached to' it; it does not belong to
12 5me or go along with me. I am my body." To make this
statement is implicitly to define man, or self, as a 
"thing" (extant) which is here, and this implies a "there" 
where he is not. This falls back upon a transcendental 
subjectivity which is Cartesian in essence since it implies 
a subject that somehow relates to an object. This is what 
Being-in-the-world reveals as inappropriate. Boss has 
said, "Sartre thought primary human being is there where 
you are with your body. And where you are with your body 
you are going out with references to things--this distorts 
Heidegger.
The "here" of corporeality, ontologicaÆy under­
stood, is the "here" of the relational possibilities which 
man as Da-sein meets or which meet him. The "here" at any 
time is where man is "just staying" (gerade aufhalt) as he 
"resides" in his relation towards that which meets him.
124Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. 
Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956),
p. 3 2 6.
125Maurice Natanson, The Journeying Self: A Study
in Philosophy and Social Role (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley Pub . Co. , 1970) 1 J~2.
126 Boss, Personal interview.
l8l
A lifeless body cannot be open to perceive a "there" much 
less a "here." Man as Da-sein stands open with and along­
side relational possibilities and body as a manifestation
of Being-in-the-world "stands" in the same manner. Body
127presupposes Exsistence ecstatically understood.
Boss offers this example of the bodily sphere as a 
manifestation of Being-in-the-world. The panic of a sensi­
tive woman who has just seen a mouse reveals itself not 
only in the attunement of fright or panic but corporeally 
as well. " . . .  the woman's total being contracts into 
the one world-relation of fleeing from the animal, this
128relationship also occurs somatically within seconds."
129(d) The Memory and Historicity of the Human Being 
Memory is associated with thinking. But thinking 
is not seen Daseinsanalytically as a process which occurs 
in the brain whereby intrapsychic images are projected and 
understood. Thinking, on the contrary, is a letting arise 
or becoming open to all which approaches us--a becoming 
present--"within" our world-opened possibilities. Memory 
is that which keeps and lets remain that which has been 
experienced either through thinking, perceiving, feeling 
or acting.
^^^Boss, Grundriss, p. 284.
128
Boss, P & D, p. 142.
129 The following represents a paraphrase of pages 
2 9 9 -3 0 9 in Grundriss.
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For the most part, memory operates on two levels. 
There is basically an unthematic background from which a 
thematic "bringing to consciousness" of that which has 
been previously experienced emerges. To a certain extent 
this requires "remembering." To remember or recall some­
thing is to "bring to the present" an actuality that took 
place in the past. It is not the case that what is remem­
bered has been lost to memory in the sense of not being 
there, but is merely not "near."
Psychoanalysis assumes the existence of an uncon­
scious intention or purpose (Absicht) as the cause of for­
getting. Forgetting, however, is the disappearance or 
vanishing (Entschwinden) of something from the immediately 
perceived "present" within the world-openness of man.
Every forgetting, therefore, is always a kind of self- 
forgetting since it entails a losing of relationship; i.e., 
as something slips out of (entfHilt) thematic awareness 
then X lose my relation to it. And since relation with 
what appears (presents) within my world-openness consti­
tutes part of my essential nature, then 1 lose part of 
that nature.
The unique character of openness which constitutes 
the fundamental nature of Da-sein is that which makes pos­
sible memory and the remembering of what has been in the 
past. It is an open, being-addressed or claimed by that 
which shows itself. But that which has shown itself is
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never lost; it continues to live in memory although 
unthematically, and further, the past in terms of memory 
and the future in terms of projected possibilities "deter­
mines" man's behavior at any given time.
Man stands not only iji his own past but within 
tradition and history as well. This standing within the 
perspective of a particular epoch, history, is that which 
constitutes man's being-historical. It is this possibility 
of being-historical which distinguishes being-human from 
all other presences
(e) Death and the Being-mortal of Human Being
In Being and Time, Heidegger reveals that Da-sein
"flies in the face of death"; i.e., Da-sein falls away
from death, and in doing so covers it up. This Being-
towards-the-end belongs primordially to Da-sein's Being
131and hence is exhibited in everydayness. Death is
acknowledged in everydayness but in its being covered up 
it is seen as something actual; death itself as a possi­
bility is concealed. "Dying is levelled off to an occur­
rence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to
Boss has said, "For 'history' in the analysis of 
Dasein always means a sequence of meaningful world dis­
closures as they are sent into being by destiny, engaging, 
in an equally primordial way, human existence as the lucid 
world-openness as well as the emerging of particular phe­
nomena shining forth therein." P & D, p. 65-
& T, pp. 295-296; H, 251-252.
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132nobody in particular." Yet, in a state of anxiety,
Da-sein faces its death, the extinction of its possibili­
ties , and faces as well death as non-relational and not to 
be outstripped.
For Boss, death is that inescapable boundary sur­
rounding man's Da-sein» In death Da-sein uncovers the true 
significance of Being-in-the-world as the final end of its 
possibilities. Neither plants nor animals have the capa­
city to die as do men; they simply perish. Man, however, 
has the capacity to choose the way he will approach his 
death. Man, in facing and knowing his death has little 
basic choice. He is forced to face death in some way 
whether it is fleeing from it or accepting it as the 
unalterable event which must be fulfilled. For the most 
part, man attempts to cover-up the certainty of his death 
with various forms of deceptions such as the well-known 
American phenomenon, the "funeral home."
When death is faced openly, one is free to relate 
to the various possibilities he has in anticipating death. 
Facing death openly also reveals the magnitude and value 
of each experience of man's existence however small or 
insignificant they may seem. Facing death in this manner.
l^^ibid., p. 297; H, 253.
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preparing for a "good" death, brings out to completion
133and fulfillment one's Da-sein.
13 3Boss, Grundriss, pp. 309-313 and "Arzt und Tod 
Ein daseinsanalytischer Versuch," Psychosomatische Medizin, 
IV, No. 1, 1972, pp. 1-11.
CHAPTER IV
BEING-IN-THE-WORLD
Being-in-the-world represents Da-sein in its unity; 
i.e., the unification and totality of the fundamental and 
equiprimordial characteristics that constitute Da-sein.
This totality is called Care (Sorge). In section 10, 
Being-in-the-world as Care will be investigated paying 
special attention to the notion of a priori as used by 
Heidegger. Section II is devoted to revealing what 
Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is not. Da-sein is described 
as "non-immanence." Examples are offered by Heidegger 
and Boss demonstrating the implications in seeing Da-sein 
as non-immanent. The "Other" is investigated in section 12. 
As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein meets not only things but 
other Da-seins, this is called Being-with. Some of the 
basic criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy center around 
the notion of Being-with eind in this section four individuals 
critical of Being-with will be investigated.
10. "Care" as Existential a priori
Da-sein as Lichtung is a standing open to and with 
the shining forth of phenomena. These two inseparable
186
187
meaning’s of the term Lichtung are conveyed by the term 
’’lumination” and expressed in this dissertation with the 
word ’’Disclosure.”^ As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein dis­
closes primordially as primary comprehension, attunement, 
fallenness and human ’’language,” all of which function 
equiprimordially. This means that Da-sein is primordially 
a primary comprehending "entity" that is attuned in some 
way by falling, in the sense of throwing open the lighted 
realm inhabited by "objects” and articulates the "meaning" 
of these objects--in their "that they are"--by means of 
Discourse. Yet, for the most part, this occurs unthemati­
cally .
The all encompassing Being-in-the-world charac­
terizing Da-sein's essence is unified as "Care" (Sorge). 
Heidegger uses the term "care" not in the sense of to worry
or be concerned or even to love; but as "essentially being
2
in relationship ,"--to be^  with. "Care consists of the
3
existentialia in primordial unity and Heidegger warns that 
these existentialia are not to be considered as blocks 
which when put together form a totality which is then
^See pp. 223-224 below.
2
Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973.
^B & T, pp. 235-6; H, 1 9 1 . "These existential 
characteristics are not pieces belonging to something com­
posite, one of which might sometimes be missing, but there 
is woven together in them a primordial context which makes 
up that totality of the structural whole which we are 
seeking. ’’
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called Care. On the contrary, the equipriraordiality of 
the existentialia is to be seen more as a weaving together 
of all characteristics so that each is entailed by the 
other. They "are" and "work" together as a unity but 
always in relation to something. If Da-sein as "Care" is 
looked at exclusively in and of itself, i.e., without con­
sidering that to which it is in relation, then the phe- 
nomenality of Da-sein, the primordiality of Care, has been 
vitiated.
Da-sein as "Care" is Being-in-the-world. Da-sein
is Da-sein because of its "already" Being-in (in the sense
of Being-alongside) the world. But Heidegger claims that
4
Care is an "existential a priori." How are we to under­
stand this term "a priori"? After all, it is a major 
philosophical term used in logical, metaphysical and 
epistemological senses. It is a term that is primarily 
associated with Kant; yet, as we have seen in Section 4, 
Heidegger sees Kant as perpetuating a substantival subject- 
oriented metaphysics. Could it be that Heidegger is intro­
ducing a new notion or understanding of a priori?
Care is "filled in" by the signification of Da-sein 
as "ahead of itself. Being already in the world as Being 
alongside entities encountered within the w o r l d . B y
^B & T, p. 238; H, 195. 
^B & T, p. 237; H, 193.
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being "ahead of itself," Da-sein is as being "beyond itself" 
in terms of its relational possibilities. To be "ahead of 
itself" is to be already in the world; thus Da-sein cannot 
be seen as a "worldless subject" that somehow goes out to 
the world; it is already the world. Da-sein is thus 
primordially a whole; i.e., it is what it is as being with 
the world, as being alongside the world. As this primor­
dial structural wholeness, Da-sein as Care can be said to 
be "before" every factical "Attitude" and situation only 
in the sense that it is ijn them.^ For Heidegger, this 
means that "Care" cannot be seen as an "earlier" or a 
"later.
Da-sein never exists before its basis but only 
g
from and ^s this basis. It might appear that Da-sein is 
the basis of its Being; yet, if this were so then Da-sein
^Ibid., p. 2 3 8 ; H, 1 9 3 .
^Ibid., p. 375; H , 3 2 7 . "With this 'before' we do
not have in mind 'in advance of something' /^as vorher7 
in the sense of 'not yet now--but later'; the 'already' is 
just as far from signifying 'no longer now--but earlier.'"
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (p. 249), Heidegger
states, "Can the a priori which in the tradition of ontology 
is held to be a characteristic of the determination of 
Being as explained by asserting that the 'earlier' which 
it implies 'naturally' has nothing to do with 'time'? Cer­
tainly, it has nothing to do with the 'time' recognized by 
the ordinary comprehension of time. But is this 'earlier' 
positively determined thereby, and is this annoying temporal 
character pushed aside? Or does it not reappear as a new 
and more difficult problem?"
Q
Ibid., p. 33O; H , 2 8 4. "It is never existent 
before its basis, but only from it and as_ this basis."
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would be before its basis and this would mean that Da-sein 
is before--i.e., before it is as Being-in-the-world. But 
Da-sein only is^  as Being-in-the-world; thus, Da-sein can 
only be the Being of its basis, i.e., Da-sein lives the 
that-it-is.
Why would it seem that Da-sein is the basis of its 
Being? If we see Da-sein as a "what," as a thing, we see 
it as a thing that relates to the world; hence, stands 
apart from the world in its relating. This would push 
Da-sein into the traditional conception of subjectivity in 
the sense of substance, i.e., as a worldless subject that 
somehow relates to the world with which it is concerned.
But Da-sein is not this. Da-sein, as has been seen, is 
only as Being-in-the-world. There is no priority here of 
a worldless subject relating to something other than what 
it is. Da-sein as "Being-the-there" lives the unfolding 
of the "there" hence it is the Being of its basis.
But what does this have to do with the a priori and 
Care as an existential a priori? Care does not stand 
before, in the sense of "prior to" the world. It does 
not stand ready to meet the world and somehow alter, mold 
or pattern the world so that the world can be known or 
lived within. Care is already "in" the world in the sense 
of being the essence of the world. Recall the term waltet 
in Section 8.^ Care is "in" the world in this sense. It
9
See pp. 151-152.
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does not pre-condition the world as did Kant's a priori
forms and categories. Care, as existential a priori, must
be seen as being in relation with. How Da-sein relates,
in what manner Da-sein relates, is an ontical, concrete
mode of behavior; but within each ontic way of relating
is the relating itself which is ontological.^^
In his discussion on spatiality in Being and Time,
Heidegger brings into relief, without ever explicitly
stating it, the distinction between a priori as seen and
used by Kant and a priori as revealed by Da-sein as Care.^^
Da-sein is spatial; i.e., Da-sein is as de-severing
(bringing-close) and directional (reference to a region).
Thus, Da-sein as spatial "gives" space. Space is not in
a subject nor is the world in space. "Space is rather 'in'
the world insofar as space has been disclosed by that Being-
12in-the-world which is constituitive for Dasein." The 
term a priori can be used here if it is seen that it means 
a previousness of disclosure as "region" since Da-sein is 
as Being-in-the-world in the sense of "already" and "always" 
with the world. But, the term a priori, "does not mean 
anything like previously belonging to a subject which is
"Care exists within, not prior or apart. . . .
It's like an oak does not exist apart from baum (tree). 
This essence of human being (Sorge) waltet in every par­
ticular behavior." Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973
^^B & T, p. 146; H, 111.
& T, p. 146; H, 111.
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proximally still worldless and which emits a space out of
itself."13
In his essay "Heidegger and the Existential A
Priori," John Wild states that Heidegger's conception of
an existential a priori is of "revolutionary signifi- 
l4
cance." Evidently, for Wild, this significance takes 
the form of Da-sein as being primordially "familiar" with 
this world and that it, Da-sein, understands itself within 
this world although not thematically. In other words, all 
of man's cognitive, concrete endeavors are based upon this 
prior existential awareness. Nevertheless, whereas Wild 
is aware that by existential a priori Heidegger is not 
talking about subjective factors that are somehow included 
within a mind-container, he does seem to stick to an 
implicit conception that somehow the existentials as a 
priori mold or condition experience. As well, he refers
13Ibid., p. 146; H , 111. Heidegger states, referring 
to Kant specifically, that he (Kant) uses the term "a 
priori" to signify a "subjective principle, which basically 
refers to a determinate character restricted beforehand 
to a worldless subject." Ibid., p. l44; H, 110.
14John Wild, "Heidegger and the Existential A 
Priori," found in John Sallis (Ed.), Heidegger and the Path 
of Thinking (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press,
1 9 7 0 ), pp. 221-235- Anyone reading this essay for the first 
time will be utterly baffled due to a gross oversight in 
editing. The first three pages have been mixed so that 
normal turn of pages is out of the question. If one jumps 
from the bottom of page 221 to the top of 223 then from 
the bottom of 223 to the top of 2 2 2 , then from the bottom 
of p. 222 to the top of p. 224 he will then have succeeded 
in getting the correct order.
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to these existential "patterns" as existing "prior to 
ontic facts." This is not, as has been seen, what Heidegger 
means by existential a priori.
In part three of his essay, Wild discusses Hei­
degger's concept of a priori and how it resembles in four 
ways the traditional notions of a priori which for Wild 
justifies the use of the term. First, "these patterns are 
a priori in the sense that they are found universally in 
all men and seem to be essentially h u m a n . T h e r e  is no 
question that Heidegger, in Being and Time, at least, is 
describing the fundamental characteristics of man; i.e., 
he is not describing behavior in its concrete manifesta­
tion so much as the essence of that behavior, its ontologi­
cal significance. On this point Wild is quite correct.
The second notion of a priori is, as Wild states 
it, ". . . these patterns are a priori in that each of them
is presupposed by an indefinite range of particular phe­
nomena conditioned by it. The prior condition retains its 
structural identity and indeterminancy throughout innu­
merable variations in specific c o n t e n t . T h i s  statement 
reveals that Wild is still in the grasp of a Kantian con­
ception of the a priori. The existentialia as a priori, 
to repeat, do not condition ontic phenomena in the sense 
of molding or designing; they merely represent the essence.
l^ibid., p. 225.
l^Ibid., p. 226.
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the meaning of directly observable behavior. Wild states 
under this second heading, that, "These patterns are 'ear­
lier than' and preconditions for vast ranges of particular 
17phenomena." But, as has been demonstrated, the existen­
tialia do not exist before phenomena but phenomena as 
their essence.
A third characteristic of the a priori in relation 
to traditional theories is that "They all maintain that 
this prior knowledge of ultimate patterns is hidden from
the common understanding of men and requires special pro-
18cedures to be brought to light." Wild is unclear as to 
how this relates to the existential a priori of Heidegger. 
Yes, he does contend that the a priori is hidden as a 
result of linguistic and conceptual self-conscious develop­
ment; but how the a priori is to be "brought to light" is 
not developed. Heidegger would not agree that to bring 
the existential a priori "to light" requires "special pro­
cedures" if by that is meant deducing a design by logical 
means from observable human behavior. The existentialia, 
as a priori, are brought to light by jumping out of (the 
leap) this representational mode of thinking and letting 
the phenomena themselves reveal their essence.
^^Ibid.
1 o
Ibid., p. 227,
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The fourth and final characteristic of the a priori
refers to the traditional conceptual, linguistic a priori.
"That is the logical contradictions, antinomies, and cate-
19gory mistakes which result from their denial or • isuse,"
On this point Wild's position seems to be well taken. The 
conceptual, cognitive world of logical discourse is tied 
to and bound with existence. To cut oneself from this 
"existential" basis is to further cover-up primordial, 
essential phenomena and thereby perpetuate the mad dash 
into the categorization of things. To loose the essential 
characteristics of the existentialia, to "cover them up," 
and hence constrict them is to incur the possibility of 
becoming "mentally ill or socially disturbed."
In closing. Wild makes a salient point regarding 
the existential a priori as expressed by Heidegger eind 
furthered by other phenomenological thinkers. Kaht's 
famous statement that concepts without percepts are empty 
and percepts without concepts are blind, will have to be 
amended as a result of this "new" emphasis on existential 
a priori. It can be accepted that concepts without refer­
ence to direct experience are indeed empty, but it can no 
longer be stated that percepts without concepts are blind.
"Percepts without concepts may be vague, incommunicable,
onand even floating. But they are not totally blind. "
^^Ibid.
20
Ibid., p. 229.
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Yet, this is only part of what Heidegger's existential 
a priori signifies.
To summarize: Care as existential a priori lies
before phenomena only in the sense of being in them, per­
vading them as their essence. Care consists of the equi­
primordial existentialia, and these existentialia refer to 
the essence and meaning of observable human behavior.
Care means to be in relation with and does not mean molding, 
conditioning, designing or patterning.
11. Being-in-the-world as Asserting the Non-immanence of 
Self
21In Section 4, it was seen that transcendence, 
as a term used by Heidegger, refers to openness and not, 
as a consciousness, a subjective immanence that somehow 
climbs out of itself in order to relate to an object. In 
point of fact, throughout this dissertation the basic theme 
of non-immanence has been present but not specifically 
articulated. This is understandable since non-immanence is 
a consequence of Being-in-the-world.
Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already "out there" 
with things by being in relation to them, so that the 
notion of subjectivity does not arise. This means that 
Da-sein exists as its relations; Da-sein is angewiesen, 
in need) i.e., what is encountered and the encounterer are
2JLSee p. 68 above.
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inseparable. It is never a question of two poles, of an
ego transcending itself in the sense of getting out of
itself going over to ein object, but that Da-sein exists as_
this openness--an openness of awareness into which things
22may shine forth and become present. Thus, the concept
of a solitary, encapsulated ego, or the use of Da-sein as
an extant (vorhanden) consciousness, collapses. This is
the way both Kant and Descartes--as well as Husserl--saw
the "I think" by beginning with an "in me" to get to the
"outside of me."^^
In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly states
that Da-sein as Being-in-the-world precludes seeing Da-sein
as contained within itself somehow relating to a world
over against it.
When Dasein directs itself towards something and 
grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an 
inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsu­
lated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it 
is always 'outside' alongside entities which it 
encounters and which belong to a world already dis­
covered.24 (Emphasis added.)
If Da-sein is seen, and comprehended, in this 
manner, then it becomes easier to understand the signifi­
cance of Heidegger's assertion that Da-sein can "never
22Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1973» "You 
are always with (by), comparable to light with the table, 
the table therefore shines forth. You as awareness are 
with the things that disclose themselves in the light of 
your understanding."
^^B & T, pp. 247-248; H, 203-204.
^^Ibid., p. 89; H, 62.
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25
cross over’* its de-severance. By de-severance Heidegger 
means the farness of the ready-to-hand (ztihanden) from 
Da-sein. Da-sein is a£ de-severance; i.e., Da-sein is 
spatially related to "things" in terms of relational 
"distance" with "things." "So little has Da-sein crossed 
over its de-severance that it has rather taken it along 
with it and keeps on doing so constantly. . .
The proximity of Da-sein to objects with which 
Da-sein is relating is not measured in terms of feet or 
yards, but in terms of significance, meaning and possi­
bility. My feet may be squarely on the pavement but in 
terms of de-severance, spatial proximity of Da-sein, I am 
closer to the friend approaching me than I am to the pave-
27
ment.
Yet, it is apparent that we in the Western world, 
have been "conditioned," via our metaphysical biases, to 
see ourselves as selves or egos or even "brains" that are 
here at this place relating to another place and hence
^^Ibid., p. 142; H, 108.
^^Ibid.
27Heidegger uses this example in Being and Time 
where he says, "One feels the touch of it (the street) at 
every step as one walks; it is seemingly the closest and 
Realest of all that is ready-to-hand and it slides itself, 
as it were, along certain portions of one's body--the soles 
of one's feet. And yet it is farther remote than the 
acquaintance whom one encounters 'on the street' at a 
'remoteness' of twenty paces when one is taking such a 
walk." pp. 141-142; H , 10?. See p. 172 above.
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transcending ourselves in the relating. All definitions 
of the concept "ego," for instance, presuppose immanence; 
i.e., the "ego" is seen as "a precinct primarily self-
28contained and delimited over against the external world."
Yet, immediate experience does not reveal an ego that is
self-contained; it reveals that man is already with the
"things" with which he is relating. When Heidegger refers
to the subjectivism of Western metaphysics, he means this
falling back to a posture which either implicitly or
explicitly conceives the "object" as being represented by
a subjectum.
In Section 44 "a" of Being and Time, Heidegger
refers to the traditional conceptions of truth. In this
section, truth as "agreement," "adequatio" (likening),
"correspondentia" (correspondence), and "conventia" (coming
together) is discussed as to "its" ontological signifi- 
29cance. Generally speaking, truth is equated with knowl­
edge. But knowledge in this sense means judging, where a 
psychial process of judging is distinguished between what 
is judged, the content. But this breaks down into a rela­
tionship of agreement between an ideal content of judgment 
and that judged about, the "Real Thing." For Heidegger, 
apparently, the ontological question concerning the
28Medard Boss, "Ego? Motivation?" Journal of 
Existential Psychiatry, I, No. 3, p. 2?8.
^^B & T, p. 257; H, 214.
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relation between the ideal entity of judging and the "Real”
object is crucial. A relation does subsist (besteht) ,
says Heidegger, and not only as a relation between the
content, the judgment itself, and that of the "Real Object” ;
but as well, between the ideal content and the "Real" act
of judgment. Heidegger proceeds to ask the question,
" . . .  does it manifestly subsist 'more inwordly' in this 
30
latter case?" He wants to know the nature of this rela­
tional subsisting and asks if this is not a legitimate 
question. He then adds this statement; "Is it accidental
that no headway has been made with this problem in over
31two thousand years?"
The preceding paragraph introduces us to one of 
the most perplexing issues, especially to English readers, 
in Being and Time ; that is, the ontological and epistemic 
significance of Being-in-the-world. It is especially 
problematic to the English reader because of what might 
best be described as the misapplication of an idiomatic 
expression.
In attempting to interrogate the phenomena of truth 
and knowledge, Heidegger offers an example. Someone is
10
B & T, p. 259; H, 216.
31
B & T, p. 259; H, 2l6. It will be pointed out, 
but without comment, that the nature of this particular 
question regarding "subsistence" is similar to questions 
Heidegger poses regarding Descartes "cogito ergo sum"; 
that is, the nature of the "sum" is that which is to be 
interrogated.
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standing with his back to the wall upon which is hanging
a picture and he makes the true assertion that "the picture
on the wall is hanging askew." The assertion is demon­
strated as to its veracity when the man turns around and 
perceives the picture hanging askew. But we may entertain 
this question: "If he who makes the assertion judges
without perceiving the picture, but 'merely represents' it
3 2to himself, to what is he related?" He is not relating
to "representations" if by that we mean a psychial process
whereby a "picture" of the real thing is somehow placed
before us as an image.
The asserting which 'merely represents' is related 
rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the 
Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is 
the Real picture and nothing else.33 (Emphasis 
added.)
Two things are to be noted by this passage: first and most
important for understanding Heidegger is that the "relating" 
is between the man and the "Real" picture, as such. There 
is no mediary representational image. Secondly, and this 
is what is confusing for English readers, the idiomatic 
expression, "has in mind," has no place in this particular 
passage, even if it is taken figuratively, for it is 
antithetical to what Heidegger intends by his interrogation 
of "relating." In the German, where Macquarrie and Robinson
& T, p. 260; H, 21?. 
^^Ibid.
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have used the expression "has in mind" the text reads,
3 k"Dieses ist gemeint und nicht anderes." This literally
translates, "This is /what is/ meant and nothing else."
Heidegger further states that if something else
is "slipped in" and by that he is obviously referring to
a representational image, then this belies tlie phenomenal
facts. For assertion, in the sense of judgment, is a way
of Being towards things themselves. And when it is asked,
what does one's perceiving of the thing(s) demonstrate?
Heidegger answers, "Nichts anderes als dass es das Seiende
3 5selbst ist, das in der Aussage gemient war." Macquarrie 
and Robinson translate this as, "Nothing else than that 
this thing is the very entity which one has in mind in
O ^
one's assertion." (Emphasis added.)
34Sein und Zeit , p. 217.
35lbid., p. 2 1 8 .
& T , pp. 2 6 0-2 6 1 ; H, 2 1 8. An interesting 
adjunct to this problem of the idiom "having in mind" can 
be discerned by Heidegger's own, but meager, reference to 
it. Toward the end of Section 23 of Being and Time, con­
cerned with the spatiality of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger 
is discussing Kant's distinction between the feeling of a 
difference between the two sides of "myself" and he makes 
this statement: "If I am to orient myself the 'mere
feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be 
of no help at all as long as I fail to apprehend some 
definite object whose position, as Kant remarks casually,
'I have in mind.'" (B & T , p. l44; H, 109). The German 
text at this point reads, "dessen Stelle ich ira Ged&chtnis 
habe." "Im GedHchtnis" means to "have in memory." But 
Heidegger goes on to say that this "im GedHchtnis" is 
basically a way of alluding to the "existentially consti­
tuitive state of Being-in-the-world," (Ibid.) and Kant 
failed to see this. He still wanted to maintain a
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Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already with the 
"things" of the world so that the question of subjective 
representational images does not arise. Thus, an asser­
tion for Heidegger, and speaking ontologically, is an 
uncovering (Entdeckend) of the entity itself; that is, the
entity is just as it is in itself as it gets pointed out
37in the assertion. It gets "uncovered." "This uncovered­
ness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the 
assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that
o Q
very same thing." Thus, for Heidegger, "truth has by 
no means the structure of an agreement between knowing 
and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity 
(the subject) to another (the object).
Is it surprising that in the "later" Heidegger we 
find the same revealing of Da-sein as non-immanence? It
"subjectivistic principle," which for Heidegger means 
having to do with a "determinate character restricted 
beforehand to a worldless subject." (Ibid.; H, 110).
37The term "Entdeckend," uncovering, must be seen 
in close proximity to "Erschliessen," disclosure. For 
as Heidegger states regarding Da-sein's disclosedness,
"with and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with 
Da-sein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon 
of truth attained." Tb & T, p. 263; H , 220.)
& T, p. 261; H, 218.
39Ibid. It must be stated at this point that 
Heidegger has altered to a certain extent the idea of truth 
as developed in Being and Time and in "Plato's Doctrine of 
Truth." For Heidegger now asserts that aletheia does not 
mean truth as such but rather unconcealment. "Aletheia, 
unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not 
yet truth." (On Time and Being, p. 6 9 .)
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is for those who contend that the later Heidegger is all
together different from the Heidegger of Being and Time.
"Bauen Wohnen Denken" was a lecture given by
Heidegger in Darmstadt, Germany, in 1951. He tells his
audience in a questioning manner to think of the old
bridge in Heidelberg from where they are in Darmstadt.
But, where are they? "From this spot right here, we are
there at the bridge--we are by no means at some represen-
40tational content in our consciousness." For Heidegger, 
when thinking of things, we are with them, they are not 
merely "in our mind" as some mental representation. "From 
right here we may even be much nearer to that bridge and 
to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily
4las an indifferent river crossing." What is this but
Da-sein as Being-in-the-world?
In On Time and Being, Heidegger expresses in a
roundabout way this non-immanence of Da-sein when he
states that the lecture hall is. "The lecture hall is
illuminated. We recognize the illuminated lecture hall
42at once and with no reservation as something that is." 
(Emphasis added.) To say that the lecture hall is
40"Building Dwelling Thinking" as found in Poetry, 
Language, Thought, translated and edited by Richard 
Hofstadler (New York; Harper and Row, 1971), P « 157.
^^Ibid.
42On Time and Being, p. 3-
205
"illuminated" is to say that it is disclosed, but not to 
an immanent conscious, rather to Da-sein as already there 
with it. How else could it be "recognized at once" as 
something that is? Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is sein- 
verstHndtnis, the immediate "comprehension" of Beingness 
as such.
In Was Heisst Denken? the full force of Heidegger's
revelation of Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is brought to
bear using the illustration of a tree and a cathedral.
This development will be further aided by Boss' own refer-
43
ence to a tree and a cathedral.
We are standing on a meadow facing a tree. But
where may we ask does the presentation take place? In our
heads? Does the tree stand "in our consciousness" or on
the meadow? But what we "really" see is not a tree at all
but, "in reality a void, thinly sprinkled with electric
charges here and there that race hither and yon at enormous 
44
speeds." But we are standing face to face with a tree. 
Yet, this is in reality only a naive, pre-scientific com­
prehension of things. However, if we affirm this point 
we have conceded to something of which, as Heidegger states, 
"we have hardly considered, and that is; That those
43
Regarding Boss the former is found in "The Concep­
tion of Man in Natural Science and Oaseinsanalysis," Com­
prehensive Psychiatry, III, 4 and the latter in Grundriss.
44
What Is Called Thinking? , p. 43.
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sciences do in fact decide what of the tree in bloom may 
or may not be considered valid reality."
For Boss, the tree in the meadow is an apple tree 
loaded with juicy red apples and since it is early in the 
morning and we have not eaten, our appetites are aroused. 
But what is "really" going on here? At the very moment 
of perception we would not know that what we are seeing is 
an apple tree. According to traditional biological sci­
ence , what initially happens is an unknown something emits 
light rays which then arouse nervous excitation in the 
retina. These excitations are then transmitted l o  the 
upper regions of the brain where they are registered as 
sensory perceptions. The excitations then eventually 
reach the cortex where they are assimilated with memory 
traces of similar, yet earlier, sensory stimuli. We thus, 
finally, recognize the "apple tree." "It will, however, 
forever remain beyond comprehension in what way and by 
what miracle nervous excitations can be changed into per-
k 6ception of meaningful interconnections."
Yet, even much later in the process being 
described "scientifically" we come across the mystery of 
a consciousness in a human subject which has the capacity 
of climbing out of itself and somehow going over to the
^^Ibid.
46Boss, "The Conception of Man in Natural Science 
and Oaseinsanalysis," p. 203.
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object. How would a subject have to be constituted so that 
it, as possessing a consciousness was able to climb out of 
itself, "transcend" itself, and go over to an object?
If we describe phenomenologically, Daseinsanalyti- 
cally, the event of perceiving the apple tree we find an 
immediate seeing and comprehending of the apple tree as 
apple tree.
How is such an immediate seeing and understanding of 
a thing . . .  possible at all unless our existence is 
already a kind of mental brightness in which a thing 
as the thing it is can make its appearance and reveal 
itself in accordance with its meaningful contents?" ?
At the moment of perceiving the apple tree our existence
was one strongly attuned to hunger so that we were open
to the "seeing" of something edible. But what if we say
that upon seeing the apple tree we go over to it and climb
up into it using our arms and legs? Have we not introduced
the notion of corporeality, body? In our drama what
transpires is the unmeditated, concrete hastening to the
tree and climbing into it in order to eat the apple. It
is only later, upon reflecting that we conjure up the
notion of body or organism.
It is only reflection after the fact, putting a 
construction on the event from the outside, and con­
cretizing the event and introducing artificial divi­
sions that induces us to regard ourselves as equipped 
with separate appendages and organs.
^^Ibid., p. 2 0 7. 
^®Ibid.
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We are never merely some kind of independently 
existing external carapace on the inside of the body 
of a biological organism, encapsulated within its 
epidermis, which organism would then at some time 
or other extend some kind of antennae or pseudopods 
to an external world in order to discern it and to 
grasp it. . . . Any experience at random shows us 
that we as human beings have always and in an abso­
lutely original sense had our abode 'out there,' 
i.e., at all times in the total arena of this or that 
perceiving, thinking, dreaming, feeling, ineluctable 
relationship to an object confronting us, whether a 
plant, an animal, a fellow human being, ourselves or 
to heaven and e a r t h . ^9
The language found in Was Heisst Denken? differs 
considerably from that of Being and Time; yet, the content 
in terms of the problematic is essentially the same. We 
are facing a cathedral, Heidegger says, but besides facing 
a church or a building we are as well facing something 
that is present in its presence. "But the presence of 
what is present is not finally and also something we face, 
rather it comes before. Prior to all else it stands before 
us only we do not see it because we stand within it."^^
What comes "prior" as Heidegger intends it, is the Being, 
the of the cathedral itself, the that-it-is. The
priority refers to the immediacy of our "awareness" of its 
being, a priority which entails the opening (Lichtung) to 
or with the present; yet the openness is not "seen," the 
"presencing" itself is not "seen" for the "presencing" is 
with that which is present and allows (lets) the present
^^Ibid., p. 2 0 8 .
^^Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 9 8 .
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be. We, Da-sein ontologically speaking, are always open 
and with that which is present since Da-sein is as Being- 
in-the-world. But metaphysics never sees the openness, 
the presencing, but only that which is revealed "in'* the 
presencing.
In Grundriss, Boss gives the example of being 
"conscious" at this moment of the Freiburger Münster (a 
church in Zürich). But this "consciousness" of the Frei­
burg is "Not at all to be seen as the awakening of an idea 
in the sense of soulish image of the Münster inside a 
' P s y c h e T h e r e  is no inner psychic idea or image of 
the Freiburger Münster, for as Da-sein, as a "perceiving"
(vernehmende) world openness, I am there with the Freiburger 
Münster itself as it is.
For Boss, Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is to be
characterized in this manner:
The Da-sein of the human as Being-in-the-world is 
'constituted out of the multiplicity and totality of 
the possibilities for relating to the beings of the 
world.' As such, it is to be characterized as the 
bearing, holding open and spanning of a free realm 
of awareness for that which is encountered.
There can be no relational possibility for that which is
encountered without this primordial realm of openness.
Yet, the primordial realm can only be as a result of its
^^Boss, Grundriss, p. 344. (My translation.)
C O
Ibid., p. 4 8 7 . The translation of this passage, 
which expands the German but without loss of meaning, was 
supplied by Dr. Brian Kenney.
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"Bexng-with" the encountered. The two are primordially 
united and thereby constitute the meaning of Lichtung. As 
Being-in-the-world Da-sein "lets" that which is encountered 
unfold in its meaningfulness, inclusive of its network of 
references, to other beings in the world.
12. Being-with
How does one evaluate Heidegger's assertion that 
he is not "doing" philosophical anthropology? Being and 
Time is concerned with the Being that asks about the meaning 
of Beingness and this particular Being (essent) is man.
Does it not follow that Heidegger is "doing" anthropology;
Ç3
i.e. inquiring into the nature of man? No, it does not.
53In Being and Time, Heidegger states that the 
analysis of Da-sein " . . .  cannot attempt to provide a 
complete ontology of Dasein, which assuredly must be con­
structed if anything like a 'philosophical' anthropology 
is to have a philosophically adequate basis." p. 3 8 ;
H, 17- Further, he says that an existential a priori of 
philosophical anthropology needs to be "rounded out" in 
many ways and looked at. "But this is not the aim of our 
investigation. Its aim is one of fundamental ontology." 
p. 1?0; H, 131. And in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
trans. James Churchill (Bloomington, Indiana: University
Press, 1 9 6 2) Heidegger says, "However diverse and important 
the knowledge which 'philosophical anthropology' may supply 
concerning man, it can never pretend to be a fundamental 
discipline of philosophy, solely because it is anthropology. 
On the contrary, it runs the constant risk of concealing 
from us the necessity of developing the question of man as 
a problem and of connecting this problem with a laying of 
the foundation of metaphysics." p. 225. And in "On the 
Essence of Truth," Werner Brock's (ed.) Existence and 
Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery, I9 6 8) Heidegger states,
"Not only is every sort of 'anthropology' and every sort
of subjectivity (of man regarded as a subject) abandoned,
as was already the case in 'Sein und Zeit,' and the truth
of Being pursued as the 'ground' of a fundamentally new
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For Heidegger, metaphysics has defined man as an "animal
rationale" and it is from this point that philosophical
anthropology goes on its way to further interrogate the
questions of man's nature. But metaphysics, as has been 
54stated, is concerned with the "gift," the that which is 
present and not with the "it gives" of the gift or the 
presencing of the present. For Heidegger in Being and 
Tim e , as elsewhere, the fundamental questions of ontology 
and/or thinking revolve around the "it gives," the Lichtung 
or clearing of Beingness and Er-eignis. This puts Hei­
degger's thought on a level different from that of meta­
physics and hence anthropology as well. In the language 
of Being and Time philosophical anthropology operates on 
the concrete ontic level by not delving into the ontologi­
cal , essential, elements of Da-sein. It operates within 
metaphysics and does not place itself within the problematic 
of laying bare the foundation of metaphysics. As he states 
in "Letter on Humanism," "The essence of man . . .  con­
sists of being more than mere man insofar as this mere man 
is represented as a rational a n i m a l . T h e  "more" here 
means more original and hence more essential; i.e..
attitude to history, but an effort is made in the course 
of this lecture to think in terms of this other 'ground'; 
i.e., Da-sein." pp. 323-324.
5^See pp. 141-142 above.
^^Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 210.
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fundamental and this means ontological or concerned with 
Beingness.
In Grundriss, Boss quotes Heidegger as saying:
Anthropology is that explication of man which basi­
cally already knows what man is and therefore can 
never ask who he might be. With this question it 
/^nthropolog;^7 would have to admit to itself being 
shaken and conquered /^vercomeY. How could you 
expect this from anthropology when it has nothing to 
perform but the assurance of securing for itself its 
subject?5o
Heidegger is concerned with attempts to lay bare 
the ontological features that underlie— and this means to 
"lie within"— every ontic or concrete case. In other 
words, he is revealing the "essence" of man; i.e., his 
Beingness as opposed to his "nature," for "nature" is an 
assumption as to the concrete, object, orientation of man. 
The unitary, primordial structure of Da-sein is Being-in- 
the-world, and Heidegger asserts that the aim of Being and 
Time is to bring this structure of Da-sein’s Being into 
relief phenomenally, ". . . i n  terms of which its possi­
bilities and the ways for it 'to be’ are ontologically 
determined.
Anthropology, on the other hand, starts with a 
preconceived notion of what human existence is and goes
Quoted in Boss' Grundriss, p. 2l4. (My transla­
tion.) The quote comes from Heidegger's, "Die zeit des 
Weltbildes," as found in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klosterman,
1 9 5 0), p. 1 0 3 . Marjorie Grene's translation of this essay 
("The Age of the World View") appears in Measure, II,
1951» pp. 2 6 9 -2 8 4 but does not contain this passage as 
found in Holzwege.
^^B & T, p. 169; H, 130.
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from there to determine how this existent gets to objects. 
This problem can only be overcome if instead of asking 
what human existence primordially is the question begins 
with Beingness as such from which human existence is seen
c O
as a particular being.
Da-sein in its Beingness reveals itself as Being- 
in-the-world. As Being-in-the-world, Da-sein is as Being- 
in, with things, equipment, and Others; and is so primor­
dially. This means that Da-sein is not occasionally with 
things, equipment and Others but is at all times with 
these as relational possibilities even in those deficient 
modes when there is no actual "thing" or other present. 
For, as Heidegger repeatedly asserts, a bare subject with­
out a world, who only relates to objects "out there" is
not given in experience; on the contrary, quite the oppo­
sa
site is true.
The aim in this section is to reveal Da-sein in 
its relation to Others. For this, Heidegger uses the
58Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1972. Boss 
stated within this interview, "Heidegger says anthropolo­
gies up till now already know what human existence is and 
then argue how this being gets--connects itself--to 
objects. But if you start with Beingness as such then you 
can look at man in his being." In other words, to assume 
that the question what is the Da-sein of man constitutes 
the whole question of beingness will lead you back to an 
ontologically inappropriate base. This is the trap that 
Binswanger fell into. See pp. 13-15 above.
59see B & T, pp. l42-l44; H, IO7-IIO; 249; H. 2 0 5-6 , 
and "The Way Back into the (àround of Metaphysics," p. 134.
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expression Being-with (mit-sein) and means by it the 
ontological signification of "other," "with," and "also" 
(too). "Other men also exist along with us."^® The 
"Other" does not mean everyone else except me or those 
from whom I am set off. The "Other" understood here, is, 
in fact, all those of whom I am one, too. The "with" 
refers to the disclosure that Da-sein as Da-sein exists 
with others of its own kind; i.e., with those having the 
same Da-sein characterization. The "also" refers to Being- 
there-also (Auch-da-sein) where the also is seen as a 
sameness of Being; i.e., sameness as Being-in-the-world.^^ 
These three characterizations of mit-sein reveal the 
"world" as one which I share with others. This shared 
world is referred to by Heidegger as the with-world (mit- 
welt) and the characterization of each individual (Da-sein 
within-the-world) is called Da-sein-with (mit-Dasein).
The with-world (mit-welt) is the world each Da-sein 
shares with others. The world of Da-sein is essentially 
mitwelt; i.e., as Being-in-the-world part of that Being-in 
includes others. We never exist as independent worldless 
subjects who only secondarily and in some derived sense 
interrelate with one a n o t h e r . W e  are primordially.
^^Boss, P & D, p. 55-
^^B & T, pp. 154-155; H , 118. See also Boss,
P & D, p. 55»
^^"Man is his social and cultural relations with 
persons and things. He lives in relations, not external
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essentially and fundamentally already with the world 
inclusive of being with the other. This is the case even 
when ontically there may be no one present.
If Da-sein were not of the essence of Being-with, 
then loneliness would not be one of his possibilities.
A lifeless thing such as a stone cannot be lonely. Lone­
liness always points to a being-with-one-another (Mit- 
einandersein). Being-with-ohe-another is a function of 
Being-with and as such is a primordial characteristic of 
Da-sein.
The essential and fundamental characteristic of 
Being-with is the basis for all human relationships whether 
in the forms of intimacy or indifference, loving or hating. 
From the Daseinsanalytic point of view, since all men have 
this fundamental characteristic in common, in whatever con­
crete manifestations it may exhibit itself, then all men 
can communicate in one form or another. " . . .  there is 
no reason to doubt that a man who has lost himself in a 
schizophrenic mode of existing has a chance of recapturing 
his mature human freedom in the encounter with a
to them." Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger and Consciousness," 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, VIII (Winter, 1970), 355- 
_ _  (p, 359.)
^^See Grundriss, p. 295- Also, Heidegger states, 
"The Other can be missing only and for a Being-with. 
Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very 
possibility is the proof of this." B & T, p. 157; H , 120.
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6ktherapist." For Boss, this means that the therapist 
must meet the patient on his own level even if this means 
communicating with him as if he were a small child.
In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes Being- 
with and Da-sein-with (mit-dasein). This latter expres­
sion reveals the Being-with quality of each individual 
Da-sein for another Da-sein; i.e., "only so far as one's 
own Da-sein has the essential structure of Being-with, is 
it Dasein-with as encounterable for others.
Da-sein comports itself towards entities, equip­
ment , in the world through concern (Besorgen) and towards 
other Da-seins through solicitude (Fursorgen). But for 
the most part, Da-sein in its relation with other Da-seins 
comports itself in deficient modes of solicitude. These 
take the form of "passing another by, not 'mattering' to 
one a n o t h e r . T h e s e  characterize what Heidegger refers 
to as "everyday, average Being-with-one-another."
64
P & D, p. 245.
^^B & T, p. 157; H, 121.
^^Ibid., p. 1 5 8 ; H, 121. Throughout Being and Time,
Heidegger uses the expression "proximally and for the most 
part" to signify Da-sein's way of Being-in-the-world as 
everydayness. "Proximally" means for Heidegger, the basic 
way Da-sein relates to others. This is a relating based 
on "publicness" which is characterized by distantiality, 
averageness and leveling down. "For the most part" refers 
to how Da-sein reveals itself to "Everyman." The expres­
sion, therefore, reveals Da-sein basically in its inauthen­
tic mode. See B & T, p. 422; H, 370.
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The two extreme positive modes of solicitude, as 
revealed by Heidegger, are a solicitude which "leaps in"
(einspringen) and takes over the Other's "care," and one 
which "leaps ahead" (vorausspringt) and attempts not to 
take away "care" but give it back authentically. In the 
solicitude that leaps in, the Other is thrown out of 
position and made dependent on the one who leaps in. 
Heidegger states that this kind of solicitude operates 
for the most part on the level of "concern" with the 
ready-to-hand (zuhanden); i.e., the one who leaps in "sees" 
the Other as a "what" to deal with. On the other hand, 
solicitude that "leaps ahead" is a relating based on the 
"existence" of the Other as opposed to a "what" he is.
Boss has taken these "two main ways of man's care- 
taking for a fellow being" and applied them to a psycho­
therapeutic framework. He distinguishes "intervening care" 
and "anticipating care." The former is to be avoided in 
therapy since it takes " . . .  over what is to be done by 
him (the. patient), to do it in his place. The patient is 
thus thrown out of his place, has to step back and take 
over what the therapist has taken care of." In anticipating 
care the therapist "tries to hand back to him (the patient) 
what has to be cared for so that it becomes an actual con­
cern." This is a concern on the part of the therapist not 
for a particular item of the patient's world, but for his
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existence or as Boss calls it, his "basic" care.^^
Even though Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is as 
Being-with, it is in every case its "own" (jemeinigkeit). 
Entities other than Da-sein are indifferent as to their 
Being; or more precisely, "their Being can be neither a 
matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite.
(Recall the stone that cannot be lonely or cannot develop 
an obsessional neurosis.) Da-sein as being "own" is in 
each and every case its own possibility. Heidegger warns 
that this "mineness" of Da-sein should not be taken as 
an isolated "I," "so that one must seek some way of getting
69over to the others from this isolated subject. . . . "
To interpret "mineness" in this manner would be to fall 
back on an immanence conception of consciousness thus 
perpetuating the idea of a worldless ego, somehow relating 
to a world "out there."
To ask "Who" this mineness of a Da-sein is would 
be understood obviously in the ontic sense of "I am that
P & D, p. 73. In Section 4 of Psychoanalysis 
and Daseinsanalysis, pp. 6l-?4, Boss examines the basic 
harmony between the psychoanalysis of Freud and Daseins­
analysis as founded on Heidegger's fundamental ontology.
The point is that the "intuitive genius" of Freud paralleled 
to a certain degree the Heidegerrian insights, but when 
these intuitively arrived conclusions were pushed into a 
theoretical formulation distortion was the result.
68B & T, pp. 6 7 -6 8 ; H, 42. 
^^Ibid., p. 154; H, II8 .
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who." But, ontologically, the who of Da-sein, even though
that Da-sein is its own, would be the who which is not
the "I itself" of everyday Da-sein. The "Not I" in this
case is not something lacking I-hood but is in point of
fact a kind of Being, an "I" that is as having lost 
70itself.' Elsewhere Heidegger states that the qualifica­
tion "in every case mine" does not mean "posited through 
me" or apportioned to an individual ego. "Being-there is
itself by virtue of its essential relation to being in 
71general."
What does it mean to say that the "who" of Da-sein 
could be the "I" as having lost itself? It must be remem­
bered that Da-sein as Being-in-the-world has "fallenness" 
as one of its essential characteristics. Da-sein "falls" 
into entities, objects within the world, in the sense of 
being enthralled, enticed or seduced by them; i.e., Da-sein 
is absorbed in the world of its concern. This world con­
sists not only of "things" but "Others" as well. In its 
relation with Others, Da-sein takes constant care as to 
how it differs from Others; i.e., how it relates to Others, 
whether with, for or against. This caring for a difference
7°Ibid., p. 152; H, 11?.
71M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans 
Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
Anchor Books, I9 6I), p. 24. In Vol. 3 of Philosophy in 
the Twentieth Century edited by Barrett and Aiken. This 
quote is found on p. I5 8.
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between a Da-sein and Others is existentially characterized
as "distantiality." But also existentially, this constant
maintenance of distance stands for nothing less than a
subjection "to the other"; i.e., Da-sein comports itself
in the world respondent to the Other and in doing so com-
72ports itself "away from” its own self.
The Others are not definite or distinct but can 
be represented by any Other. They are the "who" and con­
stitute the "they" (das Man). Da-sein succumbs to the 
dictates of the "they" by virtue of one of its--Da-sein's--
essential characteristics; "leveling down," Da-sein's care
73for averageness.
Thus, the "who" of Da-sein is the "they" and as 
such the self of the particular Da-sein is covered up. The 
self of everyday Da-sein, therefore, is the they-self. 
"Proximally, it is not 'I,* in the sense of my own self, 
that 'am' but rather Others, whose way is that of the
72Heidegger states regarding Da-sein, "It itself 
is not ; its Being has been taken away by the Others.
Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others 
to dispose of as they please." B & T , p. l64; H, 126. In 
a similar statement, but one going to the extreme of sub­
jection, Boss reveals that " . . .  the obsessional neurotic's 
intensive defense against the things he regards as dis­
gusting eunounts to his captivity by them." P & D, p. I8 3 . 
This is also similar to what Carl Jung refers to as the 
"shadow." See Jolande Jacobi's The Psychology of C. G. Jung 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19o2), pT 10b ff.
73See above p. ?6 concerning "leveling down," 
"distantiality," and "averageness." Also see B & T, p. I6 5 ;
H, 1 2 7 .
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74'they.” ' Thus, the "they-self" signifies Da-sein existing 
75as inauthentic.
Da-sein exists mainly in inauthenticity as having 
abandoned itself to possibilities which have in themselves 
been "leveled down." But what about the opposite of this 
tendency of living, existing in and as they-self? Heidegger 
states that "Dasein exists as a potentiality-for-Being which 
has in each case already abandoned itself to definite pos­
sibilities."^^ What can this mean? If by "a potentiality- 
for-Being" one means gathering oneself in or together, to 
accept, to resolve, to choose possibilities in an authentic 
way then what is meant turns out to be this; Da-sein 
exists as a potentiality for possibilities but has already 
abandoned itself to possibilities. This does not make 
sense.
Does Heidegger mean by a potentiality-for-Being a 
potentiality for realizing possibilities, or existing 
authentically in possibilities? But, as has been seen, 
Da-sein has already abandoned itself to possibilities.
Does this mean that Da-sein exists as a potentiality for 
possibilities but as soon as those possibilities become 
definite Da-sein has abandoned his potentiality-for-Being?
74Heidegger, B & T, p. l6?; H, 129.
^^Ibid., p. 225; H, l8l. "The Self . . .  is proxi­
mally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self."
f^Ibid., p. 315.
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This does not make sense either.
But, what if by "potentiality-for-Being" Heidegger
meant the disclosure of possibilities, the projection
(Entwurf) of possibilities, the opening up and revealing
of possibilities? Heidegger states that the issue for
Care is: "to be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-
77for-Being which is the issue. . . ." But Da-sein is not 
the basis of its Being rather it is the Being of its basis. 
To be the Being of its basis means to be existing as thrown;
i.e., Da-sein is called back to its thrownness so as to
7 ft
"understand" this thrownness. Thrownness is openness to 
and with phenomena or "the 'throwing open of the lighted 
realm of the world.
To exist authentically (Eigentlichkeit) is to be 
one's "there." And to do this is to exist as thrownness; 
i.e., opening up that which is closed. Authentically 
existing Da-sein is a pulling away from the they-self 
revealing Da-sein in its open-standingness, not enthralled, 
not enraptured within or seduced by entities within the 
world. Ontological authenticity is existing as the opened 
realm which gives the possibility of the ontic disclosures 
in their particularities. Only in this way can Heidegger
7?Ibid., p. 330; H, 284.
^^Ibid., p. 333; H, 28?. 
79Boss, P & D, p. 39.
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say, "But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify
80any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being." And 
the converse holds as well.
Ontological authenticity is not to be seen as a 
willful volitional attempt to make oneself a "better per­
son." Ontological authenticity is not to be seen as a 
conscious, resolute decision of a person to "live authenti­
cally." Authenticity for Heidegger, is grounded in "reso­
luteness" (EntsChiossenheit) and to understand Heidegger's 
revelation of authenticity, resoluteness must be seen for 
what it is.
One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of 
resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this 
consists simply in taking up possibilities which have 
been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of 
them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive 
projection and determination of what is factually 
possible at the time.81
"Resolution" is generally understood as a volitional act
or decision; but Heidegger uses it, as he does so many of
his terms, in an etymological, root sense. The term in
German is Entschlossenheit, the Ent means, etymologically,
"to open up." Schlossenheit comes from the German verb
schliessen "to close." Thus, in the root sense the term
means "to open that which is closed." "Resolution" in
Being and Time must be seen in the sense of dis-closure.
Disclosure in English has the same root foundation, dis
®°B & T, p. 68; H, 6 3 . 
®^B & T, p. 3 4 5 ; H, 2 9 8 .
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meaning not (or in this context "to open") and closure 
meaning that which is closed down. Resolution seen and 
understood in this context means "opening up the realm 
into which the different possibilities of relating to
82things make their appearance." Decision comes after
the disclosure of possibilities and this is on the ontic
level. One can on this level decide to "live authentically"
but this decision is made possible, ontologically, by the
ft ^dis-closing of possibilities of relationships.
82Medard Boss, Personal interview, 1972. It will 
be recalled (See p. I57 above) that the term Entwurf gen­
erally translated "projection" has a similar root meaning 
for Heidegger. Ent meaning "open" and wurf meaning "throw," 
hence "throw open." Macquarrie and Robinson make reference 
to the etymological similarities between resoluteness and 
disclosedness by saying; "The etymological connection 
between 'Entschlossenheit * ('resoluteness') and "Erschlossen- 
heit' (disclosedness) is not to be overlooked." B & T, 
ftn p, p. 3 4 3 . Also see p. 138, ftn. 2 where the prefix 
"Ent" is discussed in relation to Ent-Fernung and Ausrich- 
tung (de-severance and directionality). Heidegger states 
in An Introduction to Metaphysics that resolve means to 
will and he who wills puts his whole existence into it 
without faltering. But, "Re-solve is no mere decision to 
act, but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates 
and reaches through all action." Re-solve is " 'Entschlossen­
heit , unclosedness. ' But the essence of resolve, lies in 
the opening, the coming-out-of-cover 'Ent-borgenheit' of 
human being-there into the clearing of being and not in a 
storing up of energy for 'action.'" p. 17. Also found 
in Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 
Vol. 3, p . 1 5 4 . Also see "On the Essence of Truth" in 
Brock's Existence and Being, p. 314. Discourse on Thinking, 
p. 8 1 . " . . .  one needs to understand 'resolve' as it is
understood in Being and Time as the opening of man particu­
larly undertaken by him for openness. . . ."
On
In anticipatory resoluteness Da-sein "understands" 
itself in regards to its potentiality-for-Being; i.e., as 
a potentiality for possibilities. Yet, when Da-sein acts 
on these possibilities--Heidegger uses the expression "take
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In authenticity, Da-sein is brought, via "resolute­
ness," to the Being of its "there," and this is as "situa­
tion." "The situation is the 'there' which is disclosed 
in resoluteness--the 'there' as which the existent entity
O A
is there." That which is called "situation" should not 
be seen as a set of circumstances but as a projection of 
possibilities. As has been seen, this projection of possi­
bilities means the disclosure or possibilities, the opening 
up and revealing of possibilities and thus revealing Da-sein 
as "thrown." "Resoluteness, however, is only that authen­
ticity which, in care, is the object of care (in der Sorge 
gesorgte), which is possible as care--the authenticity of
O c
care itself." Yet, as has been seen, "To be its own
thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the
86issue for care."
over one's there factically"--the situation is one that has 
been "resolved" and this is concrete. Heidegger on this 
point makes a crucial statement. "In the existential 
analysis we cannot, in principle, discuss what Dasein fac- 
tically resolves in any particular case. Our investigation 
excludes even the existential projection of the factical 
possibilities of existence." B & T, p. 434; H, 383* Why 
does Heidegger make this statement? Because Being and Time 
is a work devoted exclusively to ontology and to render it 
ontically, any part of it (including that of "authenticity") 
is to push it into an anthropology or existentialism.
®^B & T, p. 346; H, 299.
G^ibid., p. 348; H, 301.
Ibid., p. 330; H, 284. Care is a single basic 
state but can be seen as a double meaning of "thrown pro­
jection." Ibid., p. 243; H, 199.
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One of the recurrent themes found in critical com­
mentaries of Heidegger's works, especially Being and Time, 
has been the suspected lack ("limitation") of a genuine 
"social theory." The criticisms themselves generally 
revolve around the mit-sein and its apparent failure to 
provide for a viable and "authentic" social relatedness 
of man. What follows is an attempt to look at and answer 
these criticisms by turning to three sources. Jean T.
Wilde and William Kluback have translated Heidegger's 
essay Zur Seinfrage, The Question of Being, and added to 
the translation a three part introduction, one part being 
called "A Heideggerian Limitation." The limitation turns 
out to be Heidegger's failure to consider man within a 
"practical framework" to compliment his ontological con­
sideration. A Ph.D. dissertation by Renee 0. Weber, 
entitled "Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's Being 
and Time" has attacked Heidegger's mit-sein, with its 
authentic and inauthentic manifestations, as being not 
only inadequate,but faulty. In this work Weber mentions 
as well Binswanger and Boss. In Maurice Friedman's The 
Worlds of Existentialism and in his article "Phenomenology 
and Existential Analysis" both Heidegger and Boss have been
criticized, using Buber's I-thou dichotomy, for not ade-
' 87quately seeing the importance of "encounter
^^Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans­
lated with introduction by Jean T. Wilde and William
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(a) A Heideggerian Limitation— Wilde and Kluback 
For Wilde emd Kluback, Heidegger has been too one 
sided in his questioning of the nature of man. The one 
sidedness occurs because Heidegger has considered the 
ontological dimension as constituting the totality of man. 
This ontological exclusiveness leaves untouched the "prac­
tical states of being such as the political, social, and 
88
economic." This practical state constitutes the "Other" 
which is a descriptive way of revealing what man does.
The "Other" is a necessary dialectical compliment which is 
required in order for each dimension--in this case the
Kluback (New Haven: College and University Press, 1958)«
Renee Openheimer Weber, "Individual and Social Being in 
Heidegger's Being and Time" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Columbia University, 1966). Maurice Friedman (ed.). 
The Worlds of Existentialism (New York: Random House Publ.,
1964), and Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential 
Analysis," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 
IX, No. 231 19691 pp. 1 5 1-1 6 8 . For additional sources of 
criticism along these lines see: Emmanuel Levinas* Totality
and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Linges
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, I9 6 9 , p. 134 ff;
Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human (New York: 
Random House, 1 9 6 9 )1 P 246 ff.; Thomas Langan, The Meaning 
of Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)1
p. 230 ff. See also John Wild's comments in "Symposium: 
Martin Heidegger," The Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 22, 
1 9 6 3 , p. 6 7 3 . This by no means completes the list of those 
critical of Heidegger's "social theory."
Q Q
Wilde and Kluback, p. 13. A retort to Wilde and 
Kluback's overly theological interpretation of Heidegger 
will not be made in this dissertation. "Heidegger is deeply 
immersed in the Nothing (Satan) as the veiling of Being 
(Light), in the anxiety, deepened by the shocking realiza­
tion of demonic possibilities, lying at the root of earthly 
reality." pp. 9-10. This is a false interpretation of 
Heidegger.
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ontological and the ontic--to be. Heidegger's limitation 
is that he has failed . . t o  understand that man's 
external life expressed in his political, economic, and 
social experience determines and reveals the ontological
89nature of his existence."
Wilde and Kluback identify the "practical states 
of being" as adjectival descriptions of how man does things. 
"They describe man as he does things. These adjectival 
qualifications belong to man and describe him, not ontologi­
cally but historically."^^
Both ontological and practical function as the 
"Other" for each. "Being other than the adjective, it 
(ontological) reveals that it is not the adjective nor 
can be adjective, but at the seime time only through the
adjective does it know itself to be ‘Other' and itself at
91the same time." The same dialectical reasoning can be 
applied to the adjective. The point being that by dis­
regarding the practical or adjectival dimension the full 
realization of the ontological is hindered. Heidegger's 
exclusive concern with the ontological question "What does 
it mean to be?" can reveal only one aspect of man and even 
this will be faulty.
89^
ibid. , p. 12.
9°Ibid., p. 13.
^^Ibid.
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This exclusive dichotomizing by Wilde and Kluback 
reveals the weakness of their argument. Whereas Sartre 
saw the two realms of the ontic and ontological as "incom­
municable," Wilde and Kluback at least reveal the internal 
necessity of both through a dialectical relationship. 
Nevertheless, all three have based their criticisms on an 
inadequate understanding of the ontico-ontological rela­
tionship.^^ But an initial point needs to be raised.
The question of man's practical nature as revealed in his 
social, political, and economic manifestations lies within 
the domain of philosophical anthropology. Heidegger, as 
has been seen, does not disallow this domain but refrains 
from getting within it before an adequate ontological 
basis can be worked out.
Heidegger is aware that man (Da-sein) is what he
does. "Dasein finds 'itself proximally in what it does,
uses, expects, avoids--in those things environmentally
93ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned."
Yet, within what he does and uses is (pervades) that which 
allows him to do and use. To say that either the ontologi­
cal or the practical is the "Other"--at least in the con­
text used above--is to separate unnecessarily the two. It 
is also to overlook Heidegger's own assertion that,
92For Sartre see pp. I4 9-I5O.
& T, p. 155; H, 119.
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. the roots of the existential analytic . . . are
9 kultimately existentiell, that is ontical." The two dimen­
sions cannot be seen as separate, or as "Other," for they
are in point of fact, "different dimensions of a unique
95and profoundly unified phenomenon. . .
Wilde and Kluback would be correct in their criti­
cism of Heidegger if he had been following the traditional
r
procedure of metaphysics; i.e., positing an essence, a 
what, which determines or defines man's basic nature.
This would allow for a dialectical separation of the essence 
into the particular with their mutual interplay. But 
Heidegger explicitly refrains from this kind of thinking.
His question is one of Beingness and one which looks at 
the ways that Da-sein i_£ as opposed to what it is. It is 
true that in Being and Time the questions are of an ontologi­
cal nature, but, ,even these are revealed by laying bare the 
ontic, the existentiell. The misunderstanding of Heidegger 
reveals itself when Wilde and Kluback make this statement: 
"Existentialism, however, particularly that of Martin 
Heidegger, seems to have given little consideration to the
94Ibid., p. 34; H, 13. Also, "The question of 
Dasein's totality, which at the beginning we discussed 
only with regard to ontological method, has its justifi­
cation, but only because the ground for that justification 
goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein." p. 357;
H, 309.
95Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought, p. 50.
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96problem of state and p o w e r . T h e  equation of Heidegger 
with existentialism reveals their lack of understanding 
of fundamental ontology. They want to see fundamental 
ontology as an extension of metaphysics--as concerning 
itself with the question of man's nature; i.e. philosophi­
cal anthropology. The result is to see man as a what 
which reduces him to the status of a thing (an extant).
(b) Individual and Social Being--Weber
Weber's thesis is that not only is there a defi­
ciency in Being and Time as far as a positive ethics is 
concerned but that Heidegger's "theory of man" gives rise 
to such a condition. For if we follow his thought a posi­
tive view of society can not logically be developed or 
i m p l i e d . " W e  find no hint whatever in Being and Time
98that society may be founded on positive bases."
For Weber, the "they" represents man's social inter­
action and as such is based entirely on lies and fears.
The "they" exists so as to induce man's fall which means 
fleeing from "ontological truth into shared ontic lies." 
This fallen state is necessary to protect man from the 
anxiety that would result should man see, comprehend, his
96Wilde and Kluback, p. 27«
97'Renee Weber, "Individual and Social Being in 
Heidegger's Being and Time," p. 1 (in abstract).
S^Ibid., p. 97.
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99human condition. Since the "they” is based on lies and 
fears, and since all participate in this "shared world," 
it then becomes a domain whereby all men are necessarily 
"against-one-another.
The inconsistency in Heidegger's "system" revolves 
around his concept of co-being or mit-sein. The mit-sein 
represents Heidegger's "a priori posit" that there is a 
pure co-being status serving as the foundation for all 
beings who dwell t o g e t h e r . Y e t ,  men serve mainly as 
obstacles to each other's development as each one pursues 
Being. To reach this truth of Being absolute silence is
required and this necessitates a withdrawal from all shared
. . ^ . 102 interaction.
But what of solicitude in its positive modes? The 
"leaping-in" and "leaping-ahead" of positive solicitude 
fail when they are most needed; i.e., when one faces "his 
most crucial hour." They fail because one can find himself 
only through himself. "All being-in-the-world of care and
99lbid., p. 72.
^°^Ibid., p. 78.
^^^Ibid., p. l46, ftn. 10. The inconsistency, as 
Weber sees it, revolves around the fact that Heidegger, 
"deals only with an empty, uninterpretable system from 
which no empirical value-system whatever can be derived." 
p. l44. On the next page (145) Weber mentions Boss as 
merely reiterating Heidegger's assertion regarding co-being 
but she does not offer any analysis of this reiteration.
102Ibid., p. l47. "Either man functions as singular, 
authentic being or as mass inauthentic being."
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all co-being with others fails to work when it becomes a
103question of one's own possibility to be." There can,
therefore, be no real genuine communication based on the 
so-called "positive" modes of solicitude. If it were true 
that I could share the burden of my own death with others, 
mitigate the anxiety of death by sharing with others, then 
Heidegger would have to give up part of his system; that 
of finding my own self through m y s e l f . T h u s ,  Heidegger 
is committed to a theory of radical individuality.
Weber concludes that Heidegger's first positive 
mode of solicitude is either malicious, impossible or 
meaningless. (She concludes the same about the second 
mode.) After all, how can you term "positive" that which 
would destroy the individuality of the other--through 
"leaping in"? "From all that Heidegger has said about 
Care, is it not clear that no one can possibly 'take over' 
its function for anyone else?"^^^
In Being and Time (p. 159; H , 122), Heidegger 
states that between the two positive modes of solicitude 
there are numerous "mixed forms" and that to classify these
103 Ibid., p. 1 5 5 . This is Weber's own translation 
of a passage from Sein und Zeit. Macquarrie and Robinson 
render this passage. " . . .  all Being alongside the 
things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with 
Others, will fail us when our own most potentiality-for- 
Being is the issue." B & T, p. 308; H, 2 6 3 .
lO^Tbid., pp. 1 5 5 -1 5 6 .
lO^Ibid., p. 170.
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individually would take the task of the work beyond its 
limits of investigation. Weber concludes that this state­
ment "proves” that Heidegger not only lacks a social theory 
but that he is not even interested in supplying one.^®^
What does it mean to be authentic? Although 
Heidegger appears to take it for granted that the road to 
authenticity— "The highest value in Heidegger's philosophy
of man”--must lead through inauthenticity, it can be shown,
107so Weber states, that this is not the case. Man can
become authentic directly. Her argument is bolstered by 
stating from Heidegger that, "Dasein does not necessarily 
and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of
108Being." But, to become authentic means necessarily to
isolate oneself from all other Daseins. ". . . authentic
Dasein must be a radically individualized Dasein, one that
109dwells in silent isolation from other Daseins." To be
authentic means to be in anxiety and no one can experience 
this anxiety but the individual himself, ". . . it is I 
alone who can experience it. Therefore, no one else could
lO^Ibid., p. 1 7 3 .
X07Ibid., p. 8 7 . Weber also states, " . . .  'authen­
ticity' is a value-judgment, one for which Heidegger fails 
to provide criteria," pp. 231-232.
& T, p. 303; H, 2 5 9 .
^^^Weber, p. 129.
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conceivably 'step into' my p l a c e . I n  this mood of iso­
lated anxiety man experiences his reason for being. "The 
Hoidegerrian man exists in order to know and experience a 
Being and to make Being and himself (a being) transparent 
to himself. This is his crowning task, and isolation is 
one necessary condition that can ensure the realization of 
this task."^^^
For Weber, Heidegger presents man with a choice 
between two undesirable extremes. On the one hand there 
is the fallen world of the herd-like social being who has 
missed the "true meaning of his existence." On the other, 
there is the authentic, resolute individual who is true to 
himself and true to "life's function." But he has "paid 
the price of utter isolation in exchange for his state."
There appears to be no alternative between these two and
112if there is "Heidegger does not acknowledge it."
Weber offers the position of Ludwig Binswanger as
demonstrating the inadequacy of Heidegger's social theory.
Binswanger had to discard many of Heidegger's views in
order to come up with a positive social doctrine, one based 
113on encounter. Yet, Binswanger retained much of the
^l°lbid., p. 1 0 8 .
^^^Ibid., pp. 1 0 8-0 9 .
^^^Ibid., p. 1 0 0 .
113 Ibid., p. 1 9 0 . "Not only does Binswanger not 
retain the spirit of Heidegger's views; he must discard
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terminology of Heidegger in order to appear Heideger- 
rian.
Heidegger's authentic man achieves his authenticity 
at the price of utter isolation. "Heidegger's man, not 
withstanding Heidegger's pronouncements to the contrary
ll4finds the world an obstacle that must be overcome. . . . "  
"Overcome" in this context means withdrawing from all con­
crete, empirical manifestations of the world. Binswanger, 
on the other hand, views the authentic man as being genu­
inely with the world when he is genuinely himself. For 
whereas Heidegger's world is a compound of care, tasks, 
projects, roles, escape, ruled by death, and so forth, 
Binswanger's world is comprised of love. For Binswanger 
this is a "transcendence" of care and solicitude.
Binswanger finds an alternative between inauthentic 
fallenness and authentic isolation; it is "encounter."
This is a relationship of genuine mutuality. "Encounter 
entails respect for the other and respect is incompatible 
with manipulating or using him in any way. Encounter is 
love."^^^ Binswanger, therefore, has had to import various
the most basic ones, modify others and import more foreign 
implants into Heidegger's thought than he can export from 
it."
Il4Ibid., p. 192.
^^^Ibid., p. 193.
^^°Ibid., p. 198.
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circumlocutions in order to save himself from Heidegger.
For the most part these have been borrowed from Buber.
"It is clear that Binswanger is no Heidegerrian at all
117when the central tenets of his philosophy are at stake."
Weber further states that love as encounter is that,
" . . .  abode of Dasein rising above care and transcending
-lift
even resolution."
At this point, to evaluate critically each one of
the points raised by Weber in her critique of Heidegger
would push us into lengthy and unnecessary repetition.
Nevertheless, certain key failures of understanding on the
part of Weber will be reviewed in order to reveal the
problems involved when Heidegger's ontology is seen as an
"explanation" of the "nature" of man.
A preliminary step at this point seems appropriate.
How would Heidegger himself react to a question concerning
his philosophy as being preoccupied with the question of
Being-ness to the neglect of the human condition?
How can your philosophy today be effective in regards 
to a concrete society with its multifaceted tasks and 
cares, demands and hopes? Or have your critics been 
correct, those who maintain, that Martin Heidegger has 
so concentrated on the question of Beingness that he
l^^Ibid., p. 202.
n  8Ibid., p. 208. "Heidegger's resolute Dasein 
always confronts the situation with action in some sense; 
it is afraid to 'lose' its time. What love experiences in 
the moment . . . resembles lack of resolve and loss of 
time to the narrow eyes of care." p. 211.
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has ignored the human condition, the being of man in 
society as well as the individual person?
Heidegger answers;
These criticisms are a great misunderstanding!
Because it is just the question of Beingness and the 
development of this question which anticipates an 
interpretation of Da-sein; that is, a determination 
as to the essence of Man. And the basic idea of my 
thinking is just this, that Beingness needs the open­
ness of the being of man and that vice versa man is 
only man in as much as he stands in the openness of 
Beingness as such.
With this point, the question in as much as I am 
occupied only with Beingness and have forgotten man, 
should be settled. Man cannot ask the question of 
Beingness without also asking about the essence of 
man . 119
The basic mistake Weber makes is not to take seri­
ously, as well as not understand, the nature of the ontologi­
cal "aim" of Being and Time. She has assumed whether know­
ingly or not, that Heidegger is revealing man's ontic 
manifestations when in fact he has been disclosing the
ontological essence of man ; i.e., man in his Beingness. "The
120whole of Being and Time is an ontology." And, es has
been seen, in this dissertation. Being and Time, "is a work
in ontology and to render any part of it ontically is to
121push it into an anthropology." Weber herself has stated
that Heidegger and his audience speak in foreign tongues 
which can be reduced to the "phenomological ontology" of
119Richard Wisser, Martin Heidegger im Gesprach 
(Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1970), ppT 69-70 My transla-
tion.
120 Boss, Personal interview, 1973.
121
See pp. 19-20 and 212-213 above.
239
Heidegger and the ’’anthropology" of the audience. Weber
evidently intends these two to be seen as synonymous.
"For what he terms 'anthropology' the majority of mankind
122calls 'ethics.'" It should be manifestly clear by now
that Weber has pushed Heidegger into an anthropology.
Da-sein is jemeinigkeit. Does this justify 
pushing "man" into utter isolation in order to achieve 
authenticity? Weber has charged Boss with merely reiter­
ating the Heideggerian assertion that man is essentially a 
Being-with-others and that Da-sein is primarily m^ Da-sein. 
She further states that Boss has not offered an analysis 
of Heidegger but that he, Boss, merely states that critics
have made egotistical rather than altruistic inferences
123from his thought. But Da-sein as jemeinigkeit has
nothing to do with ontic isolation. It has everything to 
do with "individual" openness to and revelation of phe­
nomena with their possibilities.
To say that Da-sein exists for its own sake does 
not refer to some ontic, concrete or egotistical end of 
factical man. To argue that this proposition can be 
refuted by bringing to bear examples whereby men have 
sacrificed themselves for others and/or that men exist
^^^Weber, p. l83
Ibid., p. 145, ftn. 7- She is referring to 
Boss' objection to "The Egotistical MisconceptionV as 
found in P & D, pp. 55-56. The term ^altruistic" is not 
found on either of these pages.
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primarily in community, rather than refute the assertion 
merely discloses it. As Heidegger has stated, "The propo­
sition represents neither a solipsistic isolation nor an 
egotistical exaltation of Dasein. On the contrary, it 
states the condition of the possibility of man's behaving 
either 'egotistically' or 'altruistically.'" (Emphasis
124other than on "either" and "or" is added.)
Weber has assumed that authenticity for Heidegger
125functions as the "prime-value. " But Heidegger is not
working with values in Being and T i m e , he is merely laying
the foundation whereby values can be imposed. But, this 
imposition occurs on the ontic l e v e l . I n  other words, 
Heidegger is laying bare the way man is in his essence; 
i.e., as Da-sein. This is not evaluative but descriptive. 
Authenticity and inauthenticity are revealed as modes of 
Being--ontological determinations--and not as objects for 
evaluation.
To evaluate something, to give "it" a value, is 
to make the "it" an oÉject for a subject which evaluates.
124Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Vom 
Wesen des Grundes), p. 8?.
125Weber, p. 239- " . . .  obviously Heidegger's
work is replete with values."
^^^In B & T , Heidegger states that value-predicates 
are "possessions" of extant (vorhanden) Things and hence 
extants themselves. Although put in the form of a ques­
tion the affirmative implication is clear, " . . .  These 
value-characters themselves are rather just ontical charac­
teristics of those entities which have the kind of Being 
possessed by Things?" p. 132; H, 99»
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In other words, thinking in terms of value-judgments is 
simply the adding of a value to an object. Thus, all evalu­
ating becomes a subjectivism. In doing this, things become 
subject to man's evaluating, and hence can not stand in 
their own Being. But, as has been seen, the ontological 
dimension is merely the disclosure, the revelation of pos­
sibilities; it is not the evaluation of those possibilities.
For Heidegger, it is through the characterization 
of something as "value" that the something loses its dig­
nity. By "evaluating" something it becomes an object for 
the appreciation of, or manipulation by, man. "But what 
a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an 
object, much less when the objectivity has the character 
of value. All valuing, even when it values positively, 
subjectivises the thing. It does not let Beings be, but 
makes them valuable as the object of its action." (Emphasis
added.
How could Weber maintain her rendering of authen­
ticity as a case of utter isolation in the face of Heidegger's 
assertion that the private is impotent? "If man . . .  is 
once again to find himself in the nearness of Being, he 
must first learn to exist in the nameless. He must recog­
nize the seduction of the public, as well as the impotence
127Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in 
Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 
III, pp. 214-215.
242
128of the private." The implication here is that authen­
ticity is "logically" different than either "utter isola­
tion" or "the impotence of the private." Is this so diffi­
cult to see? Authenticity is the "own most" disclosure of 
possibilities; it is not the evaluation of those possibili­
ties. Yet, both the public and the private are modes of 
living; i.e., they function evaluatively--they are "chosen"
possibilities. Thus, authenticity, as understood by Hei-
129degger, is antithetical to both isolation and privacy.
But the above quote (Footnote 128) reveals much 
more than this. What does it mean "to exist in the name­
less?" The nameless refers to the mode of disclosure as 
opposed to the mode of evaluation. For to judge something 
as a value is to set it apart, make "it" an object; i.e., 
to name it. To exist in the nameless is to let Being be. 
But doesn't this rather restrict us as far as our "philo­
sophical" activity is concerned? If we exist in the name­
less, if we refrain from judging, if we let Being be, 
what can we do? It is not what can we do; it is what we 
will do and that is, be silent.
^^^Ibid., p. 1 9 6 .
129The question can be raised, "What if I choose to 
live authentically?" This would be an evaluative act and 
hence would not fall within the domain of the open dis- 
closiveness of possibilities. It would use those possi­
bilities but in their use a determinative choice would be 
implemented. Thus, Heidegger says, "Authentic Being-one's- 
self . . .  is rather an existentiell modification of the 
' they ' . . ."T" B~& T," p. 1Ù8; H, 130.
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The second part of the above quote reads like this,
"Man must, before he speaks, let himself first be claimed
again by Being at the risk of having under this claim
130little or nothing to say." We have seen that Er-eignis
is not an e-vent in the sense of a happening. "It" is of 
a nature which does not allow speaking about or defining 
"it" for our languages and grammar are expressly "designed" 
to make statements about beings or Things. Language cannot
131touch Er-eignis, it can only be experienced. Perhaps
this is what Heidegger means by "existing in the nameless." 
Perhaps this is also what he means when he says that 
living the claim of Beingness will leave us with little or 
nothing to say. And perhaps this is what is meant, in an
1 32indirect way, when he says, "Man is the shepherd of Being."
The "letting Being be" may be for Heidegger what
Boss has described as "letting what appears speak to 
13 3you." As Boss has demonstrated in his many publications,
this has profound implications for psychotherapeutic tech-
134nique and theory.
13°ibid., p. 1 9 6 .
l^^See p. 138 above.
^^^Ibid., p. 210.
133Boss, Personal interview, 1973.
^^^See Boss, P & D, p. 64, also pp. 248-251.
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(c) Friedman; "All real living is meeting"
The fundamental argument against Heidegger (as 
well as Boss) is that Being-in-the-world as Being-with 
(mit-sein) is based on an inadequate comprehension of the 
significance and importance of encounter or meeting 
(Begegnung). To bolster the argument Friedman utilizes 
the "I-thou" philosophy of Buber and the "existential 
analysis" of Binswanger.
For Binswanger, love is that which grounds dis- 
closedness for our-selves, a selfhood coming about as a 
result of encounter--the Care, on the other hand is
"of the world" and of disclosedness of the "there" for 
myself. "The there of the Dasein as love is--the being- 
there ^Da-sein7 of the 'world' of Each-Other. Love 
not only transcends care but makes possible the permeation 
of care by an understanding based on the self disclosed in 
encounter.
It is through encounter that the "deepest sense" 
of unique belonging together becomes manifest in the I-thou. 
"The selfhood of this I and Thou is thus grounded not in 
the Dasein as mine or thine, but in the Dasein as ours ;
i.e. in the being of the Dasein as we. Here selfhood
136issues only from the We."
13 5Quoted in Maurice Friedman's, The World of Exis­
tentialism (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 417. This
is Friedman's edited translation of Binswanger's Grund- 
formen and Erkenntnis Menachlickens Daseins.
l^^ibid., p. 419.
245
Friedman, points out that selfhood as arising from 
encounter--the dual selfhood of love as developed by 
Binswanger— is in direct opposition to Heidegger's dis­
closure of the world as "mine." Friedman contends that 
Heidegger has "posited" this mineness of Da-sein and that 
Boss has accepted it uncritically. Further, both Boss and 
Heidegger see mineness as the true avenue to authenticity. 
For Friedman, this means that Binswanger has separated 
himself from those "existentialists" identifying the inter­
human as merely cui extension of the self and thereby joins
137the existentialists of dialogue.
Whereas Friedman makes this identification for 
Binswanger, he is, nevertheless, critical of Binswanger 
remaining with a method of analysis which is Heidegerrian. 
He is also critical of Binswanger's "dual mode" of love as 
becoming overly sentimentalized; i.e., as not containing 
within it the possibilities of conflict and opposition as 
does Buber's philosophy. However, Binswanger has caught, 
according to Friedman, the essence of Buber's I-Thou 
philosophy by realizing that existence is understood prin­
cipally from the We, or X-Thou, not exclusively from the 
I." 8
137Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential 
Analysis," Review of Existential Psychiatry and Psychology, 
IX, Nos. 2 and 3, 1969, p- 1&5.
^^®Ibid., p. 167.
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It is this identification of self with I-Thou as 
opposed to "mineness” that, for Friedman, characterizes 
the fundamental distinction between Buber and Heidegger.
Is the reality of the self grounded on "mature resolute 
existence" or found in the encounter between men? If the 
second position is adopted, then the self can only be 
understood via its dialogue with other selves; i.e., in 
the "between." If Heidegger's "position" is taken, then, 
for Friedman, "existential categories" can be used to 
reveal the self from within itself. But this is wrong 
says Friedman, for the self must be understood as a recipro­
cal relatedness, of the mutuality between selves,
" . . .  and never as an ontological entity understandable
139
prior to its interhuman relations." (Emphasis added.)
Friedman succinctly summarizes the position of 
1-Thou, reflecting both Buber and Binswanger by saying;
. . . people cannot enter an 1-thou relationship
simply by unburdening their emotions to each other 
but only by leaving the Dasein as mine or thine for 
the Dasein as ours, the Dasein as we.1^0
How could someone "leave" his Da-sein much less 
enter into another "type" of Da-sein? The only possi­
bility would be if Da-sein were seen as a something
Ibid. As stated by Friedman, ". . . it in 
inadvisable to substitute an ontological analysis of dia­
logue itself. The result could only be to reduce dialogue 
from an ontological reality to an ontic one, from 'all 
real living is meeting' to dialogue as a dimension of the 
self."
l^^lbid., p. l66.
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possessed (an extant) and this is not what Heidegger has 
revealed as Da-sein!
According to Friedman, "all real living is meeting" 
or, the self can only be understood in its reciprocal 
relatedness with other selves. But a series of questions 
can be posed at this point. How does the basic ontologi­
cal condition of "real living" allow for existing with?
This question is not answered by either Buber or Friedman. 
How can I conceive of myself as an I and a Thou? How can 
I be so constituted as to be able to experience myself as 
a mit-sein with you? What is the prerequisite of our con­
dition that allows experiencing ourselves as existing 
together? These questions all point to a basis, an under­
standing, as to why and how we can exist as We or as I-Thou. 
This basis has not been uncovered by Buber, Friedman or 
Binswanger for they still view Heidegger's ontology as 
merely perpetuating an ontic description of properties that 
man has. They, in essence, are still "hanging in the air."
Therefore the descriptions of individual sociologi­
cal phenomena which are not seen within the background 
of primary being-with-one-another of man's existence 
hang in the air.^ ^
The Jemeingkeit of Da-sein is so constituted that 
Being-with (mit-sein) belongs to it equiprimordially. It 
is this ontological grounding which allows one to speak of
^^^Boss, Grundriss, p. 287. My translation.
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an I-thou or a We. "Buber's I-thou and We remains not
l42clear as to its essence; it hangs in the air." In
other words, dialogue or what is called "meeting" is only 
possible and made possible by Being-with which pervades 
each manifestation of dialogue as its essence.
When the Other is explicitly disclosed in solici­
tude this disclosure is made possible by being with him 
primarily in every case. Yet, more than likely it is the 
disclosure of the Other which becomes the focal point for 
the problematics involved in understanding the "psychial 
life of others" not the ontological feature underlying 
the disclosure--Being-with. "Not only is Being towards 
Others an autonomous irreducible relationship of Being:
This relationship, as Being-with is one which, with Dasein's
l43being, already is."
The Jemeingkeit of Da-sein can be referred to as 
"selfhood" only if that is understood ontologically. 
"Selfhood is the presupposition of the possibility of being 
an '1 ' which itself is revealed only in the Thou." Self­
hood is a neutral expression describing Da-sein's ontologi­
cal characteristics and as such it makes possible such
142Boss, Personal interview.
l^^B & T, pp. 1 6 1-1 6 2 ; H, 124-125. Heidegger's 
development of the theme being-with, paraphrased in this 
paragraph, reveals not only important elements for the 
topic under discussion, but for the non-immanence charac­
teristic of Being-in-the-world as well.
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things as "being an I" and "being a Thou" and even "sexu­
ality." It must be remembered at all times when con­
sidering Da-sein that:
All essential propositions of an ontological 
analytic of Dasein in man treat Dasein in 
its neutrality. (Emphasis added.)ITT
In summary, the three sources constituting the 
Heideggerian critique have one general theme in common.
They have, for the most part, confused the phenomenological 
method and its ontological revelations with ontic descrip­
tions of properties that man has. This occurs as a direct 
consequence of investigating the nature of man as opposed 
to interrogating the Beingness of man. The former is con­
cerned with properties, hence substances; the latter 
reveals ways that man is.
Wilde and Kluback regard Heidegger as neglecting 
the ontic dimension seeing it as a necessary "opposite" 
for the ontological. This vividly puts the ontological in 
opposition (hence inferring a priority) to the ontic when 
in point of fact the ontological is already within the 
ontic as its essence.
Weber sees Heidegger as presenting a "deficient" 
social theory as a result of a "deficient" theory of man. 
She contrasts the "they" as representing a social structure 
based on falsehoods, facades, and trickery, with the utter
l44 /Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Vom Wesen des
Grundes), p. 87.
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isolation of the authentic man and finds them both lacking. 
But in the process of her evaluation she has created a 
chimerical Heidegger. She has not understood that Being 
and Time is a work in fundamental ontology and as such has 
given the basis for a social theory but by no means has 
presented either a "positive" or "negative" concrete social 
or ethical theory.
Friedman, using Buber and Binswanger, has attempted 
to push Heidegger and Boss into a kind of idealism 
revolving around the meaning of the expression "mineness." 
He has attempted to demonstrate that the "I" can only be 
known through a "Thou"; i.e., through the encounter. But 
this is all on a concrete level, its ground, its essence 
has not been adequately revealed, if at all. This is why 
it can be said that these ideas "hang in the air," I-thou 
functions as a result of the ontological disclosure of 
Da-sein as Being-with.
CHAPTER V
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
A development of fundamental Heideggerian themes 
and their respective relevance for psychotherapy as seen 
by Boss has been accomplished. The task now is to show how 
Heidegger and Boss specifically relate to the philosophy 
of science. Section 13 centers on a philosophy of science 
developed from Heidegger's statements on the subject and 
as interpreted by Boss. In section l4, criticisms of Boss' 
Daseinsanalysis are reviewed demonstrating that the critics 
have implicitly endorsed a definition of science which is 
overly restrictive. In section 15, a general historical 
and thematic development of the movement known as existen­
tial (humanistic) psychology is undertaken and a critique 
from the Heideggerian perspective is presented.
13. Heidegger and Boss on Science
With the possible exception of the essay "What Is 
Metaphysics?" Heidegger has not devoted himself directly to 
a critique of the issues of a philosophy of science. Yet, 
throughout many of hiw works, at least a concern for these 
issues can be discerned. Boss, on the other hand, comes
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from an orientâtion--psychology and/or psychotherapy--which 
views itself as "scientific." Yet, Boss has based his 
entire approach to the "scientific" issues of psychotherapy 
on Heideggerian thinking. Perhaps we can conclude that 
Heidegger has more to say to science than what might imme­
diately be apparent.
It will be recalled that in Sections 2 and 6^ a 
summary was presented of Boss' approach to the issues of 
a "philosophy of science." This summary focused primarily 
on his use and understanding of phenomenology. It was 
revealed that for Boss natural science has given the model, 
perpetuated by the behavioral sciences, whereby phenomena 
are explained by appealing to "forces," "dynamics," or 
"causes" that somehow reside within phenomena and give them 
their "reality." This tendency, however, merely covers up 
the phenomena in their phenomenality--they become "leveled." 
Daseinsanalysis as phenomenology attempts to undercut this 
leveling tendency by allowing the phenomena to reveal them­
selves .
In this chapter, an expansion of the summaries 
previously given will be undertaken. This involves being 
more specific in regards to the issues of the philosophy 
of science as seen from the perspective of both Heidegger 
and Boss. Also in this chapter an attempt will be made to
^Section 2, specifically pp. 33-45 above.
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evaluate some of the criticisms levied against Daseins­
analysis as well as to develop a critique of humanistic 
or existential psychology.
"What is most thought-provoking in our thought-
2
provoking time is that we are still not thinking." With 
this phrase Heidegger introduces the critical issues sur­
rounding the nature of thought in Was Heisst Denken? The 
region of what is most thought-provoking is that of non­
thinking and it is from this region that a fog arises.
3
"A fog still surrounds the essence of modern science."
But what is the fog and what is the essence of science?
If the cardinal rule for reading and understanding
li
Being and Time is followed, it will become apparent that 
the sciences, inclusive of the "human" sciences, operate 
on an ontic level. This being the case, those in the 
sciences will see the distinctions raised by an ontological 
analysis as wholly inadequate since their "logic" is based 
upon extant (vorhanden), object, orientation. Even reforms 
in this logic will not allow them to see the ontological 
distinctions which form their ground for their logic as 
logic is object (vorhanden) based. Scientific structure, 
therefore, is "thoroughly questionable and needs to be
^Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? pp. 5-6. 
^Ibid., p. l6 .
4"Being and Time is a work in ontology and to render 
any part of it ontically is to push it into an anthro­
pology." See p. 4 above.
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attacked in new ways which must have their source in 
ontological problematics."^ Perhaps the fog surrounding 
science is its inability to see itself from its ground, 
or essence, and its essence is that it is a way to be.^
But what is this "way"? Man is that entity among 
all the entities of the world whose irruption into what-is 
reveals the a^ and how of what-is. This is nothing less
7
than that man "pursues" science. Along with the irrup­
tion of man into the what-is are, "world-relationships" 
and "attitude." The world-relationship, paradigmatic of 
all sciences, is to reveal the what-is as an object of 
investigation and thereby give it a definition according 
to its essence and its modality (method of being). The 
attitude of science is one of submissiveness toward the 
what-is as object. Yet science, as defined by the triple 
process of world-relationship, attitude and irruption, is 
exclusively concerned with the what-is and nothing else.
& T, p. 71; H, 45.
^"The existential conception understands science 
as a way of existence and thus as a mode of Being-in-the- 
world which discovers or discloses either entities or 
Being." But this is to be distinguished from the "logical" 
conception of science which "understands science with 
regard to its results and defines it as 'something estab­
lished on an interconnection of true propositions--that is, 
propositions counted as valid.'" B & T, p. 408; H, 357-
7
Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?" in Brock's 
Existence and Being, p. 327.
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But what is the nothing that science not only does not
8touch but eschews?
9
The nothing as n o -thing is Beingness as such.
Nothingness is neither an object nor any thing that "is."
Nothingness allows the what-is to reveal itself and thereby
becomes an original essence of what-is. Yet science is
not concerned with the no-thing but only with the thing 
10or what-is. To put this in the language of Being and 
Time it can be said that science is exclusively concerned 
with extantness, the "thing" as object, not the being of 
the "thing."
As science turns toward the what-is the more it 
becomes the captive of what-is and the more it turns away 
from N o t h i n g . Y e t ,  the Nothing is part of the essence 
of man who "pursues" science. Thus, science can only
^Ibid., p. 328.
^"Yet this 'Nothing' functions as Being." Ibid., 
p. 353. Boss has said, "Only because 'being-ness as such' 
is so fundamentally different from all particular beings 
does Heidegger occasionally call 'being-ness as such' 
'Nothingness.'" This is not nihilism, says Boss, on the 
contrary, the Nothingness, . . t o  which he refers is of 
such immeasurable abundance that it alone is capable of 
releasing into its being all that is going to be." P & D,
p. 3 6 .
l°Ibid., p. 341.
^^Man, Da-sein, too functions as this turning towards 
and turning away. "The essence of man . . . depends on the 
fact that it endures and dwells for a time in either the 
turning towards or away." Martin Heidegger, "The Question 
of Being," p. 75* This essay by Heidegger contains an 
extended analysis of "What Is Metaphysics?" See pp. 93-101.
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understand itself when it confronts Nothing instead of 
abandoning it.
Nothing, which is revealed "in the very basis of 
our Da-sein," is that which allows for the strangeness of 
what-is to become apparent to Da-sein. It is this strange­
ness which awakens wonder and it is through wonder that the 
"Why?" is asked. It is through asking the "Why?" that man
can "seek for reasons and proofs" and thereby become the 
12enquirer.
Although not stated directly by Heidegger in the
essay "What Is Metaphysics?" it is nevertheless inferred
that with the asking of "Why?" man pulls away from the
Nothing that engenders the question and moves toward the
what-is of the question. It would appear that this is the
"place" of the rising of the fog which surrounds science in
its essence. "Modern science neither serves the purpose
originally entrusted to it, nor does it seek truth in 
13itself." It should be noted that the Nothing stands at 
the very basis of science and is, in point of fact, that 
which gives science its essential impetus.
In asking the question "Why?" science, as inquiry, 
becomes a way of seeking for "reasons and proofs." For 
Heidegger, this means objectivizing the what-is through
^^Heidegger, "What Is Metaphysics?" pp. 347-348. 
^^Ibid., p. 3 5 1.
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calculation. Yet, through objectivization as calcula­
tion the what-is becomes solidified and safeguarded-- 
safeguarded against falling back into Nothing and safe­
guarded for further advance into objectivization. This
objectivization "gets stuck in what-is and regards this
15as nothing less than Being (sein)."
This is a crucial point in "What Is Metaphysics?" 
in two, but nevertheless related, senses. It reveals that 
science is moving away from its grovind--Nothing--and heading 
toward the objectivization of what-is which is then termed 
Being. Secondly, metaphysics loses the truth or sense of 
B e i n g . T h i s  becomes the question of Being as posed, 
for example, by Aristotle and later the scholastics: "What
is being qua being?" But this translates "What is the 
essent as essent?" which escapes the question into the 
"truth," meaning or sense of Beingness.
14
"As a method of objectivizing what-is by calcu­
lation it is a condition, imposed by the will to will, 
through which the will to will secures its own sovereignty." 
Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^"(Metaphysics) tells us what what-is is by con­
ceptualizing the 'is-ness' of what-is." Ibid., p. 351.
17This point is elaborated in Heidegger's Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 211-254 and will not be 
pursued any further in this dissertation except to say that 
Heidegger attempts to "lay the foundation of metaphysics" 
by establishing the priority of the question of the meaning 
of Beingness. Metaphysics has not looked at its ground, 
but begins with the priority of man; i.e., the anthropologi­
cal. See pp. 211-213 above.
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•'Metaphysics moves everywhere in the realm of the 
truth of Being, which truth remains the unknown and
1 Q
unfathomable ground.•• Although metaphysics is integral 
with man, it nevertheless does not know its ground. It 
remains within the what-is without seeing the Nothing.
It is a mistake, therefore, to view Heidegger as perpetu­
ating metaphysics. Heidegger elsewhere has stated that 
the Question of Beingness (Seinsfrage) . . .
is thus a completely different question than the meta­
physical question. It means that when I ask "What 
is metaphysics? I am not asking a metaphysical ques­
tion but am asking about the essence of metaphysics.19
Science makes the what-is objective through calcu­
lation, reason and proof. For Heidegger this is not 
"thought" in its essence; it is the "technical interpreta­
tion of thought." "Being as the element of thought has
20been abandoned in the technical interpretation of thought."
By technical interpretation Heidegger means a conceptualiza­
tion which has as its goal the "rationalization" of all 
that is, the what-is, into a, or the, "reality." This is 
accomplished through ratio as theoretical and practical.
What do we see on the meadow, a tree? But, no, in "reality" 
we see a void which is sprinkled with electric charges that
1A
Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? p. 351»
^^Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger im Gespr&ch, 
ed. Richard Wisser (Freiburg; Karl AlkerT 1970), pp. 75-76. 
My translation.
20Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 194.
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21race about at high speeds. Thinking, however, in its
essence brings itself to its own light, it "keeps clear of
22persisting in ratiocination about ratio."
Heidegger is trying to tell us that there is a
thinking more original than the conceptual, that is superior
to contemplation and that surpasses doing, producing and/or 
23effectiveness. The conceptual, contemplative and effec­
tual is a thinking that binds the what-is in concepts and 
classifications; it is a restrictive thinking. Thinking 
that is the thought of Beingness, on the other hand, is
thinking that is elemental, primordial, and as such simple.
2^It is a thinking which unbinds, which lets what-is be.
21
Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? p. 4). 
"Whence do the sciences--which necessarily are always in 
the dark about the origin of their own natvire--derive the 
authority to pronounce such verdicts?"
2^ Ibid., p. 2 8 .
23 "Letter on Humanism," p. 222. Heidegger maintains 
that thought has been judged by a measure inadequate to it.
It is like " . . .  the procedure of trying to evaluate the 
nature and the capability of a fish by how long it is able 
to live on dry land." p. 194. The fish analogy can also 
be found in What Is Called Thinking? p. 71- Here Heidegger 
adds a statement which will be reviewed later. He says,
". . . w e  must always seek out thinking, and its burden of
thought, in the element of its multiple meanings, else every­
thing will remain closed to us." (Emphasis added.)
24Karlfried Grtinder has assessed Heidegger's critique 
of science with particular reference to "thinking" with 
these words: "For his critique of science Heidegger appeals
to his special concept of thought, which in origin and 
intention is not genuine philosophy but a religious substi­
tute of romantic origin." The equation of "thought" with 
religion and romanticism is inherently dubious since both 
can be seen as manifestations of the same Ge-stell that
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The essence of truth for Heidegger is freedom and
25"Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting be' of what-is."
But the letting-be of the what-is, is not an abandonment
of the what-is. It is not an indifference or nelgect but
an "active" way of being, a participation in the revealing
or "unconcealment" of what-is. Freedom is not understood
here in its common definition as the "random ability to do
as we p l e a s e , b u t  a participation in the very nature of
Da-sein itself. It is a participation in the "Da" of
Da-sein, the openness of that which is open, the clearing
itself. It is to participate in the revelation of what-is
27with the possibilities of the what-is.
produced "science." To see how science and religion are 
parallel in their thinking and both are superseded by 
"thought" would be a highly provocative venture but beyond 
the special interest of this dissertation. Karlfried 
Griinder, "Heidegger's Critique of Science in its Historical 
Background," Philosophy Today, VII, No. 1 (Spring, 1963)»
27.
^^Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in 
Werner Brook's (ed.) Existence and Being, p. 305.
^^Ibid. , p. 307.
27The revealment of what-is-as-such is seen as,
"The revelation of this is itàelf guaranteed in that ex- 
sistent participation whereby the overtness of the overt 
(Die offenheit des Offenen); i.e., the "there" (Da) of 
it, what it is." Ibid. Had Brock translated the overt­
ness of the overt" as the openness of the open it would 
have been clearer and would reveal the importance again 
of the term Lichtung. Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is 
already "in" the world, letting be the what-is is revela­
tory of this Being-in-the-world with its multifarious 
possibilities. It i_s the Da-sein, unrestricted, tin-leveled, 
dis-closed.
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The freedom of which Heidegger speaks is not some­
thing that man possesses but is the very basis of man as 
Da-sein; i.e., Da-sein as dis-closedness— opening up that 
which is closed. " . . .  freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory
. 28Da-sein possesses man. . . . "
Freedom in this sense becomes not only the basis 
for uncovering, dis-closing, the what-is, but also that 
directive to turn toward the what-is. But in the directive 
to turn to the what-is, the original revelatory essence of 
freedom is forgotten. "Although man is all the time related 
to what-is, he almost always acquiesces in this or that
29particular manifestation of it."
But this sounds familiar! What of the thinking of 
the gift, but not that which gives it; what of seeing that 
which is in the clearing instead of the clearing itself;
30what of the presencing which gives the present? Does 
this not sound like mysticism? But we have been speaking 
of science.
What is the fog that surrounds the essence of modern 
science? Science does not "think" its ground; it thinks
pft
Ibid., p. 3 0 8.
^^Ibid. , pp. 3 1 4-3 1 5 . "Understood as the letting-be 
of what-is, freedom is essentially a relationship of open 
resolve and not one locked up within itself." Resolve 
needs to be seen here in its ontological sense as "opening 
up that which is closed."
^^See pp. 208-209 above.
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in the sense of ratio about what-is. It attempts to become
more effective by its use of a conceptual, calculative
reason and in doing so goes ever farther away from its
ground. But what is its ground? It is the freedom to
reveal in the sense of uncover the what-is. But in its
revealing by use of a conceptual reasoning (ratio) it is in
fact covering-up. Science uses its essence, the revealing,
dis-closing, of the what-is, but "loses" its essence by
falling into the what-is, enshrouding the what-is in an
interpretative schema. The enigma of science is that it
perpetuates the fog by following the "command" of its
31essence and thereby covers up its own essence. Yet,
science must perpetuate the fog or be caught in a circle.
How can science presuppose what it is its task to provide
grounds for? Science, in order to follow its own "logic"
3 2wants to find a standpoint independent of the observer. 
Science is caught in a dilemma of its own making yet a 
dilemma that is necessary in order to perpetuate itself as 
science. In perpetuating the dilemma science necessarily
31In Being and Time, Heidegger states that Da-sein 
is inclined to fall back upon its world and interpret itself 
in terms of the world. By world here he means the world 
of things. Also, as Da-sein falls "on" its world Da-sein 
also falls prey to tradition which blocks access to "pri­
mordial sources." "Tradition takes what has come down to 
us and delivers it over to self-evidence. . . . "  B & T, 
p. 43; H, 21.
^^B & T, p. 194; H, 152.
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will always be in the dark as to the origin of its own
33nature.
Da-sein as Being-in-the-world is already "in" the 
world so that a "world" has already been disclosed to it 
even if unthematically. Da-sein's ontic involvement in the 
world is based upon the "prior" ontological disclosure of 
world. This ontological state of Da-sein gives the basis 
for the projection of the state of Being of entities to 
be investigated scientifically. For instance, the sig­
nificance, ontologically, of mathematical physics lies in 
its having projected nature mathematically; i.e., nature 
seen as something quantitatively determinable. A "fact," 
therefore, can only be "seen" in the context of a Nature 
which has been projected beforehand. There are no bare
34facts.
This "prior projection" of the Nature of world is 
something that gives science its impetus but at the same 
time is not determined scientifically. It, in fact, forms 
the prescientific underpinnings for all scientific opera­
tions. "For every science rests on presuppositions which
33See pp. 2 5 3 - 2 5 4 above.
^^B & T, pp. 413-414; H, 3 6 2-3 6 3 . Using mathe­
matical natural science as an example, Heidegger states 
that its basic character, ". . . lies in the fact that the 
entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it 
in the only way in which entities can be discovered--by 
the prior projection of their state of Being."
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can never be established scientifically, though they can
35be demonstrated philosophically.”
Does man exist in a senseless chaos into which an 
unbiased scientific observer introduces order? By the 
very fact of introducing order has not the observer pre- 
established that order? Before science operates there 
exists with the scientist a "general notion” as to the 
nature of things, a background so to speak, which neces­
sarily functions in order for him to behave scientifically. 
"The prior projection of the state of Being of Nature" 
refers to the conception of the essence of objects which 
shapes the objects so that they may be treated methodologi­
cally. " . . .  all scientific knowledge and achievement 
are never more than the orderly interpretations and differ­
entiations of a vei" lefinito and immediate pre-scientific
o A
understanding of the world.”
When considering the essence of objects whether 
thematically or not the question of ontology is raised.
Yet, for the most part, the ontological aspects of science 
are often taken for granted or assumed as "self-evident.” 
The scientist approaches his subject matter already armed
^^Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? p. 131.
^^Medard Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. 36. Heidegger 
states, "All scientific thought is merely a derived form 
of philosophical thinking, which proceeded to freeze into 
its scientific cast.” M. Heidegger, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, p. 21 in Barrett and Aiken, III, pp. 156-157•
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with these ontological determinants as well as the method­
ology to be applied. The subject matter must fit the pre­
conceived ontological and methodological determinants or
37else be dismissed.
Boss presents four pre-scientific articles of 
faith which not only animate the thought of Freud but form 
the background for all natural sciences;
1. There is an external, 'real' world, existing in 
itself, independent of man.
2. 'Real' can be only what can be measured, calcu­
lated, and thereby established with certainty. 
Reality is the totality of those objects which 
constitute the world.
3. The relations between the particles of every 
object as well as the connections between one 
entire object to all the other ones are pre­
dictable causal connections; thus the chain of 
these relations of causes and effects is always 
an unbroken one.
4. Finally, everything that is 'real' fits into the 
three dimensions of space and into a temporal 
order derived fro# the movements of the sun and 
the other stars.
37"Only those things which this tool can grasp, or 
which can be formed to fit it, are ever considered as real. 
Everything else is either completely overlooked or dis­
missed as phantasy." Boss, ibid.
o O
Boss, P & D, pp. 75-7 6 . Boss states that Freud 
concluded from these four presuppositions that: 1) mental
phenomena are products of an object, the psyche. 2) Being 
an apparatus the psyche needs energy in order to run, this 
is the "libido." 3) Internal and external stimuli undergo 
transformations in a causal manner by means of the psyche. 
4) The sole aim of all psychic processes is the motor dis­
charge of energy. 5 ) "Correct" thinking is achieved when 
there is a correspondence between thought and the external, 
objective order. "Incorrect" thinking--primary process-- 
is brought about by the internalization of thought within 
the unconscious. pp. 7 6-7 7 .
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What is immediately recognizable from these four 
pre-scientific assumptions is that they constitute articles 
of faith which in themselves are not provable. If an 
attempt is made to prove them, the logical fallacy of 
circular reasoning has been committed. Yet, this is not 
to pre-judge science as false but merely to point out 
that all sciences must begin by accepting as valid certain 
pre-scientific biases.
In Grundriss, Boss reveals the logic of the natural 
scientific approach as assuming five points:
1. It presupposes as necessary the calculability 
and exact determination of all things;
2. That there is exactly one way to determine and 
understand things;
3. That without this single way of conceptualization 
there can be no exact calculation;
4. Without exact calculation there is no natural 
science ;
5. Without natural science in general there can be 
no science.
Sciences which base themselves uncritically on 
presuppositions such as these restrict their range of 
inquiry by pre-judging which subject matter is not only 
acceptable but also amenable to "scientific" scrutiny. An 
extension of this type of thinking concludes that only
4oscience will allow us to see the "real" world. Are the
^^Boss, Grundriss, p. 376. My translation.
ko "There is a widely held belief that the chaos 
enfolding us in the beginning was truly dispelled only by
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botanists' plants more real than the flowers of the hedge­
row? Is the 'source' of the river established by the
4i
geographer more real than the "springhead in the dale?"
Are the electrical charges as a bundle of electromagnetic
undulations of measurable frequency and amplitude more real
than the rose which they "explain" much less the redness
Lo
of the rose which is a subjective illusion?
With these questions one of the basic tendencies of
science, both naturalistic and behavioral, is revealed.
It is the attempt to "find" forces, energies or mechanisms
which somehow reside behind or within phenomena and thereby
"give" them their essence. This tendency is expressed by
the term "dynamics." Heidegger states that when something
is no longer seen by just letting it be, but seen as
"harking back to something else to which it points" so that
it is seen something it then acquires the possibility of
43
being covered-up. As man scrutinizes the what-is, as 
he gets more involved in determining and explaining the 
what-is, the more he "acquiesces in this or that particular
science, which alone, will ultimately let us see the real 
order of the world." Medard Boss, "Mechanistic and Holistic 
Thinking in Modern Medicine." American Journal of Psycho­
analysis , XIV, No. 1, 1954, p. 48.
41Heidegger, B & T, p. 100; H, 70.
42Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic 
Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 
II, No. 3, 1 9 6 2 , p. 180.
^^Heidegger, B & T, p. 57; H, 34.
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44manifestation of it." This means that the fullness of 
the what-is, as a phenomenon in itself, is cut off from 
revealing itself and generally one of its manifestations is 
taken as exclusively identifying and defining it.
Modern science, inclusive of the behavioral sci­
ences, has acquiesced to the idea that the onJy road to 
understanding and seeing the "real" world is through physi- 
calistic and/or energetic systems. Since Descartes it has 
been assumed that the reality of objects can be determined 
solely through a mathematically based physicalistic 
explanation of calculation and cause-effect relationship. 
This is a "prior projection" of nature as causal, dynamic 
and physicalistic. As a "projection" the object is pre­
determined. Following the lead of the natural sciences 
and wishing to be scientific themselves the behavioral 
sciences have also "projected" and in so doing ascertained 
what is and what is not their object(s) of investigation.
In terms of the behavioral sciences, "psycho­
dynamics" attempts to determine the nature of psychological 
phenomena by "finding" the forces, energies and/or causes 
that make it move. As Boss points out, the original meaning 
of the term Dynamis as Kinesis, or motion, has nothing to 
do with forces or energies that lie behind or within phe­
nomena. Kinesis meant for the ancient Greeks "the turning
44Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 314. 
See also p. 255 above.
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into the gestalt and form of something else." For instance, 
a table made of wood is produced by the skill of the car­
penter who releases from the wood, a disposition already 
within it. Thus, there is no "force" that produced the 
table. Dynamis originally means nothing more than the pos­
sibility of Kinesis. Concomitant with dynamics is the use 
of the term "etiology" by psychodynamics. Today, etiology 
stands for a causal-genetic derivation of something from 
another object. Originally, however, the term Aitia meant 
"that which provides the opportunity for the emergence of 
something."
The opposite of dynamics is what Boss refers to as 
"statism." Statism refers to the "static" description of 
symptoms. Both statism and dynamics are intellectually 
contrived categories which are employed to supposedly help 
explain phenomena. Daseinsanalysis, on the other hand, 
focuses on immediately perceivable and experienced phe­
nomena thereby offsetting the desire to find, or construct, 
hidden causes or forces which make, move, or animate phe­
nomena. Daseinsanalysis regards all phenomena as equally 
autonomous and genuine. Yet, Daseinsanalysis is also aware 
that every human phenomenon that manifests itself at any 
given time must be seen in the context of its past and 
future. "Life history" inclusive of "life expectations" 
are integral parts of Daseinsanalysis.
& D, pp. 106-107.
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Causal dynamics operates as one of the cornerstones
of natural, and now the behavioral, sciences. How does
that which comes earlier "cause" that which comes later?
The concept of cause has become increasingly identified in
the sciences as the causa efficiens of Aristotle. By
definition, "efficient cause" is that which is "able to
produce something out of something else by acting on it
and by making it change into a different something, a new
46product or effect." Using this definition how could 
"forces," energies or instincts "cause" an observable human 
phenomena? Is it legitimate, much less demonstrable, that 
what is prior in time should be the efficient cause of 
everything that follows? If it is believed that this 
prior "what" does in fact cause what comes after it, is it 
legitimate, much less demonstrable, that this "what" be 
given an exclusive "reality" status?
Aristotle distinguished four causes: material,
formal, final and efficient. Yet, the increasingly one­
sided approach of Western natural science in general has 
tended to reduce causality to the single efficient model.
To produce something out of something else by acting on it 
and making it change into something different would be 
meaningful if the particular point in time when the cause
& D, p. 106.
4?Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. $0,
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actually turned into an effect could be determined. But 
the effect is entirely different than the cause; it is in 
point of fact "something different."
Classical models of science have uncritically trans­
formed a temporal sequence into an assumed causal sequence. 
The assumption is this: that which appears later owes its
existence to the earlier and therefore is merely derived 
and "only a disguising manifestation of an earlier and
48
presumably more real occurrence." If this is done then
that which does appear later loses its autonomy and in so
49doing the "things themselves" are abandoned.
Psychological theories that reflect this causal 
hypothesis assume that if the first or initial cause of a 
pathological mode of behavior is discovered and removed 
all subsequent pathological effects will disappear. For 
example, in accordance with this causal principle some 
psychologists believed that the birth anxiety, which 
naturally is the "first" anxiety, is that which caused all
48Boss, ?'What Makes Us Behave at All Socially?"
p. 55.
49The expression "things themselves" is an allusion 
to the phenomenological admonition "to the things themselves." 
As seen from the Daseinsanalytic perspective: "We can no
longer close our eyes to the fact that by reasoning to 
such an intellectual construction of assumed causes and 
forces behind the perceived phenomena we forever lose sight 
of the latter themselves. We thus always fundamentally 
degrade them at the very outset to something that is merely 
derived." M. Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic 
Liberation," pp. 178-179.
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Later anxieties. And further, since guilt feelings 
first arise in the child by the initial commands and pro­
hibitions of his parents, it was believed these feelings 
were the cause of subsequent feelings of guilt.
hilt what of the subsequent anxieties and guilt 
feelings, the ones that occur later? They are by virtue of 
the causal principle degraded as to their own phenomenality 
and assumed to lie merely derived.
A diffeient orientation regarding a causal hypothesis 
has been developing within contemporary physics. Physicists 
today, for the most part, have abandoned a strict causal 
hypothesis. They refrain from imposing upon their subject 
mattej- the idea that causal connections can explain the 
emergence of one event from another much less prove the 
reality of something. Neo-empiricists in physics conceive 
of causality with the logical paradigm of "if-then, always- 
up-to-now." Yet, they will not admit that future events 
will always follow this logic. For these physicists the 
causal model is a hypothesis of statistical probability 
and has no ability nor legitimacy to reveal the "dynamics"
50of the inner relatedness of a repeatable series of events.
Daseinsanalysis does not deny causality. By inter­
rogating phenomena it does attempt to see causation in
P & D, pp. 1 0 5-1 0 6 . Boss refers to Reichenbach's 
The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Chapter 10. Hans 
Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley: 
Universi ty of Calif ornia Press, 1951)•
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proper perspective and this means that for the most part, 
when dealing with man, the distinction between cause and 
motive has been overlooked. Boss attempts to demonstrate 
this distinction by the following observations.^^ It is 
the Fall of the year, I am standing in my study and sud­
denly a strong gust of wind comes up and the window slams 
shut. What happened here? First, there was an open window 
and then a closed window after the appearance of the wind. 
This sequence of events allows the conclusion that because 
the wind blew the window shut; or, a further conclusion 
"ir the wind blows, then. . . .” The slamming shut of the
window is interpreted as the effect of a cause. This is 
the basic understanding of the causality principle--it 
means merely temporal determination and explains this 
temporal process by appealing to the "if-then" paradigm.
It does not attempt to understand the reason (Grunde) of 
causality.
Human modes of behavior, however, cannot be under­
stood from the principle of causal connection. Suppose 
instead of the wind shutting the window, I shut it. I do 
so because the noise outside is disturbing my work. The 
reason for shutting the window was a pure motive, namely 
my wish to have peace and quiet. This wish for quiet was
51The following is a paraphrase of the distinction 
made by Boss between cause and motive as found in Grundriss, 
pp. 3 6 7-3 6 9 .
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the "re; son tor iictioii," the motive ( üeweggrund) for my 
closing of tlie window. Reason ( Grnnd) here is altogether 
different from the natural scientific cause (ursache). A 
gust of wind "knows" nothing of noise and quiet.
A natural cause is not moved by significance; i.e., 
it is not open. It has no "freedom" of decision. The 
wind, for instance, can never act in its own sense or 
meaning. My shutting the window, however, is no blind 
cause; it is a motive; i.e., there is a ground for action, 
a ground in significance. A significance is always a claim 
in which something as something occurs; e.g., "noise as 
disturbing."
The example of my shutting the window so that I 
might have (juiet reveals the essential nature of man as 
being-addressed (Angesprochen-werden) by something as some­
thing and his responding (Entsprechen) and answering 
(Antwor ten). When man is seen as operating via a psychic 
causal order ("psychische Ursache") he is reduced to the 
status of a thing, or "lifeless object." Human modes of 
behavior, therefore, cannot legitimately be understood from 
the perspective of causal connection but from motives or 
"reasons for action." The life history of man is a connec­
tion of motives, not a connection of causes. The basic 
difference between the two is that causes are regular 
sequences in time— hence "determinism"— whereas with
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52motives the element of human freedom enters.
The "dynamic" conception of science with its 
assumed forces and causal connections pushes the interpre­
tation and explanation of its subject matter into a physi­
calistic frame. This allows for the development of a 
highly efficient program. "Those who can only understand 
the world in terms of cause and effect are condemned by
their very philosophy to evaluate all objects in terms of
53
their utility and efficiency." Yet, efficiency demands
of the what-is that it be demonstrable, but does this not
5^ 1l)lock the way to what-is? In other words, by directing 
thought towards efficiency is not the "essence" of that 
which is being interrogated lost? "Being effective is 
never a proof of conceiving a thing in its essence, and
55
this is the mistake of our technique oriented society."
But further, we find that when nature is interrogated with 
efficiency as the goal, fulfillment, meaningfulness and 
individual happiness have been sacrificed.
“Boss, Personal interview, 1973.
5 3
Boss, Analysis of Dreams, p. Il8.
5/ j
Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 72.
5 5
Boss, Personal interview, 1972.
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"It is just the complete irrelevance of all our 
tremendous technological knowledge and power to fulfillment 
and a happy life which should lead us to suspect that nature 
only reveals its least essential aspect to the methods of 
technological investigation." Boss, Analysis of Dreams,
p. 121.
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"The j'eai 'movement' of the sciences takes place
when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical
57revision which is transparent to itself." "Basic con­
cepts" arc the pie-scientific assumptions which guide the 
sciences, demarcate not only the subject-matter but the 
means of interrogation as well. But the basic concepts 
ai’e themselves dependent upon "entities" and to become 
aware of basic concepts, to in fact ground these concepts, 
is to "interpret" entities with regard to their state of 
Beingness , or- as Boss would say their fundamental charac­
teristics or essence. But this is a "logic" that runs 
ahead of the sciences, laying the foundation, so to speak, 
in the sense of a leap. "Laying the foundations, as we 
have described it, is rather a productive logic--in the 
sense that it leaps ahead.
The logic that leaps ahead, that which grounds 
basic concepts, is the laying-bare, uncovering the "things 
themselves." Daseinsanalysis attempts to stay with the 
phenomena themselves without appealing to abstractions, 
derivations, explanations or calculations. Daseinsanalysis 
is an attempt to let the phenomena themselves reveal their 
own essence and meanings.
^^B & T, p. 29; H, 9.
58Ibid., p. 30; H, 10. Toward the end of Being and 
Time Heidegger again hits this theme in his reference to 
Count Yorck's criticisms of Dilthey: "At bottom Yorck is
demanding a logic that shall stride ahead of the sciences 
and guide them. . . . "  p. 451; H , 399.
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1 <\. Criticisms of Daseinsanalysis
The apparent simplicity of Daseinsanalysis, with 
its appeal to the autonomy of immediately perceivable phe­
nomena and its subsequent eschewing of pre-conceived 
standards of interpretation, has engendered from its
antagonists criticisms as to its "naiveness" based on its
130
simplicity. Dut since when has simplicity become a
negative quality in science? After all, the law of parsi­
mony has been one of the major principles undergirding 
the advancement of science for years. Is the admonition 
to stay with phenomena rather than meet them with the armor 
of pre-established criteria for interpretation naiveness? 
Does its naiveness stem from not following the traditional, 
time honored, modus operandi of science? Have all "advance­
ments" in science come about by strictly adhering to 
accepted methods of procedure? Perhaps those orientations 
which criticize the Daseinsanalytic penchant for simplicity 
should be warned not to confuse their complicated intricate 
methodologies and assumptions with a higher degree certi­
tude .
Boss forewarns his readers in Psychoanalysis and 
Daseinsanalysis, much like Heidegger forewarned in Being 
and Time, that the dangers of misunderstanding the insights
59"We fully realize that the believers in 'psycho­
dynamics ' scornfully dispose of the Daseinsanalytic approach 
by calling it 'naive' because its insights sound so simple." 
M. Boss, P & D, p. 1 0 8 .
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and discoveries of Daseinsanalysis are manifold. These 
dangers are inherent in the very thought processes and 
languages of the Western mind; i.e., the tendency to reify 
and objectify phenomena. As Heidegger would say, it is the 
tendency to think exclusively in terms of Vorhanden, 
extantness or the "present-at-hand." Under this tendency 
it is difficult to see the Daseinsanalytic revelation of 
the unobjectifiable nature of man. Man is not this or 
that thing, but finds his being in the way he is, as 
Being-in-the-world. To see man in this way, says Boss, is 
to "break a habit that is two thousand years old."^^
The "old habit" gives rise to five possible mis­
conceptions as to the insights of Daseinsanalysis. Boss 
lists these as: the allegorical, idealistic, Platonic,
subjectivistic and the egotistical,^^
The allegorical misconception occurs when such 
expressions as "realm of world-openness," Lichtung as 
openness or clearedness and light which shines forth, are 
taken as mere allegorical expressions or poetic abstrac­
tions. These terms attempt to best describe man's funda­
mental nature. They are descriptive of this nature and 
not objective in the sense of reified entities.
& D, p. 49.
^^The following represents a summary of these five 
points as developed by Boss in P & D, pp. 49-56.
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The Idealistic misconception occurs when it is 
believed that the "things" which shine forth within the 
openness of Da-sein are produced by man's mind and consti­
tute the created content of his thoughts or ideas. This 
misconception also includes the idea that all meaning of 
things is created by the individual subject. This idea 
rests on the assumption that man first of all encounters 
an object (extant), a factum brutum which only later is 
seen as something; e.g., an animal, a house and so forth.
For Heidegger and Daseinsanalysis, interpretation does not 
signify imposing on the object (extant) a meaning or a 
value, for that which is encountered in the world is already 
within a context however meager or full that may be.^^
Does man have access to things, essents, themselves 
or does he see them only through specific projects or "world 
designs"; i.e., as if he as a subject throws a network of 
interrelated meanings over the brute object? For Heidegger 
and Daseinsanalysis, man has immediate access to an under­
standing of himself and what he encounters even though that 
"understanding" may or may not be thematically distinct.
Man as Being-in-the-world already is with things and hence 
with the "comprehension" of things. This is the meaning of 
the term ek-stasis which refers to Da-sein's "standing out" 
with and into world-openness. Since man as Da-sein is
& T, p. I9O; H, p. 150.
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as Being-in-the-world, "world" is already "part" of the 
essence of Da-sein so that what appears in the openness, 
the light, of Da-sein and Da-sein itself are mutually 
dependent on each other.
The Platonic misconception attempts to bifurcate 
the ontological and ontic realms into two completely 
separate and incommunicable levels. All concrete mani­
festations of man's action in the world are pervaded by 
man's ontological nature and in fact "give" the ontic 
dimension its essence. If man were not of the nature of 
luminatéd disclosiveness, he would not be able to perform 
any tasks.
The subjectivistic misconception considers Being- 
in-the-world as a property or characteristic residing 
within a subject. Being-in-the-world, seen this way, 
becomes merely an expansion of the concept of subjectivity 
and hence completely antithetical to the phenomenological 
disclosures themselves. Being and Time is basically a work 
devoted to the careful elucidation of the specific nature 
of Being-in-the-world. As developed by Heidegger, Being- 
in-the-world is initially revealed as the "primary aware­
ness of Beingness as such" and then more fully elaborated 
as being the realm of openness and light in which all things 
become manifest. This is not subjectivity. But, if
This interpretation has been perpetrated by 
Sartre. See pp. 149-150 above.
28l
Being-j >1-the-world is taken as a property it can then be
64
pushed into a subjectivity.
The egotistical misconception misconstrues Da- 
sein' s Being-in-the-world as not only subjectivistic but
6 5
as negating the possibility of interpersonal relationships. 
But the "world" of Being-in-the-world is constituted not 
only with "things" but also other Da-seins so that any 
individual Da-sein has other Da-seins as part of its very 
essence. This ontological designation--Being-with--makes 
possible and is the essence of all man's interpersonal 
relationships.
In 1 9 6 2 , Boss presented a paper at the Conference 
on Existential Psychotherapy held under the auspices of 
the American Association of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry. The paper was "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychothera­
peutic Liberation." Comments of a critical nature were 
presented and both paper and comments have been published 
in the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry,
Vol. II, No. 3*^^ Since the critical comments were
Boss uses this subjectivistic confusion to reveal 
as unnecessary Jung's archetype hypothesis. Jung believed 
he had to postulate archetypal structures that exist in all 
psyches in order to account for the independent occurrence 
of similar phenomena throughout man's history. Da-sein as 
openness to and with phenomena is capable of "seeing" these 
phenomena in their multiple characteristics. There is no 
need to postulate subjectivistic structures which are 
"ontogenetically" stored in the psyche. P & D, p. 54.
^^This point has been treated in Section 12,
^^Medard Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic 
Liberation," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 
II, No. 3, pp. 1 7 3-1 9 5 . Comments, pp. 197-20?.
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d i r e c t e d  specifically at the contents within the presented 
paper only a few have been chosen here as representative 
of a larger misunderstanding of Daseinsanalysis.
Sakert Basescu finds the distinction between exis­
tential anxiety and pathological anxiety missing in Boss' 
paper and further states, " . . .  one of the main contribu­
tions of Existential therapy has been to clarify the task 
of psychotherapeutic process in reducing pathological 
anxiety so that existential anxiety can be directly con­
fronted."^^ Basescu also doubts Boss' anxiety free level 
and further contends that in the cases of, for example, 
lovers who are willing to die for each other, it is an 
act of courage that overcomes the anxiety of death.
Basescu evidently identifies existential, as opposed 
to pathological anxiety, as an all pervasive ontological 
anxiety which is ever present and not to be overcome by 
therapy or anything else. But what does he mean by 
"directly confronting existential anxiety?" If the assump­
tion that Basescu equates existential with ontological 
anxiety is correct, then the error in his criticism can be 
revealed. Ontological anxiety reveals not another kind of 
anxiety but the very possibility of anxiety. Each ontic 
manifestation of anxiety reveals this ontological trait 
of the possibility of anxiety.
^^Ibid., p. 197.
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For Boss, the essence of anxiety reveals an of
what of "which" human anxiety is afraid of, and an about
68what of which human anxiety feels alarmed about. Funda­
mentally, the of what is the fear of the destruction of 
one's capacity to be; i.e., fear of death and the about 
what is fear about existence; i.e., the continuance of the 
integrity of one's individual identification. When Boss 
refers to the overcoming of anxiety, he refers to ontic 
anxiety, not ontological anxiety of possibility. Anxiety, 
says Boss, comes from the Latin angustia and the Greek 
ancho which both mean narrowness, tying off, restricted.
"The very word anxiety thus seems to point to the fact 
that existence attuned to anxiety, can see itself only as
69something throttled." As Boss attempts to demonstrate,
there are people who, on the ontic level, are so open and
independent or who do not conceive of themselves as closed
in, restricted, that they are not afraid of being "destroyed"
by losing their individuality. What restricts man at this
level is an identification with a highly structured ego,
70subjectivity or personality.
^^Ibid., p. 1 7 9 .
^^Ib: ' , p. 185.
70 "How then if the lover, the trusting friend, the 
hero and the saint could become aware of more and richer 
human possibilities-to-be than the ordinary anxious person 
who nowadays more than ever frets and worries over the 
possible continuance of what he understands as his ego, his 
subjectivity, his personality?" Ibid., p. l84.
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When anxiety is freed from this overly restricted 
identification with subjectivity, it reveals the possi­
bility of something far greater--it reveals a something 
which is No-thing. " . . .  anxiety confronts man with the 
Great Nothingness, a Nothingness, though, which is the
opposite of any nihilistic emptiness, which is rather the
71cradle of all that is released into being."
In particular, that in the face of which one has
anxiety, is not encountered as something definite with 
which one can concern oneself; the threatening does 
not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at- 
hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 
'says' anything any longer.7^
And further; "Anxiety is anxious in the face of the
73'nothing' of the world. . . ."
In respect to the criticisms of Basescu, it would
appear that he has fallen into the trap suggested by the
subjectivistic misconception. He has assumed the existence 
of an anxiety somehow lying behind pathological anxiety 
and has equated it with ontological or "existential" 
anxiety; i.e., as a property or trait which an individual 
"has."
Basescu's question concerning courage is echoed by 
Henry Elkins who states that, "Boss advises surrender and
7^%bid., p. 186.
^^B & T, p. 393; H, p. 343.
73lbid.
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7kacceptance as the only way of overcoming anxiety." This, 
for Elkins, devalues courage as a form of resistance.
But Boss does not devalue courage. Courage occurs 
when there is something for courage to be against as well 
as for. "Courage exists only wherever anxiety is still
75powerful, against which the courage can fight." But
when there is no anxiety, when there is no restriction or
"narrowness" courage is not necessary. This is not a
devaluing of courage; it is merely to identify it on a
different level of action.
The anxiety of modern man usually restricts self- 
awareness so much that he can only perceive himself 
to be, as it were, an isolated trembling waterdrop 
suspended in the air, but cannot even suspect any 
more the existence of the ocean from which the drop 
comes and of which it is essentially a part.'
Surrender does not necessarily mean giving up; it can also
mean opening up.
Partially related to Elkins' criticism based on
"surrender and acceptance" is his identification of Boss'
role as psychotherapist with "a spiritually feminine,
77maternal image." Elkins states that the expressions used 
by Boss only reinforce this identification; "'openness,'
7 k Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic 
Liberation," p. 203.
75ibid., p. 1 8 3 . 
f^ibid., p. 1 8 5 .
77lbid., p. 203.
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'responsiveness and responsibility to,* 'allowing the
7 ft
emergence of,' 'being the custodian or guardian o f .  . .
For Elkins, the therapist, as depicted by Boss, acquires
the aura of "masterful imperturbability" and has the quality
of an "ineffable superiority over the tormented and needy 
79patient."
But how can this be? Boss states that the highest 
aim of psychotherapy is the opening up of the patient to 
an "ability-to-love-and-trust" which allows for the sur­
mounting of oppression by anxiety and guilt. He also states 
that a therapist cannot achieve this by "turning himself
into a kind of matron air by seeking to play the maternal
fto
role." There is a way, however, that the therapist can 
create an atmosphere whereby his patients can open up to 
themselves. For Boss, this is a special kind of "loving 
acceptance" on the part of the therapist. Boss calls it 
"psychotherapeutic eros" and can only be found and demon­
strated within the psychotherapeutic situation. The type 
of love revealed by the therapist is different from the 
love of parents for children, the love of a priest or 
"holy man," the love generated between the sexes, as well 
as being different from a love demonstrated via kindness,
^®Ibid., p. 204. 
f^Ibid.
O ^
Ibid., p. 191.
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considerateness or even compassion. It is difficult, says 
Boss, to describe this kind of love in textbooks since it 
can be acquired by growing into it "from the experiences 
generated by one's own training analysis."
Elkins says that Boss' approach via psychothera­
peutic eros with its appeal to love rather than reason may 
be considered a "matriarchal" countermove to Freud's basic
82patriarchal approach. Yet, ironically Boss identifies 
Freud as the one who depicted with "unequalled precision" 
certain "essential features" of this special kind of rela­
tionship. It was Freud who wrote that psychoanalysis has 
its best success when it occurs "unintentionally," that 
is, when it is not pushed, when it is, "void of all selfish
ambition, of all deliberate aiming at any kind of thera-
6 3
peutic, educational or scientific success." Psychothej 
peutic eros is unparalleled in its selflessness and
81 Ibid,, p. 1 9 2 , Does this sound like ethical indif- 
ference? Herman Tennessen has said, "Medard. Boss extends 
the total ethical indifference of existential analysis both 
to psychotherapeutic techniques and to practical consequences 
and aims! This may look most impressive as a phenomenologi­
cal program (with its 'bracketing' and 'epochs') but is cer­
tainly not consistent carried out in practice." "Happiness 
is for the Pigs; Philosophy versus Psychotherapy," Journal 
of Existentialism, Vol. Vll, No. 2 6 , 1 9 6 6/6 7 , p. 1 9 6 . 
Tennessen implies that Boss is indifferent regarding the 
status of his patients. How is this criticism justified 
in light of Boss' psychotherapeutic eros? As far as 
Tennessee's identification of Daseinsanalysis with Husserlian 
phenomenology only one comment is necessary: "Whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
8 2
Ibid., p. 204.
^^Ibid., p. 192.
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self-restraint. It surpasses even Christian humility 
since it operates without introducing the therapist's own 
God.
Elkins' charge regarding the so-called "matriarchal" 
stance of Daseinsanalysis says more about the one who 
charges than it does about the charged. Elkins' obvious 
penchant for symbolization commits him to the allegorical 
misconception.
As an addendum to the issue concerning the role of 
the therapist in Daseinsanalysis, a direct reference to 
Heidegger at this point will be helpful. It has previously 
been mentioned that Heidegger's positive modes of solici­
tude as found in Being and Time lend themselves to a thera- 
QL
peutic model. The "later" Heidegger says something 
that can support this earlier model specifically as it is 
seen Daseinsanalytically.
The specific reference occurs in What Is Called 
Thinking? where Heidegger is talking about the function of 
the teacher. Teaching is more difficult than learning, 
says Heidegger, because teaching calls for, demands, that 
the teacher "let learn." The "real" teacher is one who 
lets nothing else be learned than learning. This will give 
the impression that nothing really is learned from the 
teacher is by learning one means "useful information."
®^See pp. 217-218 above.
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"The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone,
that he has still far more to learn than they--he has to
learn to let them l e a r n . I f  the relationship between
the teacher and the apprentice is genuine then there will
be no display of authority. In psychotherapy the therapist
learns to let his patients learn; i.e., to open up to 
86themselves.
If Boss is correct, the stature of psychotherapeutic
eros is not only difficult to attain but thoroughly
u n i q u e . C a n  it be said that this is an exalted view of
the role of the therapist? For Maurice Friedman it is not
only an exalted view but the therapist "becomes . . . the
88very image of Heidegger's authentic man." The issue at 
stake here is far more complex than a mere rejection based 
on the idea that the role of therapist becomes "exalted." 
Psychotherapeutic eros as defined by Boss is unique, so
^^Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? , p. 1$.
^^Boss states that the ability to be silent is 
indispensable to therapy. "The less a physician is capable 
of being silent . . . the more he is in danger of setting 
up obstacles to the unfolding of the patient's own poten­
tial, of pressing him in pseudo-pedagogic fashion into the 
physician's own matrix." Medard Boss, P & D, p. 64.
Q ry
"Such genuine maturity is difficult to attain.
The author himself has more than once been forced to admit 
that he was not ready to open himself to an analysand suffi­
ciently to be able to live up to the Daseinsanalytic demands 
made upon him." Ibid., p. 26o.
88Maurice Friedman, "Phenomenology and Existential 
Analysis," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 
II, No. 23, 19t>9, p. 157.
290
unique in fact that it can not be learned from books, it 
needs to be experienced. Does this justify its cavalier 
dismissal as being too exalted?
Further, Friedmain identifies the role of the thera­
pist somewhat derisively as being in the image of Heidegger's 
authentic man. Heidegger, however, does not give us a
definition of an authentic man, he reveals authentic
89Da-sein. But perhaps Friedman's criticism should not be 
dismissed too quickly. Perhaps his "criticism" points to 
a profound revelation. The uniqueness of psychotherapeutic 
eros as given by Boss may lie in the fact that it has been 
able "to come closest" to realizing ontically the meaning 
of ontological authenticity--to be the "there," i.e., to 
reveal the "situation" as a projection of possibilities.
In this case it is to let the phenomena revealed by the 
patient to disclose themselves in all their complex multi­
plicity and interrelatedness without judging, categorizing 
or manipulating them in any way.
Both Basescu and Elkins criticize Boss for what 
might be called a romanticized mysticism. Basescu says, 
"There seems to be a plea in this paper for a return to the 
Garden of Eden before man ate the fruit of knowledge--a 
state of unconscious communion with nature in which there
^^See pp. 223-225 above.
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90is no self and therefore no anxiety." Elkins says that, 
"Boss' outlook thus reflects a snare which perennially
91endangers the human mind, that of mystical pantheism."
These charges are reminiscent of what Heidegger
says in "Letter on Humanism." Because he has spoken
against "humanism," does this justify criticizing him as
affirming an inhumanity; because he has argued against
"logic," does this justify denouncing him as an irrational-
ist; because he argues against values, does this justify
the claim that his philosophy is valueless; because he has
said that man is a Being-in-the-world does this justify
calling his philosophy positivistic; and because he has
referred to Nietzsche's expression "God is dead" does this
92make him an atheist? Because Boss has questioned the 
traditional definition and operation of science does this 
make him unscientific? Because he is concerned with the 
unfolding of phenomena in their own phenomenality and uses 
such terms and expressions as openness, being the custodian 
of, nothingness and responsiveness does this justify clas­
sifying him as a mystic?
It would appear that the charges by Basescu and 
Elkins are not only hasty but reflect their own identification
tion," p. 1 9 8 .
90Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Libera-
^^Ibid., p. 2 0 6 .
92Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Barrett
and Aiken, III, p. 213.
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of the "proper" function, of science. If anyone disagrees
with this definition they are automatically banished to
that hinterland that is inherently inimical to science--
mysticism. Ironically, both Basescu and Elkins, in their
preparatory remarks praise Boss for going "to the very
depths of the human problem," and then at the close of
93their remarks dismiss what he has said as mystical.
This is haste personified.
What is said to be a defect, that Daseinsanalysis 
is nonscientific is, in point of fact, its very strength. 
Daseinsanalysis is not a science in the traditional con­
ception of "natural" science. It is a phenomenological 
proceeding which aims at disclosing all regions of man's 
existence. The natural scientific orientation, with its 
appeal to pre-scientific articles of faith, remains blocked 
and closed to its ground. The claim by the natural sciences 
that they alone can reveal the "true" or "real" nature of 
things is a claim that cannot be proven scientifically.
93Basescu writes, "We have been preoccupied with 
fitting observations into theories to the point of losing 
the individual's immediate reality. Dr. Boss' reverence 
for the phenomena themselves indicates the antidote that 
enables us to put the person back into the center of our 
work." Ibid., p. 197* And Elkins writes, "Professor Boss' 
statement of his approach to psychotherapy especially 
merits our attention and respect because it goes to the 
very depths of the human problem, making explicit the 
philosophic and even religious grounds that underlie his 
point of view." Ibid., p. 2 0 3.
^^See section 1 3 , specifically pp. 263-268 above.
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Throughout this dissertation, it has been repeatedly 
emphasized that Daseinsanalysis as phenomenology attempts 
to "stay with" the phenomena themselves. This methodologi­
cal procedure eliminates the imposition of a pre-established 
criterion of explanation thereby letting the phenomena 
themselves "speak." Can it be said, therefore, that 
Daseinsanalysis is basically hostile to conceptualization 
or that it is anti-conceptual?
Daseinsanalysis is by no means anti-conceptual.
It does, however, criticize those positions which assume 
or claim that there is only one way of coming to grips con­
ceptually with phenomena. It is not an exclusive revela­
tion of Daseinsanalysis that phenomena tend to resist being 
conceptualized in one exclusive way. Indeed, it appears 
that "particularly important matters"--of importance to 
man--resist a univocal conceptualization. From where, 
from what source or authority, does the claim originate 
that everything which is is determined and must be seen in 
exactly one way? But repeated observations and phenomenologi­
cal investigations reveal the opposite, that phenomena do 
resist singular conceptualization. In other words, what 
comes to presence, what is and how it is reveals itself in 
several, if not many, ways. For example, anxiety and fear 
are not objects which can be measured or "seen" in exactly 
one way. If one approaches such phenomena through a singu­
larly exact conceptualization the phenomena can be quantified
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and the information fed into a computer. But the richness 
of the phenomena in question has been lost. By opening up 
to the multiple revelations of all phenomena--their "mul­
tiple meanings"^^--Daseinsanalysis shows itself to be far 
more conceptual than any approach assuming only one avenue 
to phenomena ever could be.
That which man brings before himself (Vor-stellen) 
is already there. Man does not make it by his conceptu­
alization. For example, when a person says the word "tree" 
something is shining forth to that person, tree, but tree 
as tree is not a special tree; i.e., an oak, a fir, a 
juniper and so forth. We believe that we come to the 
abstraction "tree" by abstracting, taking away, something 
from many perceived particulars and thereby coming to the 
conceptualization tree. But the question is, how can you 
take something away before you have it?
1 5 . A Critique of Humanistic, Existential Psychology
One of the fundamental themes of this dissertation 
has been that Heidegger is not an "existentialist." What 
follows will be a critique of the development of existential 
psychology which gives Heidegger (and Binswanger) much of 
the credit for its development; i.e., it identifies Heidegger 
as an existentialist, or at least as introducing existential 
themes. There is an apparent discrepancy here. Since in
95See ftn. 23 above.
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this dissertation Heidegger has been identified along non- 
existential lines and since psychology (specifically exis­
tential psychology in America) identifies him primarily as 
an existentialist could it be that the "non-existential" 
Heidegger is not discussing themes relevant to psychology? 
Boss certainly does not think so. The ideas of Heidegger 
have come to psychology in this country primarily filtered 
through the works of Ludwig Binswanger. But Binswanger, 
as has been seen, saw Heidegger as an anthropologist in 
the existential sense. Could it be that Heidegger, as 
seen and described by Boss, could have more to say to 
psychology than what was originally seen; and even the 
"originally seen" was revolutionary?
The revolution that is taking place in psychology-- 
and has been for more than twenty years— centers around an 
image of man. Psychologists have conceptualized man as a 
machine, an organism comparable to rats or monkeys, a com­
munication system, a servo-mechanism, as a computer; but 
only recently and revolutionarily in psychology in general
q6has man been seen as a person.' Whereas man can be seen.
96
See Sidney M. Jourard, Disclosing Man to Himself 
(New York; Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. , i9 6 0 ) , pTT 3*1 Jourard 
opens his book with what he describes as something most 
peculiar. "Suppose I were to complain to you that I had 
no will of my own, thut people were influencing me in ways 
that I could not understand. You would most likely suggest 
I see a psychotherapist at once. But, suppose I had donned
a white laboratory coat and made the assertion that you had
no will of your own, that your actions and experiences 
could be manipulated, controlled, and predicted. I would 
then be honored and recognized as a scientific psychologist.
This is most peculiar." Ibid.
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analogically and reductively, as all these things he is 
also a person and it is this personhood which allows him 
to be manifested in so many ways. The revolution is geared 
to seeing man in his "humanness," as a person. And further­
more , this revolution is being conducted under the banner 
of science.
The humanistic revolution basically represents an 
eclipse of the reductionistic mechanistic position of 
behaviorism and the institutionalized dogma of classical 
(theoretical) psychoanalysis. It is a holistic approach 
which means it does not attempt to supplant the behaviorist 
or psychoanalytic models but to draw attention to their 
respective one-sided narrow perspectives. As such, the 
humanistic revolution attempts to broaden the perspectives, 
bring into consideration many aspects of experience which 
either have been denied by traditional models--"images"-- 
or distorted to fit preconceived criteria of meaning. Thus 
humanistic psychology is interdisciplinary in that it draws 
from many sources, including behavioristic and psychoanaly­
tic positions, in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
image of the nature of man.
The identification of this new orientation within 
psychology with humanism is not accidental. The central 
point underlying the long and often turbulent history of 
humanism has been the worth and dignity of man as species
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97and as individual. In the nineteenth century this con­
viction was stressed primarily within naturalistic and 
materialistic philosophies and reinforced by the advance­
ments of science. Both were seen as relieving man of 
stultification and suppression by the church as well as 
speculative metaphysical systems. Science was seen as 
opening up new avenues of achievement.
Generally speaking, humanism's endorsement of 
science resulted from the conviction that nature was sub­
ject to the law of causality which made it possible for 
man to control phenomena. The scientist's goal was the 
objective explanation of all phenomena with corollary 
abilities of prediction and control, and the humanist's 
goal was the use of this information and ability for the
98betterment of man. Yet, despite the apparent cohesive 
identification of humanism with science, in the twentieth 
century there are several divergent and often opposing 
systems expressing humanism, e.g., communism, democracy, 
some forms of religion and some of science itself.
In the twentieth century "existentialism" has become 
identified with "a" humanism. If humanism is understood as
97Erich Fromm, "Humanism and Psychoanalysis," Con­
temporary Psychoanalysis, I, No. 1 (19&4), p. 6 9 .
98
The names of Auguste Comte and John Dewey in 
Naturalism; Feuerbach, Marx, Engels within Materialism can 
be given as examples of this overall approach. See Corliss 
Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism (New York; Philosophical 
Library, Inc., 1949),pp. 30-36.
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a doctrine which states that " . . .  individual persons are
the source of value and intelligibility, then existentialism
99is itself, humanistic. . . ." Existentialism can in some
sense be seen as a restatement of the basic tenets of 
humanism since it sees man as the source and creator of 
values and that his individual dignity arises out of his 
realization and operation on that fact.
Although existentialism regards man as free and 
is often called the "philosophy of freedom," it neverthe­
less is basically pessimistic in that it regards existence, 
from an ultimate perspective, as fundamentally meaningless 
and absurd. The individual sets his own standards and laws 
without referring to the laws of nature, society, and even 
God. Although the variations of themes reflective of vari­
ous existential thinkers is divergent, basic orientations 
can be discerned. Rolf Muuss has listed six such orienta­
tions in an essay entitled "Existentialism and Psychology."
a) Existence is always human existence. It is the way 
of being peculiar for man, insofar as existential 
philosophy is humanistic. The human being is the 
central issue.
b) Existence is always individual existence. It is the 
peculiar way of being for a definite single individual, 
insofar as existence, philosophy is subjective.
c) The methods of existence philosophy are phenomenologi­
cal, Its concern is to directly comprehend being­
ness .
99Robert G. Olson, An Introduction to Existentialism 
XNew York: Dover Publications, Inc., 19&2), p. k ? .
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d) Existence philosophy is dynamic. Existence is not 
an unchanging being, but a being that is bound by 
its very nature to time and temporality.
e) Existence philosophy is concerned with particular 
man. (Not an isolation of the individual.) Human 
being is being in the world, In-der-Velt-Sein, and 
it is always being with others, Mit-anderen-Sein.
f) Existential thinking is always close to concrete 
situations; therefore, special existential experi­
ence takes the main interest. (Guilt, death, anger, 
suffering, conflict, fighting, etc.)lOO
Perhaps it is understandable why psychology in the 
early stages of its revolution identified with the basic 
"humanistic” elements within existentialism. Indeed, the 
identification was so strong that the revolution called 
itself "existential Psychology." By identifying with the 
existing, living, experiencing human being--the person-- 
psychology came in conflict with a science that relegated 
the "person" to constructs, forces or abstract drives. It 
is ironic, in a way, that early humanism (roughly l8ü> cen­
tury and on) which looked toward science as the liberator 
from the shackles of religion and "metaphysics" would now 
see science as evolving into a perpetuation of an "inhuman" 
image of man. It is equally ironic that this new humanism 
was beginning to see the implicit metaphysics inherent 
within the bastion of science itself, a bastion which had 
prided itself on excising the scepter of subjectivism-- 
metaphysical speculation.
^^^Rolf Muuss, "Existentialism and Psychology," 
Educational Theory, VI, No. 3 (1956), p. 138.
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For existential psychology, the fundamental issue 
is man's existence. This means that it is basically con­
cerned with the question as to the nature of man. As Rollo 
May, one of the chief spokesmen for this orientation, has 
stated,
The existential approach is . . .  an endeavor to under­
stand man's behavior and experience in terms of the 
presuppositions that underlie them--presuppositions 
that underlie our science and our image of man. It is 
the endeavor to understand the nature of this man who 
does the experiencing and to whom the experiences
happen.101
Existential psychology characterizes man as a per­
son rather than an organism; i.e., as something more than 
an additive product of various "part-fvinctions. " In 
assuming this position, the existential psychologist 
attempts to make explicit the presuppositions inherent 
within a person-centered or humanistic perspective.
Bugental lists these presuppositions as;
Man, as man, supersedes the sum of his parts.
Man has his being in a human context.
Man is aware.
Man has choice.
Man is intentional.
One of the ironies involved within this revolution 
has been its initiation by men in the field as opposed to 
theoretical academicians. Psychologists involved with 
daily confrontation with patients found that the theoretical
^^^Rollo May (ed,). Existential Psychology (New 
York: Random House, I9 6I) , pT^ l4.
102James F. T. Bugental, The Search for Authenticity 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, In^Jl 19^5)> pp. 11-
12.
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structures given to them by academicians were not meeting 
the needs of actual therapeutic situations. Doubly ironic 
is that, for the most part, academic psychology has not 
fully heard the cry of the practitioners and is still pur­
suing a theoretical structure that is pulling away from 
the problems and issues raised by practitioners.
The historical development of this revolution is 
relevant at this point; however, a full comprehensive 
review will not be attempted. Certain basic historical
events, nevertheless, can yield information important to
103the subsequent critique of the movement.
In 1 9 5 8 , Rollo May, as chief editor, introduced the 
book Existence; A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psy­
chology This book represented the culmination of
sporadic attempts to introduce the themes of the revolu- 
tion^^^ and after its publication the interest began to
103For a well developed historical introduction into 
the issues under discussion see Amedeo Giorgi's Psychology 
as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
104
Rollo May, Ernest Hugel, Henri F. Ellenberger 
(eds.). Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and
Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958). Later
published in paperback by Clarion Books, Simon and Schuster.
^^^Giorgi states that early humanistically based 
psychologists evidently felt the need for a new frame of 
reference since phenomena such as experience, consciousness, 
meaning, purpose, significance and so forth simply could not 
be studied with the tools given by the natural sciences.
Yet their attempts at a new frame of reference, their 
"desire” for one, were diametrically opposed to the pre­
vailing Zeit£eis_t which undoubtedly accounts for the slowness 
of this movement's advance. Psychology as a Human Science,
p. 53.
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increase rapidly. It is for this reason that in a histori­
cal study of "existential” psychology we can refer to pre 
and post Existence
The primary focus of pre-Existence centers around 
Gordon Allport. Allport's book Becoming in 1955 introduced 
the notion that Psychology had primarily assumed a Lockean 
posture in emphasizing the external and visible as more 
fundamental; by identifying the small and molecular as 
more fundamental than the molar; and by assuming that what 
is earlier is more fundamental than the later, in develop­
ment. A counter tradition to this was identified as the 
Leiknitzian which held that the person was more fundamental 
and as such an active, molar and purposive approach was 
e m p h a s i z e d . W h e r e a s  there were other pre-Existence 
documents, Allport's work seemed to clear the way and 
create an atmosphere which called for more depth into the 
issues of holism, personalism and humanism. Also of note 
in Allport's book was his reference to Paul Tillich's The 
Courage to Be, published in 1953, and which, for Allport, 
represented a statement from existentialism. From Tillich's 
work. Allport gleaned that existentialism had something to
See Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psy­
chology and Psychiatry; A Historical Introduction (Evanston; 
Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 143-144.
107Gordon Allport, Becoming; Basic Considerations 
for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven; Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1 9 5 5 )1 PP« 9-13.
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say to American psychology. Broadly speaking, Allport
identified it as explicitly reinforcing the Leihnitzian 
1 0 8model.
The influence of Tillich, as a spokesman or at 
least a definer of existential philosophy, can be found in 
Existence itself. May, who attended Tillich's lectures 
at Union Theological Seminary and was a personal friend, 
uses Tillich as a major source in his two introductory 
essays of Existence. Specifically, May uses The Courage 
to Be, as well as Tillich's essay "Existential Philosophy" 
which appeared in 1944.^^^ Heidegger, as seen both by 
Tillich and May is identified with existentialist themes. 
May is also augmented in his understanding of Heidegger by 
Binswanger. For instance. May states, regarding the 
Daseinsanalyse school of thought (Binswanger and Kuhn) 
that :
1 oft
Ibid., pp. 79-82. Allport says that existen­
tialism, "admonishes psychology to strengthen itself in 
those areas where today it is weak." Specifically, this 
means broadening its perspectives to include an active 
intellect, becoming, a new view of anxiety, courage and 
freedom. pp. 79~80. It has already been mentioned (See 
p. 25 above) that Boss' book The Meaning and Content of 
Sexual Perversion was published in English in 19^9 so that 
it would be considered pre-Existence. It might also be 
mentioned that a book by Ulrich Sonnemann, Existence and 
Therapy (New York; Grune & Stratton, 1954) was one of the 
first to introduce existential philosophy and European 
therapists to English speaking readers. But the book has 
been criticized for being difficult to read. (See Existence, 
p. 8 1 , ftn. 5 3 .)
^®^Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal 
of the History of Ideas, V, No. 1 (1944), pp. 44-70.
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. . . Dasein indicates that man is the being who 
is there and implies also that he has a 'there' in the 
sense that he can know he is there and can take a
stand with reference to that fact. The 'there' is
moreover not just any place, but the particular 'there'
that is mine, the particular point in time as well as
space of my existence at this given moment. Man is 
the being who can be conscious of, and therefore 
responsible for, his existence.llo
Furthermore, May identifies the important term 
"transcendence,” in Heidegger's name, as "this capacity to 
transcend the immediate situation . . ." and that it is
due to this ability to transcend the immediate, concrete 
situation that allows for the use of symbols.
Not only May succumbs to the identification of
Heidegger with existentialism, but Ellenberger does as
well. ". . . there is another philosophical trend called
'existentialism,' whose major representatives are Kierke-
112gaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre."
But the importance of Existence for the revolution 
to which it seemed to give definition was that it pointed 
to the growing dissatisfaction of many practicing psycholo­
gists with traditionally accepted models which seemed to 
leave serious gaps in an understanding of man. The doubts
^^*^Rollo May (ed.). Existence, p. 4l.
^^^Ibid., p. 75* Elsewhere May identifies Hei­
degger's Care (Sorge) on the ontic level when he says, 
"When we do not care, we lose our being; and Care is the 
way back to being. If I care about being, I will shepherd 
it with some attention paid to its welfare, whereas if I 
do not care, my being disintegrates." Love and Will (New 
York; W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 290.
112^^^Ibid., p. 9 2 .
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and uncertainties of these therapists gave rise to the 
realization that attention needed to be paid to the under­
lying assumptions about the nature of man. Existentialism 
presented a new orientation which seemed to fill those gaps 
without sacrificing rigor but at the same time returning 
dignity to the wholeness of the person.
Within the next four years four journals devoted 
to the themes of existential psychology began publication; 
The Journal of Existential Psychiatry in I9 6O, Existential 
Inquiries in 19591 The Review of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry in 1 9 6 1 and The Journal of Humanistic Psychology 
also in 1 9 6I. There were, as well, several books published 
devoted to the new themes of the revolution, notably;
Abraham Maslow’s Toward a Psychology of Being; Joseph Lyons, 
Psychology and the Measure of Man; Carl Roger's On Becoming
a Person; A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy; and James
113F. T. Bugental's The Search for Authenticity.
In terms of an immediate post-Existence influence, 
both Rogers and Maslow play important parts in the
113Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being 
(New York; Insight Book by Van Nostrand Co.% Inc.j 1962); 
Joseph Lyons, Psychology and the Measure of Man (London:
Free Press, 19&3); Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A
Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (Boston; Houghton-Mifflin 
Co., 1 9 6 1); James P. T. Bugental, The Search for Authen­
ticity; An Existential Analytic Approach to Psychotherapy 
(New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 19^5)« This 
by no means completes the list. See Amedeo Girogi, "Exis­
tential Phenomenology and the Psychology of the Human Per­
son," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry,
VIII, No. 2 (1968), p. 103.
306
furthering of the revolution. Maslow's influence comes 
primarily from his book Toward a Psychology of Being and 
with Rogers it is a series of penetrating journal articles, 
many of which were contained in On Becoming a Person.
For Carl Rogers, the revolution in psychology has
meant a broadening of the perspectives of science without
loss of scientific identity in the sense of "objectivity"
and rigor. Yet, this new emphasis in psychology has
reaffirmed the proper identity of science, that it is an
activity of people, human beings. For Rogers, science
exists only "in" people; i.e., prior to the articulation
of any knowledge (scientific or other) are the aims, values,
and purposes of the individuals themselves. Knowledge
thus becomes that which is accepted, subjectively, by the
individual. "Scientific knowledge can be communicated
only to those who are subjectively ready to receive its
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . E l s e w h e r e  Rogers has said, reflecting
the views of Michael Polanyi, "All knowledge, including all
scientific knowledge, is a vast inverted pyramid resting on
113this tiny, personal, subjective base."
Rogers explicitly refers to Kierkegaard and Buber 
as those among the existentialists most influential on his
ll/t
Carl Rogers, "Persons or Science? A Philosophi­
cal Question," published in On Becoming a Person, I96I ,
p. 2 1 6 .
^^^Carl Rogers, "Some Thoughts Regarding the Cur­
rent Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences," Journal of 
Humanistic Psychology, V, No. 2 (I9 6 5), p. I8 6 .
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thought. Yet, Rogers is an independent thinker and to 
infer that his works have been heavily influenced by par­
ticular existentialists would be a m i s t a k e . R o g e r s  has 
specifically referred to existentialists, without naming 
them other than Kierkegaard and Buber, in an apprehensive 
manner. He is wary of the overly subjective tone of some 
of the more "far-out" existentialists and does not want to
see the new humanistic movement succumb to a dogmatism
117based on these thinkers.
Rogers identifies his thinking with a new "third 
force" which is rising up between the two predominant forces 
in psychology. He likens these three "emphases" to three 
ocean currents forming side by side, mingling, but having 
no clear lines of demarcation. He says there are certain 
words or phrases that identify these emphases but do not 
define them;
1) Behaviorism, objective, experimental, impersonal, 
logico-positivistic, operational, laboratory.
2) Freudian, neo-Freudian, psychoanalytic, psychology 
of the unconscious, instructural, ego-psychology, 
id-psychology, dynamic psychology.
See Joseph D. Metarazzo, "Psychotherapeutic 
Processes," Annual Review of Psychology, XVI, ed. by Paul H, 
Farnsworth (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., I9 6 5)»
p. 1 9 5 .
^^^Carl Rogers, "Some Thoughts . . .," p. I8 5 . See 
also John M. Marshall, "The Development, Assumptions, and 
Implications of Rogerian 'Client-Centered' Psychotherapy," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Oklahoma, 1 9 6 8 ) ,
pp. 5 6-5 8 .
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3) Phenomenological, existential, self-theory, self- 
actualization, health and growth psychology, being 
and becoming, science of inner e x p e r i e n c e .118
Abraham Maslow is said to have coined the phrase
“third force" to identify the new revolution of a humanisti-
119cally oriented psychology. Maslow disparages the vague­
ness and pessimism of the "European existentialists," but 
nevertheless attaches special importance to their "stressing, 
confirming, sharpening of trends already inherent in "Third 
Force psychology." For Maslow this existentialism rests 
upon "phenomenology; i.e., it uses personal, subjective
experience as the foundation upon which abstract knowledge 
120is built." But probably the most important contribution
existentialism can make to psychology, according to Maslow,
is that it can supply psychology with "the underlying
121philosophy which it now lacks."
1XÔCarl Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," 
Behaviorism and Phenomenology; Contrasting Bases for 
Modern Psychology, ed. by ¥. T. Wann (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 1 0 9 . This paper was read at a 
conference on Behaviorism and Phenomenology at Rice Uni­
versity in 1 9 6 3 .
119Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology 
and Psychiatry, p. I6 6 . Whether coincidental.or not Erich 
Fromm reveals that the historian Prederich Borr referred to 
Renaissance humauiism as Die Dritte Kraft, "Humanism and 
Psychoanalysis," p. 7 8 .
120 Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, 
p. 9 . See his fifteen "conclusions" as to "What Psychology 
Can Learn from the Existentialists," pp. 9-15.
1 PI Ibide, p. 10.
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It is difficult to discern just who Maslow is 
referring to specifically when he mentions "European exis­
tentialists." A glance at the bibliography of Toward a 
Psychology of Being does not reveal any familiar names that 
would normally be associated with that label. This leads 
one to believe that Maslow's knowledge of existentialism 
came from secondary sources. If so, Heidegger was most 
likely identified with this group. Maslow does mention 
themes which could be taken as Heideggerian, such as authen­
ticity, dread and anguish; but regarding the last two he
says these represent an "exclusive harping . . . for which
122the only remedy seems to be to keep a stiff upper lip."
According to Spiegelberg, Bugental's The Search for
Authenticity was supposed to be "an attempt to combine a
'humanistic psychology' with existentialism without much
123explicit transatlantic borrowing." Yet, a perusal of
the contents reveals such themes as authenticity, existential- 
analysis, man's "thrown" condition, death, existential 
anxiety and guilt and dread. Heidegger's name is not men­
tioned; but, as with Maslow, it can be conjectured that 
much of what Bugental identifies as themes of existentialism 
c^n be associated with an existentialist reading of Heidegger.
l^^ibid., p. 15.
123 Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and 
Psychiatry, p. l6 ?.
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The specific assumptions of a humanistically based
psychology are outlined by Bugental in six statements. He
says that humanistic psychology cares about man, that it
values meaning more than procedure, that it looks for
human rather than non human validation, that it accepts
the relativism of all knowledge, and that it relies heavily
upon the phenomenological operation. By this he means
that "The ultimate focus of our concern is the experience
of the human being." The sixth point is that humanistic
psychology is not a denial of other views but attempts to
supplement them and give them a broader conceptual basis
124within human experience.
Post-Existence, in more contemporary terms, cen­
ters around books by Ernest Keen (Three Faces of Being),
Sidney M. Jourard (Disclosing Man to Himself) and Amedeo
125Giorgi (Psychology as a Human Science). These three do
not by any means exhaust the list of books, articles or 
authors in this post-Existence phase. They were chosen
124James F. T. Bugental, The Search for Authenticity, 
pp. 13-14. The "I-process" as described by Bugental offers 
interesting parallels with Da-sein as Lichtung. For Bugental 
the "I-process" is "undifferentiated or contentless" and is 
to be seen differently from the self which "is an object in 
the awareness of the I-process." (p. 203) Bugental employs 
the analogy of a motion picture, with its light source, film 
and screen, to help understand the I-process. (p. 205).
^^^Both the works by Jourard and Giorgi have been 
referred to earlier. The full title of Keen's work is 
Three Faces of Being; Toward an Existential Clinical Psy­
chology (New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, The Century 
Psychology Series, 1970).
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primarily as representative spokesmen for the humanistic 
movement in psychology.
In Three Faces of Being, Keen attempts to develop 
a viable psychotherapeutic technique based on the insights 
of "existential philosophy and psychology." The title 
reflects Keen's observation that Being be seen in three 
aspects. Being-in-the-world is taken by Keen as describing 
man as he is; i.e., it entails "an experience of oneself- 
as-subject. . . . "  He experiences himself as being outside 
of himself; i.e., he sees himself as engaging in activity 
directed toward externals, I desire a steak; I fear a germ; 
I think an idea. Further, Keen states that Being-in-the- 
world, "means approximately the same thing in all existen­
tial literature, although it is not usually counterposed 
to two other aspects of being." These two other aspects 
are Being-for-myself and Being-for-others. The former 
refers to the experience of oneself as object and the
latter describes the experiencing of oneself among other
126selves.
For Keen, existential psychology, following the
philosophical movement for which it was named, "places
consciousness in the center of the definition of man,
127rather than on the periphery as an epiphenomenon.
l^^Ibid., p. 27.
127%bid., p. 4.
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There are several references to Heidegger in 
Keen's book but none which are exclusively concerned with 
Heideggerian themes. Rather, the identification is made 
by implication from the use of Heideggerian language, 
similar to that found in Bugental's work. Perhaps, for 
Keen, this identification by language is fed by considerable 
attention paid to Binswanger. Boss, on the other hand, is 
mentioned only once in reference to dream analysis.
Giorgi's book is a detailed and articulate polemic 
designed to broaden the definition of science to include 
the human context from a personalistic or holistic per­
spective. This "human science" would serve as the founda­
tion for psychology not only in its clinical aspects. As 
Giorgi views it, "psychology has the responsibility to 
investigate the full range of behavior and experience of 
man as a person in such a way that the aims of science are 
fulfilled but that these aims should not be implemented
128primarily in terms of criteria of the natural sciences."
The human science "approach" rests on three basic 
presuppositions. There must be a sustained "fidelity to 
the phenomenon of man as a person." This is designed to 
counter reductionistic tendencies while at the same time 
upholding the canons of rigor, consistency and systematic 
methodological procedure. The second presupposition is a
128Giorgi, Psychology as a Human Science, p. xii.
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"special concern for uniquely human phenomena." For 
Giorgi, this presupposition was introduced by the revela­
tion of human order by Merleau-Ponty, where human order 
phenomena are irreducible and hence unique. The third 
presupposition is that of the "primacy of relationships." 
This refers to the primary relation of man and world, i.e.,
whatever phenomenon is considered, it must be seen as
129already involving both man and world.
In his work there is no reference to Heidegger, 
only one to Boss but several to Binswanger. Unlike Keen 
and Bugental there is no implicit reference to Heidegger 
via language. The work itself seems to be more directly 
influenced by phenomenology (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) 
and the themes of existential philosophy seem to appear in 
a derivative sense with exclusive identification going to 
"third force" or humanistic psychology.
The reason for citing Jourard's book last, even 
though, among the three, it was published first, is because 
it introduces new elements. Specifically, Jourard intro­
duces the notion of "letting be." Man is basically a 
"concept-maker"; i.e., he forms concepts--abstractions--of 
the world and himself. But concepts have a way of closing 
off the disclosures that the objects give; i.e., we "let 
the object disclose" enough of itself so that it can be
^^^Ibid., pp. 185-186.
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"rubricized" into a category. Yet, when concepts are put 
aside and phenomena are left to "disclose themselves to
130us" we find that when reforming concepts we have grown. 
Further, man compartmentalizes experience and in doing so 
mutilates it. "He separates his experience of his 'mind' 
from his experience of his body, and produces the perni­
cious and perennial dualism that impedes our attainment
of harmony with our world. And by conceptualizing the
131world, man freezes it."
Man lives in a capsule of his own making as a result 
of his compartmentalization, categorization, and concep­
tualization. Yet man is able to "transcend" the capsule 
by "letting be." This "letting be" can occur not only in
the perceptual realm of experience but in thinking, remem-
132bering and learning as well.
Jourard further contends that modern science seeks 
to understand nature in order to manipulate and control.
But when this scheme is applied to man, his ontological 
status as a person changes into that of a thing. As Jourard 
sees it, this transmutation of man into thinghood has been
going on for several centuries of Western history but seems
133to be increasing at an accelerated pace.
^^^Jourard, Disclosing Man to Himself, pp. 156-157. 
See also pp. 218-219»
^^^Ibid., p. 1 ?6 .
^^^Ibid., pp. 2 0 7-2 1 2.
l^^Ibid., p. 189.
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In one of Jourard's two references to Heidegger he
identifies Heidegger as an existentialist when he says, "I
agree with existentialist thinkers that every man chooses
13 4
his way of being in the world." He further tacitly
accepts the existential understandings of Heidegger when 
he accepts as his model, or "metamodel," a perspective of 
man "such that in his being, his being is in question."
135Jourard identifies this as coming from William A. Luijpen.
It is apparent that Jourard, as well as those psy­
chologists previously cited, has seen and presented a 
Heidegger that is antithetical, for the most part, to what 
has been disclosed in this dissertation. Does this mean 
that the Heidegger as presented here has nothing to say to 
psychology and that any relevance to psychology must be 
seen through a distortion? To the contrary, what Heidegger 
has to say to psychology may be more original and/or funda­
mental than what was originally adduced in his name. What 
follows is an attempt to disclose this more original rele­
vance .
In Being and Time, Heidegger refers to logic as 
being founded on an ontology of extantness (Vorhanden) and
one which is still "rough." He further states that reforms
134
 ^ Ibid., p. 52.
13 5Ibid., p. 114, and William A. Luijpen, Existen- 
tial Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
I960).
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in this logic reforms ’’oriented towards the 'humane sci­
ences,' . . . "  manage only to increase the ontological
136confusion.
By "humane sciences" it is obvious that Heidegger 
means those sciences dealing with man. But when he refers 
to "reforms" in logic, does he mean an attempt to take into 
consideration man's humaneness; i.e., to see man distinct 
from things? Can we, at this point, legitimately infer 
that the reforms that have been evolving in psychology 
are similar to what Heidegger is referring to? If so, 
then what he has to say on this matter bears directly on 
the attempt by some psychologists to re-evaluate their 
approach to the question of the behavior and nature of man.
Heidegger offers historiology as an example of a 
"humane science." It is a science which investigates
137history (history being that which actually happens).
When that which takes place, history, is treated as an
object of a science, "the basic phenomenon of history,
which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology
1 «% o
and underlies it has been irretrievably put aside."
l^^Heidegger, E & T, p. l6?; H, 129.
137We are following MacQuarrie and Robinson's trans­
lations of Historié as the science of history and Geschichte 
as the kind of history that "actually happens." Ibid., 
p. 3 0 , ftn. 1.
^^^Ibid., p. 427; H, 3 7 5 . In What Is Called Thinking? 
Heidegger states: "Historical science may thoroughly
explore a period . . .  in every possible respect, and yet
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Science which operates with the logic of extantness can
only treat its "object" as object and in so doing history
as "living" (being) is "put aside." History, as that which
actually happens, happens prior to any thematizing about
it, and when thematized it becomes frozen--as object--and
139loses its phenomenality as "living" (Being).
For Heidegger every science "is constituted pri-
1^0marily by thematizing." To thematize is to project
that which is pre-scientifically familiar to Da-sein into
the Being which is specific to it. To do so is to "bound
off" the projected entities by making them objects. In
this manner they are then manageable and "'managed'
methodologically, emd the conceptual structure for inter-
141preting them is outlined." Yet, in so thematizing; i.e.,
in treating the phenomenon as object, the phenomenon.
never explore what history is. It cannot do so, scientifi­
cally. By way of history, a man will never find out what 
history is. . . ." pp. 32-33- Heidegger is saying that 
the essence of science— whether it be history, art, poetry, 
nature, man or even God--remains inaccessible to science. 
And it is this essence which is the concern of thinking.
In the language of Being and Time, thinking is more or less 
synonymous with phenomenology. "Thinking means: letting-
lie-before-us and so taking-to-heart also: beings in
being." p. 224. Essence is synonymous with beingness.
^^^The equation of "living" with "being" should not 
be overly stressed. What is intended is the on-going 
process, "way of being" of that which is.
l^Oibid., p. 445; H, 393.
l^^Ibid.
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which is prior to this thematizing in its Beingness, is 
put aside.
But does this necessarily block us from revealing
historicality? Not if it is carried out "phenomenologi-
cally"; i.e., an interrogation of historicality should
capture the Being of historicality despite the tendency
of Da-sein to cover it up. "The existential-ontological
constitution of historicality has been covered up by the
1^2way Dasein's history is ordinarily interpreted. . . . "
What does it mean to be thematized, to be set off 
as object? We have seen that for Heidegger to make some­
thing an object does not exhaust its Beingness, nor is its 
Being exhausted when made a value. In seeing the thing as 
object not only is its Being covered up, when "valued" it
becomes the "object" for an evaluating subject, it is sub-
1^3jectivized and thereby loses its own Being.
Psychology studies, among other things, the behavior 
or man, which is his own behavior. Bpt by becoming an 
object his fundamental behavior, which is prior to any 
thematizing about it, is put aside, primarily so that the 
object of study can become "manageable." Even when "cor­
rections" are made in the "logic" of this study, it still
Ibid., p. 428; H, 376. "Historicality" refers 
to the kind of being which belongs to the historical; i.e., 
history.
^^^See p. 24l above; also Heidegger, "Letter on
Humanism," pp. 214-215»
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thematizcs. Even when its object is valued, the study 
subjectivizes and thereby covers up the Being of that 
phenomenon which it started out to study.
Existential humanistic psychology studies, makes 
an object of, the behavior of man for whom the psychologist 
values. Man is unique, both as a species and individually, 
he is a person and each is to be seen in his wholeness.
The humanistic approach presupposes not only the human as 
value but the human as man; i.e., man in his "Nature." The 
very nature of value and valuing presupposes man in his 
nature as that which values. But what about value? A 
value is nothing in itself if it cannot be stated what it 
actually is. The humanistic approach starts with an object, 
man--whose "Nature” is predetermined--"which" is valued and 
then proceeds from there. This approach leaves the Being 
of its valued object suspended; i.e., it does not interro­
gate the meaning of value or valuing which it uses. Human­
istic psychology, like its adopted philosophy, existential­
ism, "hangs in the air." By this is meant that the basic 
characteristics (ontological) of what is being studied have 
not been allowed to unfold. What is being investigated is 
thematized.
Whereas the natural sciences base themselves on pre- 
scientific "articles of faith"— basic presuppositions--the 
existential psychologists have tried to make their pre­
suppositions explicit; i.e., they have formulated elaborate
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descriptions as to the worth, dignity, wholeness and 
value of man. But to replace the value of articles of 
faith with the value of human personhood is still a value. 
The " . . .  behavioral sciences have up to now actually 
left the whole dimension of human values hanging in the 
air.
Existential psychology, in recognizing man's unique­
ness and wholeness extended the "progress" of science by 
attempting to re-humanize the dehumanized apparatus-like 
conceptions of other psychologies. In doing so the exis­
tential psychologists recognized the "evaluative nature" 
of man and as a consequence explicitly entered the dimen­
sion of values. Yet in seeing man in his wholeness, in 
accepting him as evaluative, in seeing his responsible and 
full behavioral possibilities, it was (and is) generally 
believed that these qualities represent a new super-personal 
psychic layer imposed on an already tacitly accepted bodily, 
instinctive and emotional ground. But questions as to how 
these psychic layers of such different qualities can com­
municate, have intercourse and reveal meaning, are left 
unanswered.
The values endorsed by existential psychologists, 
such as uniqueness and wholeness, and are supposed to be 
dwelling within these psychic layers, are not questioned as
p. 6 1.
l44Medard Boss, "What Makes Us Behave at all Socially?"
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to their essence. These values are taken as mere formal
definitions of human beingness. But, questions as to the
fvuidaunental characteristics as well as origin of these
values are left unanswered. This is why Boss can say,
l4'î
"They hang in the air."
The humanistic approach in psychology has answered 
the question as to the nature of man and has by its answer 
assumed that the uniqueness of its subject-matter lies in 
its valued wholeness. However worthy this may be, recap­
turing the dignity of man from harsh reductive methodolo­
gies, however proper this may be in respect to man's "total" 
behavioral possibilities, the Being of man; i.e., his funda­
mental characteristics (ontological) have not, for the most 
part, been laid bare. Basically this means that we, the 
scientists, are still telling the objects of our investi­
gation what they are, what kind of intellectual inferences 
we have made about them including our estimation of their 
worth or value to us. This is still paradigmatic of 
thematizing.
Humanistic existential psychology, even with its 
talk of human personality, responsibility, and freedom, is 
basically ungrounded. It has not adequately interpreted 
the phenomenological-ontological admonition "back to the 
things themselves." It still perpetuates, but in a more
l^^Ibid., p. 61.
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subtle way, the operation of the natural sciences which 
attempt to impose on the objects pre-conceived criteria of 
meaning, whether that meaning be in the form of a tacitly 
held pre-scientific attitude towards the world, or an 
explicitly endorsed set of descriptive values.
Since values and valuation are unclear as to their 
essence, they cannot function as the fundamental basis or 
ground for the behavioral sciences. But, just as Heidegger 
claims that historicality can become transparent phenomeno- 
logically so too can the "object" of the behavioral sci­
ences. The phenomenological {Daseinsanalytic) approach, 
however, is not to be seen as another scientific doctrine 
supporting a psychological or philosophical theory. By 
following a phenomenological procedure of disclosiveness 
the scientist refrains from all artificial theories and 
conceptually produced distortions.
Daseinsanalytic disclosures reveal that the phe­
nomena of the world come to be by "announcing" themselves 
"within" the world-openness which man as Da-sein is. These 
phenomena claim u s , as Da-seins, as that which reveals and 
discloses them, however restricted that disclosure may be. 
This is what Heidegger means when he refers to man as the 
guardian or shepherd of Beingness. It is this which becomes 
the basis, the fundamental characteristic, of inan and as
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14:6such the basis of ethics and value. It is the "call
as claim" to "let be" of phenomena. Freedom, understood 
fundamentally, becomes that ability to choose either to 
comply with the call to let phenomena reveal themselves or 
not to comply. To comply, to let be, is to reveal the p he­
nomenon in all its richness; not to comply is to impose on 
the phenomenon preconceived criteria of knowing which auto­
matically bind it. It is this "call as claim" to which 
man is fundamentally responsible.
Existential psychology, in its attempt to re-claim 
the dignity of man from the reductive methodologies of the 
natural scientific model is merely substituting one explana­
tory model for another. Both approaches are essentially 
ways of relating to the world. But, unless either approach 
can ground itself on an ontological disclosure of man, it 
will find itself endorsing a particular set of values as 
opposed to another set; in other words, it will "hang in 
the air."
The Daseinsanalytic orientation far from trying to 
destroy or undermine the natural scientific model or the 
humanistic model is attempting to reveal these essentially 
as ways of relating to the world. As such, they are two of
146 Boss says that the hierarchy of ethics and values, 
"is determined by the respective degree of each concrete 
human behavior's potentiality to serve as the disclosing 
realm into which the encountered phenomena may shine forth 
and unfold its own meaning content." Ibid. , p. 6?.
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many ways of relating. The important issue for Daseins- 
analysis is how this relating is possible, what ar« its 
characteristics, and how can we better understand it. This 
understanding constitutes the ground, that which makes 
possible all kinds of relating. The ground is the Being­
ness of Da-sein.
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